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Abstract 
This thesis critically examines some of the plays of the playwright, screenwriter and 
poet, Harold Pinter, in order to argue, first of all, that he was a writer of psychological 
realism, and that his oeuvre can, in the main, be defined as a body of psycho-political 
works. My essential contention is that Pinter’s defining interest in power relations, 
coupled with his dedication to exploring how psychological ‘realities’ shape these 
said relations, implies that he is a playwright, who generally wrote psycho-political 
works. 
 
In the main body of the thesis, I then offer eight close readings of Pinter’s plays, 
which are essentially informed, in their respective ways, by theories drawn from the 
post-Freudian school of thought, most notably Winnicottian object-relations theory 
(indeed, the common feature of these otherwise disparate theories are that they all 
explore how the self is constituted and/or influenced by its relationship with the 
other). Whilst there were a number of themes that could have been selected, my 
decision to focus on the themes of authoritarianism, territoriality and of patriarchy 
was not arbitrary. Apart from an appeal to quantitative considerations (i.e., that these 
themes recur again and again at different stages of Pinter’s career), my main reason 
for including them is that they are defining features of power relationships in general. 
For example, if one construes power as ‘power-over’ others, then a psycho-political 
exploration of power necessitates that the malignant form of authority (i.e., 
authoritarianism) be examined; likewise, if sexual politics involves, as Pinter, for one, 
contends, power reified as the possession of a particular sex (i.e., patriarchy), then 
again this suggests that this theme is of central importance in the psycho-political 
taxonomy of power.  
 
The final part of the thesis explains how the three central themes can be considered to 
be inter-related in general and in Pinter’s work in particular. Furthermore, the thesis 
conclusion also provides several possible criticisms of Pinter’s psycho-political 
approach to power (e.g., a social materialist position contends that ‘psychologising’ 
power relations obscures the central importance of how distal powers construct 
oppressive political relationships).        
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this introductory chapter, I intend to argue, first and foremost, that Harold Pinter’s 
plays are works of psychological realism. My approach is to begin by defining two 
important, and seemingly divergent dramatic traditions (absurdism/social realism), as 
I believe that one of the main reasons for Pinter’s originality was that he integrated, 
albeit unintentionally,1 stylistic and thematic features which belonged to these 
different genres. 
Once I have explained how the dramatic form of his plays emerges organically 
from a selective integration of these traditions, I then proceed to characterize his 
works in a more precise fashion. In particular, I will argue that much of his oeuvre 
consists of what could be called ‘psycho-political’ works, mainly because, as Robert 
Gordon puts it, ‘The ceaseless desire for power is the prime motor for the action in 
almost all of Pinter’s drama’.2 Although I will shortly explore this matter in more 
detail, I believe that, providing we accept that Pinter wrote psychologically realistic 
plays, it is but a small step to see why his oeuvre mainly consists of psycho-political 
works. This is because power is an inherently political theme (perhaps the political 
theme par excellence), and so Pinter’s fidelity to this theme, combined with his 
particular, one might almost say obsessive, emphasis on the psychological dimensions 
of the dialectic of dominance/subservience, defines the nature of his work as psycho-
political. 
                                                 
1 There are two main reasons why it is unlikely that Pinter deliberately integrated features of social 
realism with absurdism. Firstly, Randall Stevenson quite rightly argues that Pinter was more influenced 
by the modernist novel than by plays (‘Harold Pinter–Innovator?’ in Harold Pinter: You Never Heard 
Such Silence, ed. by Alan Bold (London: Vision Press, 1984), pp.29-60 (p.29)).  Secondly, these new 
and rather subversive dramatic forms were emerging at roughly the same time as Pinter was penning 
his own works.    
 
2 Robert Gordon, Harold Pinter: The Theatre of Power (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 
2013), pp. 1-2.  
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In the final part of this chapter, I consider alternative ways of reading Pinter’s 
oeuvre. Most of what I shall describe will be relevant in as far as it allows me to 
define for my readers certain key concepts that are integral to my own reading. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, I have chosen to read his work from a psychoanalytical 
perspective, as I see this approach as one of the most respectful of Pinter’s emphasis 
on the psychological dimensions of power relations. More fully, as the reader will 
note as he follows my argument, although I utilise some standard Freudian ideas, I am 
essentially nomadic in my appropriation of psychoanalytical theory, since I wish to be 
respectful to what I interpret as the psycho-political subtlety of the individual plays 
that are analysed herein. Nevertheless, since psycho-political drama shows how the 
interpersonal domain shapes, and is shaped by psychological factors, theories from 
the object-relations school of psychoanalysis will constitute much of the critical 
repertoire that I draw upon, as this particular tradition examines relationships in terms 
of relational needs and phantasies 
Dramatic Form: Pinter’s psychological realism 
When Pinter first started writing plays in the late 1950s, two different theatrical 
movements challenged ticket office orthodoxy, as they sought, in their respective 
ways, to undermine the worldview of the bourgeois naturalistic play. What united 
these dramatists was the conviction that the ‘drawing room’ play ‘represented the 
ingrained, unthinking conservatism of the comfortable English middle classes’3, as 
such works never subverted, in the final analysis, middle-class values, since they 
portrayed, with a fidelity to detail, the mores and morals of this class. These new 
dramatists either believed that West-end standard fare refused to engage with the great 
existential questions of the age or they construed such plays as guilty of a failure to 
                                                 
3 David Pattie, Modern British Playwrighting: The 1950s: Voices, Documents, New Interpretations 
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), p. 122.   
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examine class divisions, and how they impacted on the lives of working-class British 
people. In short, neither of these movements placed much value on ‘mere’ 
entertainment.   
The first of these dramatic traditions came to be classified, for reasons shortly 
to be explained, as absurdist drama. In this particular case, these writers’4 dramatic 
imaginations were inspired by a metaphysical dilemma that had become, in the post-
war years, a timely social problem. Since the period of the Enlightenment in the 
eighteenth century, European society had found its direction, its sense of purpose 
from what postmodernists term ‘grand narratives’, as these narratives, with their 
positing of an ultimate goal, legitimized progress and acted as the guarantor of 
meaning. After the Second World War, however, the modernist subject suffered an 
acute crisis of confidence, as adhering to these supposedly rational grand narratives 
had led to the most irrational and terrifying of outcomes: rationality and utility had 
formed an inextricable and unholy alliance, which culminated in millions of people 
having been slaughtered in concentration camps. As Martin Esslin explains, these 
zeitgeist trends helped to form the premises upon which absurdist theatre is based: 
 
The hallmark of absurdist theatre is that the certitudes and unshakeable basic 
assumptions of former ages had been swept away, that they had been tested 
and found wanting, that they have been discredited as cheap and somewhat 
childish illusions…All of this was shattered by the war.5 
 
                                                 
4 Two of the most distinguished writers in this tradition are Eugene Ionesco (1909-1994) and Samuel 
Beckett (1906-1989). Their most famous works are, respectively, Rhinoceros (1959) and Waiting for 
Godot (1953). 
5 Martin Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd (New York: Vintage-Random, 1961), pp. xviii-xx. 
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As Esslin intimates, these absurdist writers presented audiences with a powerfully 
discomforting vision of life, where existence, in the metaphysical sense, was 
perceived to be meaningless, as basic assumptions about the world’s purposefulness 
had been challenged; indeed, these playwrights portrayed the search for a 
transcendentally meaningful life as a delusive escape from encroaching despair, and, 
as such, any remedy was seen as a hubristic attempt to flee from a world that was now 
known to be unyieldingly indifferent to the human plight. 
If it was the case that absurdist theatre constituted a new, if somewhat 
disconcerting, addition to the British theatrical landscape, then the other movement, 
known as ‘kitchen sink’ realism, can seem like a less radical departure from the 
bourgeois naturalist play, since the emphasis remains on a realistic portrayal of what 
is perceived, by the playwright, as social reality. In some respects this criticism may 
be true, because, unlike absurdist theatre, social realism was not provocative primarily 
due to its seemingly bizarre dramatic form; yet, social realists, such as John Osborne6, 
would no doubt have classified the metaphysical musings of the absurdists as 
reactionary, since his group wished to be provocative through laying bare the nature 
of British class conflict. As the phrase ‘kitchen sink’ drama encapsulates, these 
playwrights sought to show middle-class audiences, who were used to ‘soporific and 
comfortingly familiar plays’7, what it is like to live at the gritty, subsistence level. 
Furthermore, and above all else, such playwrights wanted to show these middle-class 
audiences that they were the haves, who were, as they sat comfortably in their 
expensive theatre seats, watching the trials and tribulations of the have-nots. Thus, the 
fundamental challenge posed by this drama was this: middle-class complacency rests 
upon material privilege, which, in turn, is founded upon material exploitation.                 
                                                 
6 His play, Look Back in Anger (1956) is seen as a defining work in this genre. 
7 Pattie, p.122. 
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When Pinter’s first few plays were produced, it is no surprise that most critics 
overlooked, or misinterpreted his originality, as there was a tendency to label what 
was subversive as being an example of either absurdist or social realist drama. For 
example, after a 1958 production of The Birthday Party, a critic wrote in The 
Cambridge Review that Pinter was inclined towards absurdism, and that he was 
indebted to Ionesco’s theatrical innovations: 
 
Mr. Pinter is a lively and assimilative new talent, and his play, originally 
announced under the balder title of The Party, owes much to Ionesco, whose 
influence on British theatre may ultimately prove insidious as it now seems, to 
those sated with West End dreariness, as promising.8  
 
Irrespective of whether this drama critic is correct or not about Ionesco’s influence   
upon the young Pinter, this reviewer is nevertheless wrong in categorizing the 
playwright as an absurdist writer, even at the time that Pinter wrote The Birthday 
Party. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, Pinter is a political writer, which means, 
by definition, that he believes that oppression matters, and that suffering is not merely 
‘senseless’ or ‘absurd’; rather the kind of suffering that is caused by overt violence, or 
the more insidious attack on the integrity and autonomy of the self, is what interests 
this writer.  As Robert Gordon puts it: 
 
Whether, as more recently, concerned with state abuses of power, or with the 
micropolitics of human relations that constitute the key motif of his work until 
1981, much of Pinter’s drama examines both the brute reality and the language 
                                                 
8 ‘Review from the “Cambridge Review”, http://www.haroldpinter.org/plays/plays_bdayparty.shtml 
[accessed 3 April 2015] 
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of power, so that a paradoxical continuity can be traced from his early–
apparently apolitical–attitude, and his later, explicitly political plays.9 
 
Secondly, if we are to consider the dramatic form of the Pinter play, it shows little 
sign of being constructed to portray an absurdist vision of life. Although Esslin 
included Pinter in his seminal and defining study of the genre, entitled Theatre of the 
Absurd (1961), his own summarising of the salient differences between the ‘good’ 
play (his ironic term for the ‘well-made’ (or well-behaved) bourgeois realistic play) 
and absurdist works implicitly rules out the playwright: 
 
If a good play must have a cleverly constructed story, these have no story or 
plot to speak of; if a good play is judged by subtlety of characterization and 
motivation, these are often without recognizable characters and present the 
audience with almost mechanical puppets; if a good play is to hold the mirror 
up to nature and portray the manners and mannerisms of the age in finely 
observed sketches, these often seem to be the reflections of dreams and 
nightmares; if a good play relies on witty repartee and pointed dialogue, these 
often consist of incoherent ramblings.10        
 
Even a cursory examination of Pinter’s work shows that they possess a plot, that they 
contain characters that are clearly individuated, each with a degree of internal 
consistency, and that they feature dialogue that is rich with meaningful subtext. In 
essence, one of the main reasons that Pinter does not adopt the absurdist form is that 
he wishes to maintain the conventional connection between action and character 
                                                 
9 Gordon, p.3.  
10 Esslin, p.4.  
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psychology, as the meaning of his characters’ actions are in principle intelligible 
(even if, as is so often the case, they try to frustrate being known by speaking in an 
elliptical fashion).    
 Still, it is understandable why critics did (and still do) miscategorise Pinter as 
an absurdist writer. Pinter’s plays not only refuse, like traditional linear drama, to 
offer any kind of clearly defined resolution, but also their emotional impact often 
suggests the absurdist’s aim of reflecting the seemingly irrational sphere of life, 
namely the realm of ‘dreams and nightmares’. In Esslin’s discussion of Ionesco, he 
provides a cogent explanation for this kind of ‘evocative’ effect, as he argues that it is 
‘by combining …evocative emotional images into more and more complex 
structures’11 that theatre is transformed ‘into an instrument for the transmission of 
more complex human situations and experiences’.12 In other words, in such plays, the 
intangible realities of life (feelings and motivations) are conveyed through the 
changing repetition of key iconic images, which creates overall a unity (or 
‘condensation’) of thematic meaning.13 Although I will return to this issue later, it is 
the case that Pinter’s plays are often ‘symbolically charged’ on a macro and micro 
level, suggesting a close affinity with absurdist theatre’s desire to convey complex 
emotional states, which are never explicitly stated.    
 Whilst the absurdist label proved misleading in many respects, this 
nevertheless did not mean that Pinter was straightforwardly a member of the school of 
                                                 
11 Esslin, p.155. 
12 Esslin, p.155. 
13 This idea of ‘changing repetition’ may sound paradoxical, but what it implies is that certain images 
may accrue meaning by recurring in different contexts, such that their thematic import is gradually 
modified and elaborated upon over the course of the play. For example, at the beginning of A Slight 
Ache, Edward’s pain around the eyes can be taken literally; however, over the course of the play, his 
encounter with the blind matchseller lends it new meanings, as it becomes a signifier of his 
encroaching old age and death, and of his hubristic refusal to acquire in-‘sight’ into his own psyche.  
 12 
social realism either. Yet some critics did fall into this critical ‘trap’, which was easy 
to do, for reasons that Randall Stevenson articulates: 
 
The prior appearance of such ‘kitchen sink’ domestic realism in the work of 
Osborne and other ‘Angry Young Men’ led some early critics to associate with 
them the shabby milieu of Pinter’s plays, and his meticulous reproduction of a 
range of speech patterns, including those of the lower classes, and of down-
and-outs.14   
 
It is true that early plays, such as The Caretaker (1960), do portray ‘shabby’ milieus, 
but the label of social realism refuses to ‘stick’ to the works themselves for two main 
reasons. Firstly, Pinter was never entirely invested in portraying the world of the 
working classes, as even his early plays, like A Slight Ache (1960), depict middle-
class life. Secondly, and more tellingly, Pinter’s plays do not quite explore, as the 
social realists do, the ‘dialectic between an individual’s subjectivity and objective 
reality’.15 To translate this into more prosaic terms, and, at the risk of caricature, the 
social realists chart out their plays according to the following schema: event  
reaction (motive)  action. This schema cannot, however, be mapped onto Pinter’s 
plays without obscuring a central aspect of his work: what he explores is not so much 
how his characters adapt to (or conflict with) objective social reality, but rather how 
their ‘reality’ is an ‘in-between’ (or transitional) construction, consisting of a merging 
of what is found, and what is phantasmal. Thus, for reasons to be discussed shortly, 
Pinter’s emphasis lies with examining the psychological preconditions for certain 
power relations, as those power relations are not primarily explored as objective 
                                                 
14 Randall Stevenson, p.50.  
15 Georg Lukacs, ‘The Ideology of Modernism’, in the Lukacs Reader: A Survey, ed. by Arpad Kadarky 
(London: Blackwell, 2002), pp.187-210 (p.192).  
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realities (although they do, of course, exist), but as phantasmally-infused political 
relationships.       
  Since Pinter’s work seems to stubbornly resist easy critical classification, I 
believe that it is helpful to turn one’s attention to what the playwright himself has said 
about his dramas. Whilst Pinter dislikes labels, seeing them as a straightjacket that the 
author must escape from, he did make a seemingly defining statement that has 
subsequently become a bone for the critic to chew on: in an interview, the playwright 
remarked, ‘What goes on in my plays is realistic, but what I’m doing is not realism’.16 
This is indeed an intriguing, and initially somewhat enigmatic statement from the 
playwright, as Pinter notably commits to verisimilitude, which is one of the defining 
features of any kind of realism. For example, in his 1962 speech at Bristol University, 
he says that it is his willingness to explore a set of characters, situated in a specific 
social milieu, which provides him with the impetus to start writing a play:    
 
I have usually begun a play in quite a simple manner; found a couple of 
characters in a particular context, thrown them together and listened to what 
they said, keeping my nose to the ground. The context has always been, for 
me, concrete and particular, and the characters concrete also. I’ve never started 
a play from any kind of abstract idea or theory and never envisaged my own 
characters as messengers of death, doom, heaven or the milky way or, in other 
words, as allegorical representations of any particular force, whatever that may 
mean.17       
 
                                                 
16 Harold Pinter, qtd in Ronald Knowles’, ‘Pinter and Twentieth Century Drama’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Harold Pinter, ed. by Peter Raby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.75. 
17 Pinter, ‘Between the Lines’, The Sunday Times (4 March 1962), reprinted in Harold Pinter: Plays: 1 
(London: Faber, 1991), p. ix. 
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Pinter’s working ‘method’ (if it can be called that) seems congruent with the aims of 
realism, as he shows a marked loyalty to depicting a concrete, recognisable world, 
which implies that he is aiming for a certain kind of accuracy of presentation. My 
view is that Pinter’s statement makes most sense if we interpret his approach as 
distinct from social realism (which, I believe, he equates with realism), and see his 
fidelity to actuality arising from his commitment to portraying psychological realities. 
J. Chesley Taylor and G.R. Thompson helpfully define this kind of drama, known as 
‘psychological realism’: 
 
In addition to suggesting the accurate rendering of concrete details from man’s 
physical environment, [psychological realism] refers to the detailed, 
sometimes almost clinical fashion in which man’s inner world of emotions and 
mental processes is examined.  The great significance of the drama of 
psychological realism, then, is that it subordinates all of man’s external reality 
to the internal reality of his psychological self.18 
 
Taylor and Thompson’s most significant remark in this passage is that psychological 
realism ‘subordinates all of man’s external reality to the internal reality of his 
psychological self’. When it comes to drama, this would be a curious, and very 
difficult position for a dramatist to adopt if taken too literally, as dramatic conflict 
remains the pre-eminent reality; in fact, unlike the modernist ‘interior’ novel, 
psychologically realistic drama explores how the ‘outer’ world of relationships and 
conflicts is determined by the ‘primary’ reality of the inner life.19 In the case of Pinter, 
                                                 
18 J. Chesley Taylor and G.R. Thompson, Ritual, Realism and Revolt: Major Traditions in the Drama 
(New York: Scribner, 1972), p. 244. 
19 Remarking about the characters in The Homecoming, Pinter said, ‘Still, they aren’t acting arbitrarily, 
but for very deep-seated reasons’ (qtd. in Victor L Cahn’s Gender and Power in the Plays of Harold 
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one can observe such features in his work, as there is an ‘accurate rendering of 
concrete details from man’s physical environment’, but this fidelity to detail serves 
the purpose of exploring how these familiar and pervasive relationships are 
influenced, and to a significant extent, constituted by particular psychological 
realities.   
Since Pinter writes psychological realistic plays, there is still the unanswered 
question of why the playwright contrasted realism with realistic, as this suggests that 
his oeuvre is stylized in some unarticulated fashion that precludes, in his view, the 
possibility of them being works of social realism. To define this ‘stylization’, we can 
consider T.S. Eliot’s definition of ‘poetic drama’:   
 
It [poetic drama] should remove the surface of things, expose the underneath, 
or the inside, of the natural surface appearance. It may allow the characters to 
behave inconsistently, but only with respect to a deeper consistency. It may 
use any device to show their real feelings and volitions, instead of just what, in 
actual life, they would normally profess or be conscious of.20    
 
Although Eliot’s rich description of ‘poetic drama’ does not explicitly mention 
psychological realism, it is clear that they have to be equivalent, as any extensive and 
realistic dramatization of the inner life must draw upon literary tropes to convey 
subtle and complex emotional realities, which are hard to capture discursively. As 
Eliot articulates, poetic drama, like psychological realism, adheres to a metaphysics of 
‘depth’, as it is a dramatic form that implies ‘interiors’ and ‘hidden depths’, which 
                                                                                                                                            
Pinter, 2nd edn (Oregon: Resource Publications, 2011), p.12). This statement also applies to most of his 
other characters, as they too are motivated by their elemental needs.  
20 T.S. Eliot, qtd in F.O. Matthiessen’s, The Achievement of T.S. Eliot (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1959), p.155. 
 16 
suggests that the world of outer action becomes symbolically representative of the 
reality of what is happening ‘within’. Now, since this kind of drama relies upon the 
connotative force of language and action, this implies that what is said and what is 
done begins to acquire, over the course of the play, a symbolic charge that is faithful 
to inner realities, but cannot always be taken, in terms of action, as being literally true; 
in other words, when a Pinter play seems to take a bizarre and almost inexplicable 
turn, this is because the inciting incident may appear to be social realism, but, as the 
inner reality is elaborated upon and perhaps transformed, the action becomes a 
‘realistic objective correlative’ of those conflictual motives, and deep-seated 
phantasies. For example, Rose’s blindness in The Room (1957) cannot be taken to be 
literally true, in terms of an actual physical condition; instead, it conveys how the 
protagonist has returned to a state of self-deception that makes her ‘blind’ to any self-
knowledge that she has painfully acquired.    
  At this juncture it is worthwhile to examine further how Pinter conveys the 
underlying inner worlds of his characters. In my view, he does this in four main ways. 
Firstly, like his absurdist counterparts, he creates actions that coalesce into symbols 
that are rich in their associations about the inner life; where he differs, however, from 
these contemporaries, is that his symbolic meanings do not portray, so abstractly, any 
grand postulate about existence, nor do they posit the inherent unintelligibility of life 
and of the self. Rather, Pinter’s symbolic meanings intend to convey, as Eliot 
suggests, the underlying consistency of the inner life, even if that means invoking the 
idea of unconscious motives and feelings. Secondly, Pinter uses the rhythms of 
demotic speech to convey not only a literal meaning, but also a symbolic rendering of 
a character’s inner life. F.J. Bernhard writes: 
 
 17 
Any single line of dialogue might be taken as realistic prose. But in the 
construction of the play as a whole, the words have a consistent rhythmic 
construction and a symbolic charge that lift them beyond conventional 
realism.21 
 
As Bernhard’s remark intimates, it is this ‘symbolic charge’ that moves Pinter’s plays 
‘beyond conventional realism’ into the realm of psychological realism, as the dialogue 
points to what lies ‘underneath’ in a character’s psyche. Indeed, one can see how this 
stylistic device could serve the purpose of signifying what is, in a psychological 
sense, hidden, as this kind of dialogue mimics, in a heightened form, how repressed 
ideas, containing their own ‘charged’ energy, recur in a person’s speech, yet they may 
never assume any directly conscious form. Thirdly, Pinter’s characters are fond of 
telling narratives that either constitute an attempt to keep the other at bay and/or 
provide some substantiality for an otherwise precarious identity. Such narratives also 
often contain a ‘latent’ meaning that can be revelatory about the character’s deeper 
needs and phantasies. Finally, Pinter’s characteristic use of pauses and silences 
punctuate the dialogue, and leave ‘space’ for inferred meaning. In the following 
passage, Pinter himself explains why he uses these rhetorical devices in his work: 
 
You and I, the characters which grow on a page, most of the time we’re 
inexpressive, giving little away, unreliable, elusive, evasive, obstructive, 
unwilling. A language, I repeat, where under what is said, another thing is 
being said.22 
 
                                                 
21 F.J. Bernhard, ‘Beyond Realism: The Plays of Harold Pinter’, Modern Drama VIII (1954), 185-191 
(p. 185). 
22 Pinter, Plays 1, p.xiii. 
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Any audience member watching a Pinter play will observe that even if the characters 
have their garrulous moments, they all, without exception, exhibit a paranoiac 
reticence when it comes to their psychological vulnerabilities, as they see life as a 
jungle, where such exposure could allow another to assume dominance. Pinter’s 
pauses and silences therefore ‘speak’, as they tell an otherwise untold tale of 
insecurity; indeed, their connotative force comes from the fact that they point to the 
‘landmines’ that are buried deep in the psyche, and thus, through omission, they draw 
attention, like a selectively darkened room, to the fact that something is ‘hidden’ from 
view.  
Pinter as a psycho-political writer 
In his study, British and Irish Political Drama in the Twentieth Century, David Ian 
Rabey makes the following distinction between social and political drama: social 
drama ‘purports to act as an impartial report on social relations, or to focus on specific 
social abuses, without stepping over into an attack on the fundamentals of society in 
question’23; in contrast, political drama ‘views specific social abuses as symptomatic 
of a deeper illness, namely injustice and anomalies at the heart of society’s basic 
power structure’.24 Apparently Rabey is making the claim that political drama is 
essentially a more ‘penetrating’ form of writing than social drama, as the former seeks 
to locate and portray the ‘underlying’ insidious power structures. My question would 
be this: can the portrayal of a specific social abuse omit the examination of 
‘underlying’ power structures? The answer I believe is ‘no’, for the reason that, if a 
playwright portrays a social abuse, then it is necessary for him to depict, at least to 
some degree, the relevant power structures that directly caused the abuse (i.e., a 
socially endorsed form of power) or allowed it inadvertently to happen (i.e., a misuse 
                                                 
23 David Ian Rabey, British and Irish Political Drama in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1990), p.2. 
24 Rabey, p.2. 
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of a socially endorsed form of power). To phrase this another way, when a play 
depicts a social abuse, it must credibly answer why the oppressed was subject (i.e., 
vulnerable) to that abuse; this leads to some implicit explanation in terms of power. In 
general, then, I believe it is important to stress that the portrayal of ‘local’ abuses of 
power nevertheless constitutes an attack on some of the fundamental power structures 
in a society; this point is indeed vital for understanding Pinter, as the personal is 
intertwined with the political, mainly because this playwright often construes the 
macropolitical in terms of the micropolitical.  
 Assuming Rabey’s description of political drama as the genre that exposes the 
nature of a society’s power structures is correct, I find it intriguing that he invokes a 
medicalized metaphor to define power inequalities, as he calls them a kind of 
‘illness’. This raises the following question: what is the essential nature of this 
‘illness’? No definitive answer can be given, as it depends on the playwright’s 
political affiliations, and his underlying worldview; nevertheless, there are two main 
philosophical ways that an answer could be framed, in terms of how the ‘inner’ world 
of subjectivity relates to the ‘outer’ world of social structures. Firstly, as discourse 
theorists contend, power is constitutive of subjectivity, such that the subject is situated 
in his society, according to the interplay of the subject’s discursive worlds. This 
philosophical viewpoint therefore construes the world of subjectivity as a social 
construction, which undermines the view that the psychological realm possesses an 
essential nature that can only be modified, but never definitively changed, by social 
influences. According to this view, the ‘illness’ lies within the social structures and 
their discursive presentations. 
 Another, perhaps more conventional view is that, if power structures are 
oppressive and ‘ill’, this is because there is a disturbance in the holistic ‘field’, in the 
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sense that a ‘healthy’ and harmonious negotiation between the inner psychological 
world and the outer social world has not been achieved. Nevertheless, according to 
this view, even a society’s ‘ill-health’ is due to the inter-relationship between the 
psychological and the political. This is because the ‘deviation’ from what constitutes a 
healthy and humane society must be expressed both in oppressive forms of social 
organization, and in corresponding forms of psychopathology. Consequently, if we 
adopt this philosophical stance, Rabey’s invoking of the idea of ‘illness’ becomes less 
metaphorical, as this worldview contends that psychological illness is the supporter of 
oppressive and exploitative power relations, where ‘support’ here means the 
psychological contribution to the overall holistic disturbance.  
Considering Pinter’s own work, it is relatively straightforward and 
uncontroversial to categorise him as a political writer. As I intimated earlier, Pinter’s 
great theme, his abiding obsession, is defining and exploring the nature of insidious 
power relations. Michael Billington, for one, agrees with this classification when he 
writes: 
 
Eric Bentley in a classic essay pointed out that much drama that people 
loosely call ‘political’ might be better termed ‘social’. ‘It would be more 
sensible’, wrote Bentley, ‘to limit the term political to works in which the 
question of the power-structure arises’. Which it does throughout Pinter’s 
entire oeuvre.25    
 
One of the most curious and interesting aspects of Pinter’s work is that as soon as one 
defines him as a political playwright, as I have just done, it becomes necessary to 
                                                 
25 Michael Billington, Harold Pinter rev. edn (London: Faber, 2007), p.89. 
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qualify this somewhat. Before doing this, I want to draw upon another of Rabey’s 
statements about political drama: 
 
Political drama emphasizes the directness of its address to problematic social 
matters, and its attempt to interpret these problems in political terms. Political 
drama communicates its sense of these problems’ avoidability, with implicit or 
explicit condemnation of the political circumstances that have allowed them to 
rise and continue to exist.26 
 
Rabey assumes here that political drama emphasizes the political structures that create 
and perpetuate political oppression. This is true, but one may ask: since Pinter is a 
writer of psychological realism, who is also obsessed, in the most creative of senses, 
with the theme of power, how can his work be more precisely defined? My concise 
response to this is to define Pinter, in the main, as a ‘psycho-political’ writer.27 The 
reason why I append this attribution to Pinter’s work is that, whilst he does explore, as 
a political writer must do, power structures, his emphasis is not primarily on those 
power structures. Instead, as a psychological realist, the question that motivates much 
of his work is this: what psychological realities correspond to certain power 
structures? 
   Given that Pinter can be defined, in the main, as a psycho-political writer, I 
wish to discuss briefly some of the distinguishing features of this kind of writing, 
                                                 
26 Rabey, pp.1-2. 
27 I contend that Pinter is, in the main, a psycho-political writer, as some of his plays are difficult to 
classify under this label. For example, Betrayal (1978), which was written during his ‘memory’ period, 
is a work that is hard to classify as psycho-political, as the play’s relationships do not seem to have any 
wider political resonance. Another example is his play, Mountain Language (1988), which is again 
difficult to classify as psycho-political, but this time the reason is quite different: although it is overtly 
a political play, Pinter is interested in dramatizing a dehumanizing regime, which denies oppressed 
groups the right to use their native tongue and to articulate their subjectivity; thus, in keeping with its 
theme, the characters are not endowed with much psychological complexity.    
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including what I take to be its strengths and limitations. Firstly, and rather 
unsurprisingly, psycho-political drama is concerned with the individual’s emotional 
investment in key power relations, as this taps into what fears, phantasies and desires 
correspond to the disharmonious social structures. Billington alludes to this when he 
suggests that Pinter’s work, over the course of his career, has portrayed intimately 
personal bonds as the psychological ‘reality’ that perpetuates power structures: 
 
As Pinter’s career proceeds, he increasingly sees private life as a form of 
power politics full of invasion, retreats, subjugations and deceptions. 
Conversely, when he later comes to deal quite overtly with the machinery of 
the state, he describes it in terms of individual power and powerlessness. To 
put it simply, marriage for Pinter is a highly political state, just as the 
relationship between torturer and victim often acquires a degree of marital 
intimacy.28 
 
In essence, then, psycho-political writing is both concrete and abstract: concrete 
because it explores what psychological factors support insidious power relations, and 
thus there is an emphasis on emotional investment, which means that the portrayal of 
the social sphere represents what the individual directly confronts and responds to 
with the depth of his being (in other words, individuals in drama are generally not 
emotionally invested in abstractions). Related to this, psycho-political drama is also 
abstractive, as its psychodynamic emphasis overlooks how distal powers might create, 
and perpetuate power structures–indeed, psycho-political drama fails to intimate the 
sheer scale and differential complexity of global power. Thus, psycho-political 
                                                 
28 Billington, p.89. 
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drama’s relative ‘abstractive’ quality has the following consequences for my 
interpretation of Pinter’s work: in my close readings of his plays, I will allude to the 
social and historical contexts where relevant, but I will not be exploring these in great 
depth, given that my focus will be the same as Pinter’s, namely on the purported 
psychological realities that support the power relations that are depicted.  
Secondly, another distinguishing feature of Pinter’s work as a political writer 
is that he problematizes Rabey’s view that political drama ‘communicates its sense of 
these problems’ avoidability’.29 From a Marxist point of view, for example, Pinter’s 
political pessimism can be attributed to the smallness of his dramatic ‘canvas’, as his 
plays portray conflicts between a small number of characters, who are hermetically 
‘sealed’ in their rooms; thus, they do not give an audience a sense of contingency, 
because the plays do not expose the network of power from ‘top’ to ‘bottom’, which 
would then provide intimations of how the structure could be changed. In response, 
this is a genuine criticism of Pinter’s work, but it would be wrong to leave it entirely 
unchallenged, as it does rest upon a simplification: yes, Pinter’s work may lack this 
kind of ‘comprehensiveness’, but, on occasion, it partly redeems itself by substituting 
the power of evocative symbolic imagery for comprehensiveness. For example, there 
is no extensive tracing of the power relations of industrial capitalism in The Dumb 
Waiter (1957), but the use of the central conceit, namely the dumbwaiter mechanism, 
defamiliarizes the power relationship between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, such that 
the audience can see, perhaps for the first time, the central exploitative power relation 
between workers and their bosses.   
There are nevertheless deeper reasons for Pinter’s political pessimism, ones 
that are organic to his very approach and worldview. A psycho-political writer, by 
                                                 
29 Rabey, p.2. 
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definition, must posit that the ability to cure the ‘illnesses’ of the social world is 
limited by the realities of our all-too human psychological nature; in other words, 
whilst we may conceive of a democratic society, the psycho-political writer would 
argue that it is only feasible if our psychological ‘reality’ permits it. Pinter would no 
doubt concur with this, as his plays often show how power relations are rendered 
almost inevitable by the deep-seated conflicts of human nature. For example, in One 
for the Road (1984), Nicholas’ autocratic attitude can be construed as a manifestation 
of an infantile, regressive mind-set, which is nevertheless much easier to ‘inhabit’ 
than the anxiety-producing democratic mentality. In conclusion, the more ‘limited’ a 
psycho-political writer believes human nature to be, the more entrenched will be their 
political pessimism.  
Pinter as a ‘psychoanalytical’ writer  
An important question to ask regarding the interpretation of Pinter’s work is this: 
assuming that he is a psychological realist, and a psycho-political writer, what 
psychological theories are relevant for studying his oeuvre? Perhaps an answer can be 
unearthed from considering Robert Gordon’s perceptive remark about Pinter’s 
dedication to portraying the apparent ‘irrationalities of human behaviour’: 
 
The seeming illogicality of motive and action in Pinter’s plays involves an 
innovative dramaturgical means of portraying the irrationality of human 
behaviour itself rather than a technique for producing purely aesthetic 
effects.30 
 
                                                 
30 Gordon, p.9. 
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Earlier, I quoted Eliot’s remark on the purpose of poetic drama and it is worthwhile to 
quote him again, as his remarks illustrate how this form can examine the ‘irrationality 
of human behaviour’: 
 
It [poetic drama] should remove the surface of things, expose the underneath, 
or the inside, of the natural surface appearance. It may allow the characters to 
behave inconsistently, but only with respect to a deeper consistency. It may 
use any device to show their real feelings and volitions, instead of just what, in 
actual life, they would normally profess or be conscious of. 
 
As Eliot contends, in order to understand a seemingly irrational contrast between 
avowed motives and feelings, and what a person actually does, one must invoke the 
notion of an underlying consistency–a sort of ‘counter-will’ that is in conflict with the 
individual’s consciously avowed commitments. To do this is to tame the ‘irrational’, 
as the individual’s actions–their ‘acting out’–are rendered explicable, and therefore 
they are rationally motivated. This key explanatory move is indeed typically, albeit 
not inevitably,31 associated with the discursive world of psychoanalysis, as Freud 
proposed, as his main hypothesis, the existence of an unconscious realm, which was 
in conflict with the conscious mind, thus causing the individual to act, at times, in 
‘symptomatic’ and apparently senseless ways. Since Pinter is committed to portraying 
the seemingly irrationalities of human behaviour, one compelling way of conceiving 
his characters’ psychologies are in ways that are akin to the psychoanalytical model of 
the mind. 
                                                 
31 For example, Herbert Fingarette, in his book Self-Deception (1969), provides a Sartrean-inspired 
account of the notion of ‘counter-will’. 
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 In this section, I want to explore further the kinds of psychoanalytical theory 
that fit well with Pinter’s oeuvre. To do so, I wish to clear the path, so to speak, by 
examining a few prominent psychoanalytical readings of Pinter’s plays, as their 
respective weaknesses highlight the way to proceed. 
The first interpretation of this kind is one offered by Lucina Paquet Gabbard, 
in her book The Dream Structure of Pinter’s plays: A psychoanalytical approach. As 
the title discloses, Gabbard’s central critical ploy was to treat a Pinter play as though 
it were a dream to be interpreted in Freudian style, as she argued that the dramatic text 
was a camouflaged concoction that expressed, in a wilfully distorted fashion, an 
unconscious wish. According to this interpretation, a Pinter play is the ‘manifest 
content’, and the main task for the critic is to uncover, by undoing the defence 
mechanisms of condensation and displacement, the underlying desire known as the 
latent content. 
In spite of this methodological approach possessing some cogency, there are 
nevertheless some evident problems with this interpretation. With respect to its 
strengths, Gabbard’s reading is a nuanced and rigorous attempt to explain the mystery 
and power of Pinter’s drama using Freudian dream theory: 
 
The realistic reading can be compared to the manifest dream; it is concerned 
with current events. This current realism, however, conceals associated 
memories that are condensed beneath it. These hidden determinations are the 
unconscious or sometimes preconscious life of the play. They create its 
ambiguity, its depth, and its power.32  
 
                                                 
32 Lucina Paquet Gabbard, The Dream Structure of Pinter’s Plays: A Psychoanalytical Approach (New 
Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1976), p.23. 
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Gabbard contends that the realistic elements of the play are a front for a disguised 
wish, just as the ‘day residues’ are weaved together, in novel and surrealistic 
combinations, to express underlying desires. Yet, the difficulty about this sort of 
psychoanalytical reading is that, although it offers a credible explanation for why 
Pinter’s plays deviate from the genre of social realism, the purported analogy between 
dreams and his works may ultimately fail to explain the playwright’s dedication to 
depicting psychologically realistic characters, which are far more internally consistent 
than those figures, which populate dreams; furthermore, a related difficulty is that, if 
Gabbard’s analysis were to be extended to Pinter’s work after the publication of her 
study (i.e., his explicitly political period that began in the nineteen eighties), its 
credibility would be diminished, as the analogy between his plays and dreams could 
indeed appear to be ‘deflective’, in the sense that the political relationships are 
reduced to being displacements of an underlying order, rather than what needs to be 
essentially understood. Overall, a psychoanalytical reading that posits that the 
psychodynamic features reside in how actual relationships are influenced, and, to 
some extent, constituted by inner conflicts would be the most respectful of Pinter’s 
psycho-political emphasis, whilst also agreeing with his devotion to portraying 
psychologically realistic characters.       
Another early psychoanalytical reading was proposed by Lois Gordon’s 
Strategems to Uncover Nakedness: The Dramas of Harold Pinter. Compared to 
Gabbard, Gordon focuses on the inter-subjective dimension of Pinter’s work, rather 
than construing the plays as a series of dreams. Her reading is influenced by the 
Freudian view that there is a central, and ultimately irreconcilable tension between the 
instinctual demands of the individual and the responsibilities of society: 
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Pinter’s aim is really, as Freud’s was, ‘Civilisation and its Discontents’. There 
is something about the nature of the individual that is incompatible with the 
communities of men.33 
 
Gordon advocates that Pinter, as an artist and humanist, takes the side of the 
individual against society, and that his work is a critique of a social contract that 
alienates man from his deepest feelings: 
 
Pinter’s assault is levelled at the sources responsible for this terrible disparity 
between one’s acts and impulses–civilization itself. All societies, he seems to 
be saying, have taught that one must repress his deepest feelings, for once they 
force themselves into actual behaviour, they are vile and irreversible. In effect, 
Pinter condemns the initial contract that man makes with society, the 
unmanageable, indeed unworkable, negotiation of man and all institutions.34 
 
I would like to suggest that the main weakness of this reading is that Pinter 
supposedly depicts the individual as essentially in conflict with society. This raises 
the following important question: does Pinter, as a psycho-political writer, portray the 
relationship between an individual and his society always as a conflict? My answer 
would be ‘no’, as his interest, as a psycho-political writer is to articulate the 
psychological predispositions that result in oppressor/oppressed being attached to 
authoritarian regimes. In some respects, this writer is more pessimistic than the 
founder of psychoanalysis, as Pinter understood that even the oppressed may 
reconcile themselves to their exploitation, precisely because these insidious 
                                                 
33 Lois Gordon, Strategems to Uncover Nakedness: The Dramas of Harold Pinter (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1969), p.8. 
34 Gordon, p.8. 
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relationships nevertheless become a means to express, rather than repress, the 
individual’s deepest needs and phantasies.     
 With these critiques in mind, I propose that the kind of psychoanalytical 
reading that is most faithful to Pinter’s psycho-political works is one that respects and 
explores how the inner world shapes human relationships, and, just as importantly, 
how the outer world of relationships shapes the inner world. In essence, what I am 
proposing is that, since Pinter views power relations as an interweaving of the 
psychological and of the political, any psychoanalytical theory, Freudian or otherwise, 
that is applied to any particular work must be a theoretical perspective that has, as its 
focus, the connection between psychological dynamics, and the structure of actual 
human relationships. Indeed, whilst some Freudian ideas will be invoked, my critical 
repertoire will mainly draw upon post-Freudian theory for the following basic reason: 
whether such theory takes a Langsian, Winnicottian or Lacanian form, each is a 
revisionary account, which foregrounds the relationship between self and other.    
Alternative ways of reading Pinter’s work 
Performance Readings 
Since Pinter is a playwright, and drama is the literary genre of action, it is 
unsurprising that some critics would choose to focus on the performative features of 
his work. I do not deny the value of such readings, because, without question, how a 
play is staged reveals a great deal of what a dramatic work is interpreted as meaning. 
Furthermore, it is also true that, whilst a play may be read, it is only fully realized 
when it is performed.  
I say the above not only sincerely, but also in the spirit of concession, as I am 
aware that, in this thesis, I will not be examining the performative aspects of Pinter’s 
work. Nevertheless, I do not consider this exclusion as quite a damning omission, for 
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the following two reasons. Firstly, from a critical perspective, a skilful performance of 
a play reveals and elaborates upon the possible meanings inherent in the play, but the 
text itself is the foundation, and all performative interpretations must be tested for 
‘coherence’. I can therefore conclude that my close readings would be richer if I 
considered some of the ways in which the plays were performed, but I do not believe 
my focus on the text precludes my readings from being essentially coherent with the 
work’s purported thematic meanings. Secondly, since Pinter is a psycho-political 
writer, who intimates through his writings his characters’ depth psychologies, most of 
my focus is on what is inferred from what is said and done. Once again, a 
performative reading, with its examination of the signification of apt actions, can help 
to examine these psychologies, but a close reading of the text still allows key (i.e., 
foundational) inferences about the characters to be made. In fact, a focus on the 
textual helps to ‘unearth’ the rich, connotative meanings of this poetic dramatist’s 
dialogue.     
Philosophical Readings     
Philosophy can be defined as the ‘study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, 
reality, and existence, especially when considered as an academic discipline’.35 In 
terms of literary analysis, it is possible, in principle, to offer a philosophical reading 
of any literary work, for the simple reason that philosophical concerns are so 
comprehensive in scope and therefore so inescapable; thus, every text, knowingly or 
unknowingly, involves the presentation of some philosophical theme (even if that 
theme is not explicitly mentioned, and even if it is not insightfully presented). 
Nevertheless, the fact that there exists the genre of ‘philosophical literature’ highlights 
an important distinction: while all texts adopt a philosophical stance, what is 
                                                 
35 Definition of philosophy in Oxford Dictionaries, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/philosophy [accessed 3 March 2015] 
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categorised as philosophical literature are texts that can be described as philosophy as 
literature; in other words, a philosophical reading of a particular literary work is 
especially warranted, where normally discursive themes are explored concretely and 
extensively in the text itself. 
When it comes to Pinter’s work, as a whole, I believe that his fundamental 
philosophical concern is posed in the question: what is the nature of power? Since 
Pinter is, in the main, a psycho-political writer, his answer is fundamentally that 
power relations are revelatory of particular psychological realities. Of course, this 
answer, like all responses to the above question, is predicated upon an underlying 
philosophical worldview, but I would argue that Pinter is not primarily writing 
philosophy as literature. Indeed, as the quote made clear earlier, Pinter, as a psycho-
political writer, is dedicated to developing very concrete scenarios into plays, and so 
his explicit intentions cannot be defined as philosophical in orientation. 
  In this section, I want to examine further what Pinter’s perspective on 
psychology may imply about his underlying philosophical worldview. To help me to 
do this, I will use some excerpts from Walter Kerr’s short book on Pinter and 
existentialism, as Kerr’s anti-essentialist reading will open up the discussion.  In this 
work, Kerr bases his reading of Pinter upon the Sartrean credo, ‘Existence precedes 
essence’, which means that humankind is not endowed in the womb with a fixed and 
definite identity; instead, whatever ‘essence’ one does acquire is a result of a 
‘posthumous’ examination of one’s acts, as identity is a construction that is always 
subject to further revision. Kerr explains these points as follows: 
 
Existentialist philosophy, moving from troubled speculation in the nineteenth 
century to aggressive assertion in the twentieth, reverses the Platonic order. It 
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insists that existence precedes essence. That is to say, the notion of an original, 
immaterial archetype is jettisoned. There is no matrix from which individual 
men in the concrete are drawn. There are only individual men, born undefined. 
It is not even possible to say what a ‘man’ is until we have seen how this man 
or that man actually behaves, until we see what this man or that man has done. 
Man does not come to the planet with an identity; he spends his time on the 
planet arriving at an identity.36   
 
After this explanation of what he means by existentialism, Kerr proposes that Pinter is 
an existential writer, paying him the compliment that he is the only existentialist 
playwright (so far), who has been able to marry harmoniously content and form. As 
Kerr phrases it, Pinter ‘writes existentialist plays existentially’37, as he explains that 
the playwright’s characters mimic the real-life process of self-definition: 
 
If existence does precede essence, if an actual thing precedes an abstract 
concept of that thing, then it should also do so on the stage. Exploratory 
movement in the void, without preconception or precommitment, should come 
first. Conceptualisation should come later, if at all.38           
 
Although this talk about ‘exploratory movement in the void, without preconception or 
precommitment’ may seem cryptic, what Kerr means is that, in a universe where there 
are no essences, individuals are ‘free’ to explore possibilities before committing to a 
particular contingent identity. Given the prior definition of Pinter as a psycho-political 
playwright, who explores how people are bound to pernicious power relations, Kerr’s 
                                                 
36 Walter Kerr, Harold Pinter (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.10. 
37 Kerr, p.11. 
38 Kerr, p.11. 
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view that the playwright’s characters move about ‘without preconception or 
precommitment’ does not seem to me to be an auspicious way to begin his critical 
reading. 
Before articulating my own interpretation of Pinter’s view on identity, it is 
worthwhile to consider further Kerr’s thesis, since a counter-reading can indeed help 
to distinguish my own emphasis. With this in mind, in another excerpt, Kerr provides 
some further support for his main contention that Pinter is an existentialist writer, who 
writes ‘existentially’:  
 
‘I don’t conceptualize in any way’, Pinter has said in an interview given to 
Lawrence M. Bensky for Paris Review, a statement which may well be taken 
at face value and which may help to explain why Pinter’s plays seem strange 
to us through and through.39    
 
For Kerr, Pinter’s remark is an expression of a playwright who lets his characters 
exist before they explore various forms of self-definition; in other words, according to 
Kerr, Pinter’s characters are not the embodiments of some pre-conceived idea. But 
Kerr is unfortunately being disingenuous here, as the quote is lifted from an interview, 
where Pinter is emphasising the point that he does not outline his plays before starting 
to write them. In my view, what Kerr has done is misconstrue ‘conceptualizing’ as 
meaning that Pinter’s characters are not originally defined, but that they come to be 
defined. In reality, however, Pinter’s ‘strangeness’, as Kerr puts it, originates, in part, 
because of his dedication to psychological realism, since he lets his dramatis 
personae’s characters primarily emerge through relationships, rather than by the 
                                                 
39 Kerr, p.14. 
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means of expository information. To put it bluntly, Pinter’s characters are not so 
much undefined as that their natures go unannounced; the playwright indeed 
understands that life is not lived with a voice over.   
 If the anti-essentialist reading seems unpromising, then Pinter’s own remarks 
appear to undermine its credibility even more, as an excerpt from one of his most 
notable speeches makes clear: 
 
Given characters who possess a momentum of their own, my job is not to 
impose upon them, not to subject them to a false articulation, by which I mean 
forcing a character to speak where he could not speak, making him speak in a 
way he could not speak, or making him speak of what he could never speak. 
The relationship between author and characters should be a highly respectful 
one, both ways.  And if it’s possible to talk of gaining a kind of freedom from 
writing, it doesn’t come by leading one’s characters into fixed and calculated 
postures, but by allowing them to carry their own can, by giving them 
legitimate elbowroom.40 
 
Although it cannot be literally true about his characters possessing autonomy, it is 
nevertheless revealing that Pinter treats his characters as autonomous agents; 
furthermore, and more importantly, he invokes the idea of credibility and of truth, in 
the sense that, in his view, he must be faithful to their defined identities, as it is these 
identities that delimit the realm of the possible. Assuming, as I do, that this little 
manifesto on characterization is representative of the playwright’s general attitude 
                                                 
40 Pinter, Plays:1, p. vii. 
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towards depicting his characters, this therefore raises the following important 
question: must Pinter be described as an essentialist? 
 The short answer to the above is ‘no’. The longer answer is that, in spite of 
Kerr failing to provide particularly compelling reasons for a Sartrean reading of 
Pinter’s plays, I do not believe that it is in principle impossible to offer such an 
interpretation. More fully, although Pinter’s characters do not in general exhibit much 
freedom in the Sartrean sense, their apparent ‘fixity’ can still be explained in terms of 
not only a refusal to ‘spell-out’ the implications of their actions, but also an 
unwillingness to admit that those said actions are chosen rather than pre-determined.41    
 Nevertheless, with this concession having been made, I am choosing to 
interpret Pinter as an essentialist, as I seek to show that particular psychoanalytical 
readings of his plays can provide compelling and comprehensive psycho-political 
interpretations. More fully, I propose as a ‘working hypothesis’ that identity, for 
Pinter, consists of a set of factors, such as a character’s traits, defining motives and 
needs, characteristic phantasies, and interpersonal style, most of which is influenced 
by the environment that the characters are situated in. Overall, I am fully aware that 
this ‘hypothesis’ has different political implications to the Sartrean reading, as my 
approach suggests that Pinter’s characters, including the most exploitative and 
authoritarian, are more compelled than free, as they are, to a large extent, the 
playthings of their unconscious minds.  
Gender Readings    
Rather unsurprisingly, the category of ‘gender’ is a vital critical concept to be kept in 
‘play’ when reviewing and interpreting Pinter’s work. This is for two main reasons. 
Firstly, as will become clearer in a later chapter, Pinter typically equates authoritarian 
                                                 
41 For a fuller philosophical discussion of these themes, see Herbert Fingarette’s Self-Deception (1969). 
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societies with patriarchal structures, and therefore the way in which he construes the 
relationship between society and the individual inevitably draws upon the connections 
between gender and power. Secondly, and perhaps more obviously, Pinter’s plays 
often directly stage the supposedly perennial battle between the sexes, as his 
characters situated in their rooms seek to achieve dominance over both the space and 
over others.  
Although it is incontestable that gender concerns must be taken into account 
when providing readings of Pinter’s work, critics have however been divided over 
how to interpret the playwright’s understanding of the notions of 
masculinity/femininity. For example, Victor L. Cahn suggests that Pinter strongly 
favours the theory of biological essentialism i.e., that masculinity and femininity maps 
directly onto sex:  
 
Pinter implies that much of the behaviour of men and women is the product of 
their nature. In his plays, social and linguistic manifestations are not causes of 
the roles the characters play, but products.42   
 
Other critics have challenged Cahn’s straightforward reading in a variety of ways: 
Guido Almansi and Simon Henderson proposed a constructivist interpretation of 
Pinter’s work,43 which is premised upon the idea that gendered identity is a social 
construction, such that there is no inherent link between social role and biological sex; 
in contrast, Elizabeth Sakellaridou indirectly contested Cahn’s thesis in less divergent 
terms by suggesting that Pinter’s later work (beginning, it would seem, during his 
‘memory’ period) depicts a more androgynous world, where men and women can 
                                                 
42 Cahn, p. 12. 
43 For a fuller discussion of these points, see Guido Almansi and Simon Henderson’s Harold Pinter 
(1983). 
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sometimes be found to possess traits of character normally attributed to the opposite 
sex.44 
With regards to my own critical stance on the question of gender, it coheres 
with my more general commitment to reading Pinter’s oeuvre as works of 
psychological realism. More specifically, I wish to reconcile, as much as possible, the 
tensions between Cahn’s interpretation and Sakellaridou’s. This is for two main 
reasons. Firstly, unlike Almansi and Henderson, I interpret the language of Pinter’s 
characters as an invitation to posit an underlying nonverbal inner life that is consistent 
enough with what is said. Thus, my construal of Pinter’s work is based on the premise 
that the social roles that his characters enact represent, to some extent, masks, which 
not only hide their inner lives, but also hinder their psychological development (for 
example, his masterpiece of sexual politics, The Homecoming (1964), may be viewed 
as an indictment of patriarchal society, which ordinarily suppresses a woman’s sexual 
appetite, so that she can play the more submissive and subdued role of wife and 
mother).       
Secondly, in my opinion Cahn’s reading possesses some cogency, as Pinter’s 
non-‘memory’ works generally suggest that there is a relationship between gender and 
sex, since men, for example, are consistently portrayed as the more violent and 
domineering of the sexes. However, with that having been said, Sakellaridou’s 
interpretation also has its merits, because, even if Pinter’s characters are not typically 
androgynous, some of his personages feel, think and behave in ways normally 
attributed to the opposite sex e.g., in No Man’s Land (1975), Hirst’s genteel, if 
somewhat boozy camaraderie, hides a more touching, and in Pinter’s world, more 
feminine need for relationship; in contrast, a female assistant in The Hothouse 
                                                 
44 For a more in-depth discussion of androgyny in Pinter’s work, see Elizabeth Sakellaridou’s Pinter’s 
Female Portraits (1988). 
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(1958/1980) is clinically ‘objective’ and exercises her aggression through her sadistic 
‘scientific’ experiments, and so she can be construed as ‘masculine’, given her 
lauding of reason and her domineering interpersonal style.  
Taking these considerations into account, I believe that the way to make Cahn 
and Sakellaridou’s readings consistent with the notion that Pinter wrote works of 
psychological realism is to define the playwright as a psychological essentialist when 
it comes to matters of gender. More fully, what this means is that gender is viewed as 
neither a given, nor a complete construction, as the social constructionists might 
claim; instead, one’s character is a bundle of tendencies that, from the beginning, 
enters the field of social forces and is shaped by them. Consequently, whilst the 
psychological essentialist may describe masculinity and femininity in terms of 
contrasting qualities, he also argues that neither sex has an inherent and complete 
monopoly on those qualities. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have established that I wish to read Pinter, in the main, as a psycho-
political writer, and that my methodology will consist of psychoanalytical approaches 
that are focused on the relationship between self and other. In the next three chapters, 
I intend to look at three ‘Pinteresque’ themes, namely the authoritarian society, the 
‘territorial imperative’, and the patriarchal family structure. I do not intend to argue 
that these three themes encapsulate all of the defining features of ‘Pinterland’,45 but I 
do believe that, for reasons that will become clearer later, these are central themes. 
Briefly, my reasoning is as follows: firstly, the most oppressive societal structure is 
the authoritarian society, and so an examination of Pinter’s psycho-political writing 
necessitates an exploration of how he conceives the psychodynamics of autocratic 
                                                 
45 For example, a notable omission is an exploration of the theme of memory in Pinter’s work. 
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relations; secondly, the hermetic retreat into a room, with the subsequent battle for 
territory, is perhaps the most defining feature of a Pinter character’s being-in-the-
world, and thus I believe it is necessary to examine the psycho-political subtext 
behind why his characters apparently need to flee from wider engagement in the 
world in order to construct a ‘burrow’; finally, the need to examine, in a psycho-
political fashion, familial structures is premised upon the idea that Pinter construes the 
family as the micropolitical structure par excellence, as it is the prototype for the 
patriarchal order.    
In terms of the rubric of each chapter, it will be as follows: several plays, 
which thoroughly explore the chapter’s theme, will be subjected to close readings 
from a psychoanalytical perspective. Each reading will involve a presentation of the 
relevant theory first, before proceeding to close read a particular play.     
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Chapter 2: Escape from Freedom: The Seductions of Authoritarianism  
Introduction 
In a 1960 BBC interview, Pinter criticised what he thought was contemporary 
drama’s misguided tendency to present society as the villain and the individual as a 
hero. According to Pinter, the relationship between society and its citizens is instead 
an interdependent one, such that it is impossible to construe one party as the culprit, 
whilst exonerating the other: 
 
In contemporary drama so often we have a villain society and the hero the 
individual…Well it isn’t like that. These two things (the man in relation to 
society) both exist and one makes the other. Society wouldn’t be there without 
the man, but they’re both dependent on one another and there’s no question of 
hero and villain.46 
 
Although Pinter speaks openly and almost declaratively about this topic, it 
nevertheless seems a curious approach for him to adopt, as any Pinter enthusiast 
knows that the playwright often portrays society as a coercive, corrupting force that is 
hell-bent on undermining the development of all of the qualities in an individual that 
he, as a liberal humanist, holds dear: a sceptical, open mind, a flexible, considered 
moral viewpoint and a unique voice. Could it be the case that there is an inconsistency 
between the writer’s political philosophy and his actual work? 
 In reality, Pinter is guilty of no actual contradiction, as he rejects this 
melodramatic presentation of society and the individual for a very specific reason: as 
a psycho-political writer, he cannot exonerate the individual from responsibility, since 
                                                 
46 Pinter, qtd in Billington, p.89. 
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his dramatic approach is based upon finding the deep-seated individual needs that 
support (i.e., ‘prop up’) various kinds of political ‘ills’. Thus, for Pinter, individuals 
are not so much bound by force to autocratic societies as seduced by them.  
In this chapter, I wish to examine Pinter’s dramatizations of the seductions of 
authoritarianism by offering close readings of the following plays: The Birthday Party 
(1957); One for the Road (1984); and Party Time (1991). Firstly, I will argue, using 
some of the insights of adaptive (a.k.a. communicative) psychoanalysis, that Pinter’s 
The Birthday Party suggests that certain individuals–the Stanley Webbers of this 
world– comply with the dictates of authoritarian, paternalistic societies as a form of 
penance for committing the ‘original sin’ of attempting to become ‘exceptional’. 
Pinter’s first full-length play is indeed a work of great psychological penetration, as it 
shows, rather counter-intuitively, that an individualist nevertheless longs, on some 
level, to comply with a traditionalist and freedom-denying society. More specifically, 
what I hope to show is that the Langsian interpretation of death anxiety can provide a 
compelling and overarching explanation for why Stanley Webber submits to the 
coercive order that he ostensibly despises. 
With regards to offering close readings of two of his later works–One for the 
Road and Party Time–I shall provide the reader with a sense of how Pinter construes 
the motivations of what can be termed the authoritarian personality. What I intend to 
argue is that Pinter’s understanding of the autocratic self is essentially in agreement 
with two of the central figures of the object-relations school, namely D.W. Winnicott 
and Margaret Mahler, as this playwright contends that the autocratic individual needs, 
on a cognitive and corporeal level, to divide the world into clear factions, because he 
cannot reconcile himself to true otherness; instead, he must exert ‘omnipotent’ control 
over his world in the vain hope of maintaining a delusory belief in his own 
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‘unlimited’ power. More fully, using some of the foundational notions of 
Winnicottian theory, I wish to show firstly that the autocratic personality is unable to 
relinquish the seeming epistemic security that the stage of omnipotence provides, and 
so he is condemned to viewing others not as separate individuals, but as either 
supporters of his underlying project, or dissenters, who must be persecuted (or, as he 
sees it, eradicated or ‘corrected’) because they threaten his precarious psychological 
equilibrium. Secondly, some of the insights of Mahler’s developmental theory will be 
used to understand the psycho-political subtext of Party Time, as her hypothesis about 
the existence of a symbiotic stage provides a means of understanding the connection 
between the autocratic self and the gendered (i.e., ‘hypermasculine’) corporeal form 
that it assumes.  
The Birthday Party 
When Pinter’s first full-length play, The Birthday Party, made its 1957 debut, it both 
baffled and irritated many London-based critics. For example, a Guardian journalist, 
known only as MWW, wrote, ‘What all this means only Mr. Pinter knows, for his 
characters speak in non-sequiturs, half-gibberish and lunatic ravings’.47 This journalist 
is very much wrong about the play’s coherence, but he got one thing right: Pinter 
himself was always clear about his play’s theme, as he proposed, in a letter to director 
Peter Wood, that The Birthday Party depicts the following ‘message’:      
 
We’ve agreed: the hierarchy, the Establishment, the arbiters, the socio-
religious monsters arrive to effect alteration and censure upon a member of the 
                                                 
47 MWW, qtd in Samantha Ellis, ‘The Birthday Party, London 1958’, in Guardian Online  
http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2003/apr/02/theatre.samanthaellis [last accessed: 4 March 2015] 
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club who has discarded responsibility (that word again) towards himself and 
others.48 
 
As one might expect from a perceptive writer like Pinter, he is accurate about his 
play’s central theme, as it is the case that the play stages a battle between the 
emissaries of the Establishment, and a lone outsider, who does not wish to conform to 
autocratic rule. Nevertheless, even Pinter’s perceptive remarks do not fully explicate 
the psycho-political complexities of this work. Ann C. Hall, for one, provides an 
excellent counter-example to the notion of a clear-cut ‘villain’/’hero’ dichotomy: 
 
Once Goldberg finds the flashlight, we are aligned with him again, and our 
gaze is forced upon Stanley, who is not escaping, not helping Meg, but 
instead, is poised over the unconscious Lulu in a position suggesting rape and 
laughing maniacally. There is no hero here, no innocent or noble character 
with whom we can identify.49   
 
If we take into account that Stanley intended to end the evening’s ‘celebrations’ with 
a rape, Pinter’s much-quoted comment that ‘Stanley is neither hero nor exemplar of 
revolt’50 seems like a gross understatement, whilst Christopher Innes’ suggestion that 
the play depicts ‘a victimized boarding-house population’51 seems marred by its naïve 
melodramatic premise. In truth, as counterintuitive as it may originally sound, Pinter 
is actually undercutting the victim/victimiser dichotomy in his play. Not all critics, of 
                                                 
48 Pinter, qtd in Billington, p.78. 
49 Ann C. Hall, ‘Looking for Mr. Goldberg: Spectacle and Speculation in Harold Pinter’s The Birthday 
Party’, Pinter Review (1997), 48-56 (p.52). 
50 Pinter, ‘Letter to Peter Wood’, Drama (Winter 1981), pp.4-5 (p.5).  
51 Christopher Innes, Modern British Drama: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p.333. 
 44 
course, have overlooked this crucial point: Katherine H. Burkman, for example, has 
recognised that the portrayal of Goldberg and McCann has too many ambiguous 
shadings for them to be classified as unadulterated ‘villains’: 
 
Pinter’s characters reveal a curious ambiguity about their positions as victims. 
Stanley, in The Birthday Party, is victimized by two men who are themselves 
frightened, potential victims of the power they serve.52  
 
This logic can be extended to Stanley himself, as it is undoubtedly the case that he is 
not only a victim, but a victimiser too: the intended rape, above all else, provides a 
graphic and unequivocal indictment of his exploitative character. Thus, Goldberg and 
McCann may indeed be socio-religious ‘monsters’, but Stanley’s fragile and 
responsibility-denying individualism does not preclude the exploitation and 
victimisation of others. 
 In this section, I intend to offer a nuanced reading of the play that respects its 
psycho-political subtlety. To be precise, what I wish to argue is that the battle (in as 
much as it is a battle) is not simply between the forces of conformity and 
nonconformity, but rather between the two ‘species’ of anti-social tendency, namely 
the rigid, dogmatic traditionalist/conformist and the sullen, self-serving individualist. 
Viewed in this way, Stanley’s victimisation and eventual conformity is still the central 
psycho-political theme, but what my reading emphasises is that the pianist’s 
submission is caused by his unconsciously accrued guilt feelings. Indeed, using the 
insights of adaptive psychoanalysis, I intend to propose that the originary cause of 
Stanley’s conformity is his acute existential death anxiety, as his symbolic quest to be 
                                                 
52 Katherine Burkman, The Dramatic World of Harold Pinter: Its Basis in Ritual (Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 1971), p.21.  
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‘death-defying’ created a kind of guilt that could only be annulled through an 
annihilating embrace with an autocratic society.           
I 
In one of his recent works on clinical technique, the renegade psychoanalyst, Robert 
Langs, begins his presentation by proposing that a human being’s most essential task 
in life is to adapt to his environment: 
 
Granted that there are basic needs for boundaries, nourishment, metabolism 
and excretion, nevertheless the most fundamental task for all living beings is 
that of adapting to their environments–a term used in its broadest sense to 
include living conditions, interactions with other living beings, natural events, 
and the state of our body organs and our inner feelings, fantasies, and other 
affects and processes.53    
 
From a psychoanalytic point of view, Langs’ emphasis on adaptation may seem 
innocuous at first, but, in reality, this straightforward, evolution-based premise has 
some profoundly disruptive implications for traditional psychoanalysis. According to 
Langs, if it is the case that our primary task is to adapt to environmental threats, then 
our mental life can no longer be described as primarily an inner war between the 
realistic conscious mind, and the pleasure-seeking unconscious; on the contrary, both 
regions– or, as he calls them, ‘systems’–must be primarily orientated towards reality, 
otherwise we, as human organisms, would leave ourselves open to external threats. 
What is therefore foundation shaking about Langs’ strongly adaptive approach is that 
he posits that the emotion-processing mind, otherwise known as the deep unconscious 
                                                 
53 Robert Langs, Fundamentals of Adaptive Psychotherapy and Counselling (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2004), p.5. 
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system, is an organ of perception, as its raison d'être is to detect and then process 
environmental impingements that threaten the survival of the organism.54 
 On a basic level, Langs’ revisionism appears to be either a revolutionary or 
transgressive reworking of Freud’s topographic model of the mind, as he depicts the 
psyche, like his illustrious predecessor, as essentially divided into two distinct 
regions, but where these two analysts differ is that Langs argues that the division is 
based on two separate ways of processing environmental threats. For the theoretically-
inclined reader, I imagine that Langs’ theory immediately raises the following two 
pertinent questions: why is there a ‘division of labour’ in the mind, and how does the 
unconscious communicate its supposed ‘perceptions’? 
 Dealing with the former first, Freud’s topographical model proposed that the 
mind was inherently divided against itself, as the conscious mind is aligned with the 
organism’s adaptation to reality, whilst the unconscious region seeks immediate 
gratification, without any concern about feasibility or danger. In Langs’ case, he 
cannot, of course, offer a model couched in these precise terms, but this nevertheless 
does not prevent him from offering an opposing theory of mental conflict. More fully, 
for Langs, the inner conflict between the two ‘systems’ arises because our 
evolutionary progress dictated that human organisms should not be consciously 
burdened by events that trigger, on an emotional level, traumatic anxiety; this is 
because such events otherwise possess the pernicious ability to ‘overload’ one’s 
conscious processing capacity, thereby blunting one’s awareness of the more 
immediate threats posed by physical dangers.55 For Langs, where conflict inevitably 
arises is that, although this arrangement seeks to serve our survival instinct, delegating 
traumatic material to the unconscious system implies that the conscious mind 
                                                 
54 See Langs, p.6. 
55 See Langs, p.46. 
 47 
maintains a high degree of denial about what is harmful, in an emotional sense, to the 
organism; in other words, inner conflict of the Langsian kind is even more 
epistemically based than its traditional counterpart, as the battle is not between 
pleasure and reality, but between denial and insight.  
 As for the second question, Langs believes that the unconscious system can 
and must communicate its perceptions, even if the conscious centre finds them both 
brutally frank and disturbingly apt; indeed, as I have just intimated, without some 
form of unconscious intervention, the denial-ridden conscious system would continue 
a path characterised by a form of ‘blindness’, as it would keep on overlooking the 
ways in which the environment, on a psychological level, is threatening. Thus, to help 
avoid repeating harmful behaviour, the unconscious system has the capacity to 
communicate its insights through a form of subterfuge, which Langsian theory calls 
encoded narratives.56 Langs’ fundamental postulation is therefore that the unconscious 
system relays its anxiety-provoking messages to the conscious system through 
narratives, as this circumnavigates the inner ‘censor’, whilst also allowing it to 
propose an adaptive response to the trauma-inducing triggering event, since stories 
detail the resolution of an initial psychical disruption. In the case of people who wish 
to choose insight over denial, Langs in his writings proposes that they must decode 
these narratives, and relate these bridging-themes back to the original external trigger. 
Only then can they begin to stop being the victim of their denial, as they would now 
understand how they have interpreted a traumatic occurrence.       
Assuming that the unconscious is a communicative organ of perception, it may 
now be asked what kind of event this system processes. The superficial answer is 
traumatic events; the more accurate response is that the unconscious processes events 
                                                 
56 See Langs, p.10. 
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that constitute a threat to the psychological integrity of the individual. The reason why 
this is so is actually quite simple: basically, the unconscious system is, like its 
counterpart, invested in ensuring survival, and, on a psychological level, this means 
that it is committed to detecting any environmental impingement that undermines the 
functioning of the self. In reality, what this amounts to is that, whilst the conscious 
system evolved to deal with the threat of physical death, the unconscious system came 
into being so that the individual could have a means to cope with various forms of 
death anxiety. According to Langs, there are three forms of death anxiety in 
particular, each of which is processed by the unconscious system, and each of which 
exacts its own toll on the organism as a whole.57 Since this topic is of much relevance 
for my subsequent reading, it is worthwhile to examine each of these anxieties in 
some detail.    
The first form of death anxiety is predatory death anxiety, which is 
experienced by the unconscious system when the individual is subjected to what is 
interpreted as a kind of ‘assault’ on the psyche, in the sense that deeply held ethical 
boundaries have been transgressed.58 In this case, the conscious system may be 
vaguely aware of being persecuted, but, unlike the unconscious system, it will not 
register the most disturbing ramifications of the event. The reason for this division of 
labour is that Langs speculates that the unconscious system evolved, in part, to deal 
with the situation where there is a conflict between dependency and the admittance of 
injury. In Langs’ view, human beings often find themselves mistreated by their 
caretakers, and yet, in the interests of survival, it is necessary to block from conscious 
awareness the full scale of the harm caused by the emotional abuse. In other words, 
this evolutionary mechanism prizes physical safety over emotional protection, which 
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has the unfortunate consequence that it leads to a kind of denial that makes it likely 
that the individual will continue to be subjected to the same abuse. 
 The next related form of death anxiety is known as predation, which occurs 
when the unconscious system registers that the individual has violated some ethical 
boundary by committing a harmful act upon another person.59 Guilt naturally ensues, 
but, as mentioned earlier, the conscious system cannot, in the interests of survival, be 
burdened too much by an awareness of wrongdoing, which is why recognition of 
one’s culpability usually remains in the unconscious domain. Again, such an 
arrangement serves the interests of physical survival, but proves very costly in two 
notable ways. Firstly, an inability to recognise one’s guilt perpetuates denial, which 
typically gives the perpetrator little chance of making any healing, reparative gestures. 
In such cases, where denial triumphs over insight, the individual is consigned to 
masochistic acts of self-punishment as his only means of trying to alleviate his guilt. 
Secondly, as Langs argues, predation death anxiety includes persecutory anxiety, as 
predation is typically interpreted by the unconscious mind as an act of murder, which 
renders, so it is believed, the perpetrator susceptible to being ‘killed’ by some 
revenge-seeking agent.60 Consequently, those acutely burdened by predation anxiety 
will suffer from otherwise irrational fears of being harmed or murdered without 
knowing the actual origins of their terrors. 
 And the final, most fundamental form of death anxiety is of the existential 
kind. In essence, this can be characterised as a profound dread of non-being that arises 
from an acute awareness of what Langs terms as the following existential ground rule: 
whatever lives must, without exception, eventually die.61 According to Langs, this 
awareness of the inevitability of personal demise cannot remain in the conscious 
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domain too long, otherwise it would be obstructive to the organism’s primary task of 
surviving and adapting; the unconscious mind is therefore the processor and 
repository of such awareness. Unsurprisingly, this act of denial still causes 
difficulties, though, because, if the existential death anxiety is particularly acute, the 
individual will repeatedly try to exempt himself from the fundamental existential law 
by attempting to become ‘exceptional’ in the sense of being ‘beyond’ rules or laws. 
For our purposes, one of the most important and reprehensible consequences of such 
denial is that the ‘exceptional’ individual must stand against the pro-social values of 
his society.         
II 
The Birthday Party opens with a seemingly pedestrian scene: an elderly couple, called 
Meg and Petey, are sitting at the breakfast table making small talk before Petey 
returns to his Sisyphean task of setting up deckchairs. Since this is a Pinter play, 
initial appearances prove to be deceptive, however, as this is no benign relationship: 
although their lives are characterised by dull routine, where the most noteworthy 
events are lived second-hand in Petey’s newspaper, there is nevertheless a power 
inequality. In Meg’s case, she craves, in an obviously child-like way, affection, as she 
tries, for example, to receive compliments by asking Petey if his cornflakes and fried 
bread were nice; likewise, she wants her husband to read out any interesting sections 
from the newspaper, as if he were some doting father that reads a bedtime story to her. 
Petey, in contrast, perceives his wife in somewhat more calculating terms, as he is 
mainly interested in Meg as a good housewife, who can be kept relatively content and 
useful if he mouths the required replies; in fact, for Petey, what he seems to value the 
most is being left alone to follow his own quiet pleasures, as it is painfully apparent 
that, if Meg remained silent, the newspaper would act as an unspoken barrier between 
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him and his wife. Pinter therefore shows in this opening scene that, for both parties, 
this relationship may seem mundane, but it is instead founded upon a varying degree 
of strategic manipulation of the other.    
 After this stage-setting scene, Pinter introduces a third, rather dishevelled, 
character, who descends from his bedroom to sit at the table for a belated breakfast. 
Strange as it may seem at first, what is readily apparent is that Stanley receives a kind 
of treatment not befitting his years, as Meg goads the young man to eat his cornflakes 
‘like a good boy’62, whilst even Petey serves him his food. Such behaviour seems 
inexplicable only until we recall that shortly before Stanley Webber’s entrance, the 
topic of Meg and Petey’s childlessness was inadvertently raised by some remarks 
made about a birth notice: 
 
 MEG: What is it? 
 PETEY (studying the newspaper): Er–a girl. 
 MEG: Not a boy? 
 PETEY: No. 
 MEG: Oh, what a shame. I’d be sorry. I’d much rather have a little boy. 
 PETEY: A little girl’s all right. 
 MEG: I’d much rather have a little boy. 
 Pause. 
 PETEY: I’ve finished my cornflakes.63 
 
As this excerpt implies, their lodger Stanley has been assigned, over time, a leading 
role in the couple’s domestic ‘games’, as the void in Meg’s married life has been 
                                                 
62 Pinter, The Birthday Party (London: Faber, 1991), p.14. 
63 Birthday Party, p.11.  
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filled by loving, cherishing and protecting her ‘little boy’; meanwhile, the retiring, yet 
calculating, Petey has been given space to follow his solitary pursuits. Stanley himself 
seems to have no great objection to these casting decisions, as the couple give him 
free board, allow him to sleep late, and, above all else, they permit him to avoid any 
kind of work. In short, Stanley is the couple’s parasite of choice, as he lives off their 
spoils, giving nothing in return, except ungrateful remarks and unreasonable demands. 
The following altercation nicely characterises Stanley’s manner:       
 
STANLEY: The milk’s off. 
 MEG: It’s not. Petey ate his, didn’t you Petey? 
 PETEY: That’s right. 
 MEG: There you are then. 
 STANLEY: All right, I’ll go on to my second course. 
MEG: He hasn’t finished his first course and he wants to go onto his second 
course? 
STANLEY: I feel like something cooked. 
MEG: Well, I’m not going to give it to you. 
PETEY: Give it to him.64 
 
When Stanley wants something, he gets his own way, even if the couple have to split 
into separate factions. Quite evidently, their treatment has allowed Stanley to become 
like a petulant emperor, who holds sway over their dingy boarding house, as he knows 
nothing about responsibility; instead, he can only articulate his supposed 
‘entitlements’. 
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 Stanley’s autocratic and egocentric behaviour worsens once Petey leaves, as 
he starts to taunt Meg for being a bad wife, knowing that the old woman tries to be as 
agreeable as possible. Unfortunately, Meg is slow-witted, and cannot easily provide a 
cutting riposte to his slanderous comments; all she can do is tell him to ‘mind your 
own business’.65 It is only when Meg remarks that two visitors are intending to arrive 
that day that Stanley seems strangely perturbed and undermined: according to the 
stage directions, he ‘slowly raises his head. He speaks without turning’,66 as if this 
unwelcome bit of news signifies a possibility too frightening to confront directly. In 
fact, Stanley quickly concludes that ‘they won’t come’67 and it is ‘a false alarm’,68 as 
he hopes that the boarding house’s appalling record for visitors (over the last year, he 
has been the only guest) means that the two men have made some kind of mistake. 
Yet his anxiety suggests otherwise, as Stanley knows that he has quite tangible 
reasons to be upset, since his selfish and irresponsible behaviour may be tolerated, 
perhaps even encouraged by the Boles, but it would seem anti-social and unethical to 
third party onlookers. To the discerning theatregoer, Stanley comes across as someone 
on the run, who originally chose a good cover in this boarding house, only to then 
discover to his horror that he may indeed be found out. He is, without question, 
phobic about the prospect of outside scrutiny, as this might be the end to those 
domestic games that he has always won.        
Stanley, in essence, seems like a frightened, defensive and selfish man, a man 
who has, for some yet undetermined reason, chosen to be exempted from life, as if he 
were an invalid. Meg’s surprising bit of news about the visitors comes as a crushing 
blow, as he senses, with the bristle-raising keenness of an animal about to be attacked, 
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that it is the beginning of the end of his tyrannous ‘reign’. Sitting beside Meg at the 
breakfast table, all Stanley can do is articulate his broken dreams, as he tells a 
significant story about when he gave a concert at Lower Edmonton: 
 
 …I once gave a concert. 
 MEG: A concert? 
STANLEY (reflectively): Yes. It was a good one, too. They were there all 
there that night. Every single one of them. It was a great success. Yes. A 
concert. At Lower Edmonton. 
MEG: What did you wear? 
STANLEY (to himself): I had a unique touch. Absolutely unique. They came 
up to me. They came up to me and said they were grateful. Champagne we 
had that night, the lot. (Pause.). My father nearly came down to hear me. Well, 
I dropped him a card anyway. But I don’t think he could make it. No, I–I lost 
the address, that was it. (Pause.). Yes. Lower Edmonton. Then after that, you 
know what they did? They carved me up. Carved me up. It was all arranged, it 
was all worked out. My next concert. Somewhere else it was. In winter. I went 
down there to play. Then, when I got there, the hall was closed, the place was 
shuttered up, not even a caretaker. They’d locked it up…A fast one. They 
pulled a fast one. I’d like to know who was responsible for that. (Bitterly.). All 
right, Jack, I can take a tip. They want me to crawl down on my bended knees. 
Well I can take a tip…69 
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Through the fog of memory, denial and delusion, Stanley’s faltering and cryptic tale 
constitutes some kind of response to the imminent arrival of the visitors. On a 
manifest level, Stanley’s narrative is coated with a romantic sheen, as the narrative 
portrays a tragic case of the artist, the true individualist, refusing to kowtow to the 
generic demands of the marketplace, only to then find that his career as a concert 
pianist is brought to a premature end. Read this way, the two visitors can be 
understood as representatives of the anonymous ‘they’, a group that embodies, in the 
very fibre of their being, the insidious levelling tendencies of society. This romantic 
interpretation undoubtedly predicts that the visitors will be unmitigated villains.  
Although this manifest story may indeed be seductive, and receive much 
support from subsequent events, it nevertheless fails to answer some nagging 
questions that undermine its overall credibility; for example, if Stanley was a man 
dedicated to his art, and to the expression of his ‘unique touch’, why did he take their 
cursory rejection as a ‘carve up’ that required him to flee into the stifling shelter of the 
Boles boarding house? Such a question cannot be convincingly answered within the 
framework of Stanley as primarily and essentially an artist fighting back the forces 
that want to compromise his ‘unique touch’. Rather, if we construe Stanley Webber as 
a man that wants to be not so much an artist, but an exception to the common ‘herd’, 
then his phobic reaction to any ‘imposition’, commercial or otherwise, starts to make 
sense. For Stanley, it is external standards and laws that ‘carve him up’, as he 
perceives them, in a deeply unconscious way, as harbingers of death, since he 
unknowingly suffers from acute existential anxiety, which demands that he 
symbolically prove that he is, unlike his fellow human beings, exempt from the all-
encompassing ground rule of life. According to this reading, his narrative is a reaction 
to the trauma-inducing trigger of hearing about the arrival of outside scrutiny, as it 
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details the original psychological ‘death’ that sent him hurling into the protective arms 
of Meg, and it foreshadows the end of his life as a little dictator, free from any social 
rules and responsibilities. Indeed, perhaps the most compelling support for this 
interpretation is that it explains Stanley’s exacerbated need for social recognition and 
his peculiar trajectory through life, as the defining feature of this need to prove one is 
exceptional is that it is dependent on the anonymous, generic and death-fated ‘They’ 
confirming the ‘intractable’ difference between you and them. Without them playing 
this game, it is impossible to remain in society as an exception, and the path of 
resignation and failure is adopted as one last attempt to achieve an ‘exemption note’. 
Stanley’s whole being therefore seems to be imprisoned in the following ‘logic’: 
better to be a reclusive ‘loser’ than a faceless servant to society.         
The two emissaries of society are undoubtedly on their way, but just before 
they arrive, Pinter includes a short scene with the neighbour, Lulu, and Stanley. With 
Meg off to do some shopping, Lulu enters the living room, only to find the 
bedraggled, unshaven Stanley standing alone. Neither of them seems particularly 
familiar with each other, but this does not prevent Lulu assuming a direct and 
judgmental attitude towards Stanley. Over the course of this little scene, she subjects 
him to much criticism, mostly about his appearance (e.g., his unshaven, unwashed 
face, his wearing of glasses), as Lulu is simultaneously repelled and attracted to 
Stanley. What is even more significant (it is the main reason Lulu is introduced at this 
juncture) is that her criticisms gives an audience a further idea of why Stanley 
responds to others’ negative judgments so defensively. Although we already know 
that the concert organisers’ dismissal of him ‘carved him up’, his inertia and general 
self-contempt are not exclusively to do with his misbegotten need to be exceptional. A 
new element is introduced here, one that the audience might barely suspect, namely 
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Stanley’s largely unconscious feelings of guilt. As Lulu taunts him for his appearance, 
and for getting ‘under [Meg’s] feet all day long’,70 Stanley neither argues nor 
criticises her back; his main strategy is to lie about his responsibilities, making out, 
for example, that he disinfected the house that morning. Coupled with this 
unpersuasive fakery is a general feeling of futility, as he remarks that there would be 
no point in him washing himself; furthermore, while he abruptly asks Lulu to run 
away with him, he remains rooted to the spot, unable to even accept her offer of a 
short walk. Viewed within the context of the overall action, Stanley’s lying about his 
responsibilities, and his general lethargy, suggest that, on a conscious level, he 
disavows his wrongdoing, but, on an unconscious level, he knows that he is guilty of 
being a sponge, which is why he feels, over and above the literal meaning, ‘unclean’. 
In fact, it seems that unconsciously and masochistically he awaits his imminent 
‘judgment day’, where he will be ‘cleansed’ of the ‘predation’ guilt that comes from 
the hurt and strain that he has caused the Boles couple. Indeed, confirmation that this 
is so is that Stanley’s acutely paranoiac reaction to the otherwise mundane 
announcement about two visitors arriving exposes his underlying fear of being 
murdered (or, in his own terms, ‘carved up) for betraying, on a daily basis, the ethical 
boundaries associated with living in a society.  
Lulu’s departure is quickly followed by the arrival of Goldberg and McCann, 
society’s ‘pest control’. Sneaking in through the back door, the two men enter the 
unfamiliar territory of the living room with markedly different attitudes: McCann, the 
junior partner, is unsure that this is the right place, and seems tense and worried in 
general; Goldberg, in contrast, is certain they are where they should be, and he makes 
himself at home by settling into the armchair. At this point, Goldberg offers his 
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anxious partner some advice, which quickly becomes a tribute to his own ‘hallowed’ 
past as an apprentice. It is worth quoting this section at length: 
 
The secret [to relaxation] is breathing. Take my tip. It’s a well-known 
fact. Breathe in, breathe out, take a chance, let yourself go, what can 
you lose? Look at me. When I was an apprentice yet, McCann, every 
second Friday of the month my Uncle Barney used to take me to the 
seaside, regular as clockwork. Brighton, Canvey Island, Rottingdean–
Uncle Barney wasn’t particular. After lunch on Shabbuss we’d go and 
sit in a couple of deck chairs–you know, the ones with canopies–we’d 
have a little paddle, we’d watch the tide coming in, going out, the sun 
coming down-golden days, believe me, McCann. (Reminiscent.) Uncle 
Barney. Of course, he was an impeccable dresser. One of the old 
school. He had a house just outside Basingstoke at the time. Respected 
by the whole community. Culture? Don’t talk to me about culture. He 
was an all-round man, what do you mean? He was a cosmopolitan […] 
You know one thing Uncle Barney taught me? Uncle Barney taught 
me that the word of a gentleman is enough. That’s why, when I had to 
go away on business I never carried any money…Otherwise my name 
was good. Besides, I was a very busy man.71  
 
Goldberg obviously likes to talk about his sentimentalised past, and to set himself up 
as an exemplary example of how to live the good life: ‘The secret is breathing. Take 
my tip’. Apart from his businessman attire, this monologue indeed adds to the 
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impression that Goldberg is Stanley’s alter ego, as his talk is laced with prescriptions, 
moral lessons, and sugary nostalgia; this is quite different to the former pianist’s 
mirror-image story of fatherly rejection, crushing defeat, and perceived abandonment. 
Already the audience can see that, in many respects, Goldberg’s life philosophy is a 
symptom of a man who wanted to achieve status through being perceived as 
unassailably right, and so he chose the strategy of identifying with paternal authority 
figures, such as his Uncle Barney; indeed, by becoming one of ‘the old school’ 
himself and adopting bourgeois cultural values, Goldberg feels that he is an ‘all round 
man’.  Such confidence may not, at first, seem foreboding, but it does in fact signal 
that this man in particular, with his authoritarian, closed-minded way of talking 
(‘Culture? Don’t talk to me about culture’.), and his over-emphasis on tradition, 
community and family solidarity, will find the self-centred individualist, Stanley, as 
someone needing to be ‘reformed’. This is, of course, his mission.   
 In an earlier part of the play, Goldberg advises his tortured junior partner that 
this particular ‘job’ depends a great deal on the subject’s ‘attitude’.72 When Goldberg 
and the ‘subject’ first meet, the former realises, quite quickly, that the reclusive 
lodger’s attitude implies that he will not permit extended pleasantries: Stanley had 
previously tried to ingratiate himself with McCann, but now, after no success, he is 
prepared, like a cornered rat, to launch a counteroffensive. He tells the stranger that he 
finds him to be a ‘dirty joke’,73 and he tries, with more than a hint of bravado, to act 
as the protector of the Boles couple: 
 
Let me–just make this clear. You don’t bother me. To me, you’re nothing but 
a dirty joke. But I have a responsibility towards the people in this house. 
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They’ve been down here too long. They’ve lost their sense of smell. I haven’t, 
and nobody’s going to take advantage of them while I’m here. (A little less 
forceful.) Anyway, this house isn’t your cup of tea. There’s nothing here for 
you, from any angle, any angle. So why don’t you just go, without any more 
fuss?74  
   
Stanley’s defiance is evidently couched in moral terms, but the whole speech is as if 
the pianist had struck a series of false notes. For the audience, it is almost impossible 
to believe that the spoilt and work-shy Stanley really cares about the Boles couple; 
instead, it is tempting to paraphrase his objection by saying ‘nobody else is going to 
take advantage of them while I’m here’. Such cynicism seems justified, partly because 
Stanley cannot muster up any kind of sustained indignation, and partly because his 
most indirect strategy is based upon the assumption that Goldberg is as self-centred 
and as exploitative as he is: ‘There’s nothing here for you, from any angle, any angle’. 
 Unsurprisingly, Goldberg’s initial reactions are markedly different. Unlike the 
surly tenant, he tries to remain cheerful and sociable, offering his effusive 
congratulations on Stanley’s purported ‘birthday’. Yet even for this embodiment of 
bonhomie, his projected attitude is undercut by his little tribute to the regenerative 
powers of ‘rebirth’: 
 
But a birthday, I always feel, is a great occasion, taken too much for granted 
these days. What a thing to celebrate–birth! Like getting up in the morning. 
Marvellous! Some people don’t like the idea of getting up in the morning. I’ve 
heard them. Getting up in the morning, they say, what is it? Your skin’s 
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crabby, you need a shave, your eyes are full of muck, your mouth is like a 
boghouse, the palms of your hands are full of sweat, your nose is clogged up, 
your feet stink, what are you but a corpse waiting to be washed? Whenever I 
hear that point of view I feel cheerful. Because I know what it is to wake up 
with the sun shining, to the sound of the lawnmower, all the little birds, the 
smell of the grass, church bells, tomato juice–75 
 
Listening to this clichéd talk, an audience would find it difficult to overlook that this 
speech contains a veiled analogy, one that may be actually lost on both Goldberg and 
Stanley. Although Goldberg may marvel about mornings, his speech has a subtextual 
meaning, which suggests that he sees the lapsed pianist, with his unshaven face and 
unclean body, as a ‘corpse waiting to be washed’. From the point of view of adaptive 
psychoanalysis, this strikingly macabre metaphor arises in this narrative like some 
malign ship on the horizon, foretelling not only Stanley’s eventual death-in-life, but 
also, more urgently, Goldberg’s unconscious perception that this individualist, with 
his separatist agenda, is like a dead man polluting the world of the living. Indeed, it 
seems that, for Goldberg, Stanley’s very existence is inherently objectionable, as the 
staunch defender of tradition emerges from this initial encounter as a death-obsessed 
man, who hates and persecutes ‘dissidents’, as they arouse his unconscious fear of 
becoming like them, since he does not wish to be subject to their unenviable fate of 
being rendered as a scapegoat i.e., as an individualist who must be ‘murdered’ for his 
transgressions against society.                  
Goldberg finds it difficult to maintain his pleasant façade against Stanley’s 
acrimony for too long, and so he decides, there and then, to fulfil the rather ominous 
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obligations of his job: washing and resurrecting the ‘corpse’. Negotiating Stanley into 
a chair, both Goldberg and McCann start a process that is not so much an 
interrogation, but a verbal kicking ending in a character assassination. Their intention, 
it seems, is to hurl as many questions and accusations at Stanley as possible, so that 
the ‘carve up’ of their ‘subject’s’ psyche leads to inner reform. The conclusion to this 
episode nicely encapsulates their method: 
 
 GOLDBERG: Which came first? 
 MCCANN: Chicken? Egg? Which came first? 
GOLDBERG and MCCANN: Which came first? Which came first? 
Which came first? 
STANLEY screams. 
GOLDBERG: He doesn’t know. Do you know your own face? 
MCCANN: Wake him up. Stick a needle in his eye. 
GOLDBERG: You’re a plague, Webber. You’re an overthrow. 
MCCANN: You’re what’s left! 
GOLDBERG: But we’ve got the answer to you. We can sterilise you. 
MCCANN: What about Drogheda? 
GOLDBERG: Your bite is dead. Only your pong is left. 
MCCANN: You betrayed our land. 
GOLDBERG: You betray our breed. 
MCCANN: Who are you, Webber?  
GOLDBERG: What makes you think you exist? 
MCCANN: You’re dead. 
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GOLDBERG: You’re dead. You can’t live, you can’t think, you can’t 
love. You’re dead. You’re a plague gone bad. There’s no juice in you. 
You’re nothing but an odour.76 
 
The vindictiveness and the vitriol are indeed palpable during these quick-fire 
exchanges, as the earlier, more legitimate criticisms of Stanley (e.g., ‘Why don’t you 
pay the rent?’77) have receded into the background once the lodger became, for each 
emissary, the very face of nonconformity. In truth, this symbolic quality can be said to 
lend the verbal assault an almost darkly absurd quality, as it is unlikely that Stanley is, 
for example, both a betrayer of Ireland and of the Jewish race; similarly, it is 
decidedly implausible that Stanley was involved in the Siege of Drogheda in 1649. 
Nevertheless, from a psycho-political point of view, there is most definitely a 
rationale behind their accusations, as they are using Stanley as a sort of projective 
vessel to contain all of their own community-defying tendencies that they associate 
with death. From an audience’s point of view, engaging in this scapegoating may 
seem like a warped exercise, but, according to their demented logic, their 
determination to ‘wash’ or ‘sterilise’ Stanley constitutes a kindly, reparative act, 
which will save them all. This is because their authoritarian mind-set dictates that, if 
all three of them are reborn in the life-body of the traditional, autocratic society, then 
they will no longer be ‘infected’ with the temptation to divorce themselves from the 
identity-giving sustenance that their rigid beliefs provide for them. 
 Goldberg and McCann may be the bearers of audacious hopes, but Stanley, in 
contrast, is an even more dejected figure at the end of this character assassination. 
Unlike his concert story, this particular ‘carve up’ began even before the celebrations, 
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and it continues, with a grim remorselessness, until Stanley can barely take any more. 
Yet, in spite of Stanley protesting somewhat (most notably when he knees Goldberg 
in the groin), critics, such as Penelope Prentice, believe that Stanley actually invited 
this inquisition. This is how she puts it:                  
 
Stanley’s unfortunate choice to sit, a pivotal mistake assumes the form of 
hamartia, the classical mistake, the error in judgement which in Aristotle’s 
Poetics is sometimes translated as ‘flaw’. Trapped by his own decision to 
assume a subordinate position, Stanley steps over an invisible line that ushers 
in a brutal inquisition.78   
 
Prentice no doubt has a point here, but, in my view, Stanley’s assumption of the 
subordinate, sitting position is a ‘faulty accomplishment’, to use the Freudian term; in 
other words, Stanley does achieve his unconscious objective, no matter how much it 
might seem like a misguided conscious choice. Quoting the beginning of the 
inquisition should make this clear: 
 
GOLDBERG: Why are you wasting everybody’s time, Webber? Why are you 
getting on everybody’s wick? Why are you driving that old lady off her conk?        
MCCANN: He likes to do it! 
GOLDBERG: Why do you behave so badly, Webber? Why do you force that 
old man out to play chess? 
STANLEY: Me? 
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GOLDBERG: Why do you treat that young lady like a leper? She’s not the 
leper, Webber!79 
 
Apart from the manic insistence on answers, the most curious quality about these 
criticisms is that Goldberg possesses an almost preternatural knowledge of Stanley’s 
weak spots; for example, whilst it is true that Stanley avoided Lulu’s invitations due 
to his acute social awkwardness, how could Goldberg, who has never met the young 
woman, possible know this? Perhaps a definitive answer must remain elusive, but one 
possibility, consistent with preceding events, is that the two emissaries are, in part, an 
externalisation of Stanley’s own deep unconscious guilt. Such unacknowledged guilt 
is indeed plausible, as his earlier retelling of his concert story, coupled with his lying 
to Lulu about fulfilling his domestic responsibilities, show that Stanley is a man 
caught in the following double bind: he wants exemption from societal obligations, 
after being deemed ‘unexceptional’, but this only brings in its wake a sort of 
‘predation’ guilt, as he knows, on an unconscious level, that his life is based upon 
exploitation. His sitting down is thus an unconsciously willed masochistic act, 
because he acutely feels that these representatives of society do actually have a 
legitimate ‘debt’ to collect.         
 Goldberg and McCann’s relentless ‘inquisition’ of Stanley could have 
continued on, perhaps even verging into physical cruelty, but it is brought to a sudden 
end by Meg’s appearance on the scene, complete with toy drum. Goldberg’s finely 
honed social skills come into play at this point, as the transition to the actual birthday 
party proceedings is made with a minimum of awkwardness. Within a matter of 
minutes, Stanley has rather bizarrely moved from being persecuted to being 
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celebrated, as Meg provides a loving, if naïve, tribute to her ‘son’, whilst the family-
centric Goldberg pays homage to both this doting ‘mother’ and the birthday ‘boy’. As 
for Stanley himself, he remains silent immediately after these speeches, and, more 
worryingly, for the rest of the evening. In this particular case, such silence no doubt 
‘speaks’, as the audience is aware that they are watching a man who is trying to come 
to terms with a recent ordeal, which has left him with many raw emotions. There is 
indeed a palpable tension at this juncture in the play, as it is obvious that Stanley’s 
silence is only some form of recuperative measure before he takes action. 
 Intriguingly, the former concert pianist never decides at his birthday party to 
blow the whistle on Goldberg and McCann. Instead, he just sits as if he were a passive 
victim of fate, remaining sullen whilst Goldberg looks longingly into the eyes of 
father-fixated Lulu, and Meg monologues to McCann about her childhood years. It is 
only when Meg suggests that they all play a game that Stanley starts to participate in 
the birthday ‘celebrations’, thereby revealing his underlying intentions. With the 
lights switched off, the game begins rather innocently, but it takes a macabre turn 
when Stanley, as the blindfolded player, tries to rape Lulu. Goldberg and McCann 
quickly come to the rescue: 
 
MCCANN finds the torch on the floor, shines it on the table and STANLEY. 
LULU is lying spread-eagled on the table, STANLEY bent over her. 
STANLEY, as soon as the torchlight hits him, begins to giggle. GOLDBERG 
and MCCANN move toward him. He backs, giggling, the torch on his face. 
They follow him upstage, left. He backs against the hatch, giggling. The torch 
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draws closer. His giggle rises and grows as he flattens himself against the 
wall. Their figures converge upon him.80  
 
Stanley’s motives for these violent acts may seem both obscure and tragically 
misguided, as it should surely be the case that the targets would be Goldberg and 
McCann; after all, these two have been his persecutors. Stanley’s actions still do make 
overall psychological sense, though, as his sexual aggression towards Lulu is, in part, 
an expression of Oedipal competitiveness, given that this rivalrous ‘son’ has tried to 
sleep with his ‘father’s’ (i.e., Goldberg’s) love interest; in fact, Stanley’s demented 
glee can be understood as a sign that he achieved a near ‘victory’. Nevertheless, this 
Oedipal act is only relevant in as far as it is Stanley’s punishment of choice, as his 
masochistic longing for punishment has guided him, with an unfailing logic, to 
commit a transgression that would incite Goldberg’s wrath and expiate his guilt. In 
other words, Stanley has willed the ‘carve up’ this time.        
 The next day could be described as the terrible aftermath of the party, as there 
are some ominous signs that Goldberg and McCann are hiding Stanley away from the 
others. For example, when Petey asks Goldberg about Stanley’s health, the latter is 
uncharacteristically nervous and reticent, as he knows that the former concert pianist 
would seem like a broken man to any discerning individual. Yet one of the many 
ironies in the play is that it is when Stanley is at his most ‘broken’ and deflated that he 
is ready to re-join society; indeed, in Goldberg and McCann’s view, the ‘rebirth’ of 
Stanley is an event worthy of celebration, which they mark with a rendition of the 
complimentary gifts that come with being ‘integrated’. Here is a salient section from 
this promotional spiel:       
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GOLDBERG: We’ll make a man of you. 
 MCCANN: And a woman. 
 GOLDBERG: You’ll be re-orientated. 
 MCCANN: You’ll be rich. 
 GOLDBERG: You’ll be adjusted. 
 MCCANN: You’ll be our pride and joy. 
 GOLDBERG: You’ll be a mensch. 
 MCCANN: You’ll be a success. 
 GOLDBERG: You’ll be integrated. 
 MCCANN: You’ll give orders. 
 GOLDBERG: You’ll make decisions…81 
 
With his clean-shaven face, dark suit and broken glasses, Stanley seems like a corpse 
that has been washed, so that he is ready to re-join the ‘living’ as a fellow faceless 
servant. More fully, for Stanley to accept such doctrines, he must have committed 
what is tantamount to an act of self-murder, as he is now even bereft of an individual 
‘voice’. This is painfully evident when Goldberg asks him what he thinks about his 
‘social contract’: 
 
GOLDBERG: Well, Stanny boy, what do you say, eh?   
 STANLEY: Ug–gughh… uh–gughhh… 
 MCCANN: What’s your opinion, sir? 
 STANLEY: Caahhh… caahhh…82 
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Without a voice to argue back with, or glasses to ‘see’ his own truth, Stanley is now 
like his new mentor Goldberg, who always sat where he was told to sit. Indeed, at the 
play’s conclusion, Pinter underscores Stanley’s degree of subjection, his newfound 
readiness to be led, by having Petey cry out, ‘Stan, don’t let them tell you what to 
do’83, whilst Goldberg and McCann usher him into their car. On this dispiriting note, 
the audience now knows that Stanley will, on the contrary, let ‘them’ tell him what to 
do for a very long time. 
In conclusion, I believe that Stanley’s act of self-murder is, without question, 
perturbing, but it was nevertheless fated, given his psychology. From a psycho-
political perspective, the main virtue of this play is that Stanley’s fate possesses a 
representative quality, as the dishevelled pianist embodies that tendency in human 
nature, which seeks exemption from responsibilities, either through exceptional talent 
or shameless trickery. More fully, as I have argued earlier, Stanley’s neurotic 
ambition to realize his ‘unique touch’ was motivated by an existential death anxiety 
that compelled him to try and flee from the laws, regulations and responsibilities that 
constrain ‘mere’ mortals.  However, as we have seen, this existential stance creates 
profound moral difficulties, as it incites much unconscious guilt, since the vain, self-
serving individualist recognises on a subconscious level that ‘exemption’ requires the 
exploitation of others. Indeed, it is this guilt that fuels a countertrend to Stanley’s faux 
individualism, because when it acquires enough force, his self-hatred drags him down 
to become like his conformist victimisers. Intriguingly enough, Pinter himself noted at 
one point that Stanley’s essential problem was a lack of self-acceptance:    
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Stanley cannot perceive his only valid justification–which is he is what he is–
therefore he certainly can never be articulate about it. He knows only to justify 
himself by dream, by pretence and by bluff, through fright. If he had cottoned 
on to the fact that he need only admit to himself what he actually is and is not, 
then Goldberg and McCann would not have paid their visit, or if they had, the 
same course of events would have by no means been assured.84 
 
Although Pinter does not mention guilt in his brief commentary, he does nevertheless 
articulate the seeming paradox of Stanley’s existence, namely that pretending to be 
‘more’ than what he is, he ends up being ‘less’ than what he is. In this psycho-
political play, then, it can be said that Pinter makes the provocative and somewhat 
paradoxical assertion that those who seek to flee from existential death anxiety (which 
authoritarianism, in particular, exacerbates85) by giving themselves over to 
worshipping a radically ‘unique’ self, nevertheless leave themselves open to the 
seductions of authoritarianism. As the case of Stanley Webber shows, a pseudo-
individualist cannot provide any prolonged and sustained inner resistance to autocratic 
rule, as a fixation on exceptionality precludes the possibility of being an individual 
within a society, whilst the guilt induced by this existential stance acts like a vortex, 
sucking the person into the trap of inner assent. Overall, this rebounding ‘process’ is 
wonderfully exemplified by Stanley Webber, as he is a modern day Icarus, who, in 
seeking to fly above everyone else, finally decides to plummet and become ‘Joe 
Soap’.    
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One for the Road and Party Time 
In the third act of The Birthday Party, the ‘renowned’ spokesman for tradition and the 
family finds himself at a loss for words: 
 
GOLDBERG: …And you’ll find that what I say is true. Because I believe that 
the world….(Vacant)…Because I believe that the 
world…(Desperate)…BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THE 
WORLD…(Lost)…86 
 
Goldberg’s sudden inability to articulate a coherent life philosophy cannot be put 
down as a merely personal failing; in reality, it is an inherent weakness, a fault-line in 
what can be termed the authoritarian mind-set, as those mired in an autocratic 
perspective have nothing but contempt for any form of reflective pursuit. In One for 
the Road, Nicholas perfectly captures this sentiment when he castigates his victim for 
his ‘needless’ thinking: ‘He [a member of the party] didn’t think like you shit bags. 
He lived’.87  
One of the most important implications of this contemptuous attitude towards 
the authority-defying act of critical scrutiny is that the autocrat does not uphold his 
political stance due to it expressing, in his opinion, a coherent and cogent political 
philosophy. On the contrary, from a psycho-political perspective, it seduces the 
authoritarian personality, as it is an answer to his most insistent and tortuous needs.  
In this section, I will offer readings of two plays (namely One for the Road 
and Party Time) in order to determine Pinter’s own understanding of why the 
authoritarian individual needs to be bound to an autocratic regime. More specifically, 
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I will argue that Pinter suggests that the authoritarian is seduced by autocratic 
regimes, because, on an emotional and cognitive level, such societies, with their 
‘either/or’ worldview, play into his phantasy of omnipotent control; furthermore, I 
will also propose that Pinter suggests that the autocrat suffers from a fragile body ego, 
which means that he seeks out ‘hypermasculine’, authoritarian societies, because they 
provide a much needed sense of boundaries, as they preclude, as much as possible, the 
terrifying threat of ‘merger’ with the despised other. 
 To support my readings of these plays, I will preface my close readings with 
two theoretical subsections denoted by ‘A’ and ‘B’. Firstly, I will provide a brief 
discussion of some key Winnicottian theory, which helps to explain the essential 
features of the authoritarian’s political ‘style’ i.e., his splitting of the world into the 
‘ideal’ and the ‘debased’, and his futile quest for omnipotent control over his destiny.  
In the second sub-section, I will offer a very brief discussion of Mahler’s notion of the 
symbiotic stage of development, as this idea can account for why the autocrat must 
erect a form of body armour to prevent any kind of merger with what is deemed as 
oppositional to the body politic.    
I 
              (A) 
It is indeed a truism that a psycho-political explanation of authoritarian societies is 
premised upon an examination of what could be termed the authoritarian personality, 
as it is this character type that is so insistently drawn to autocratic forms of 
government. In his book on psychosis and power, James M. Glass indeed offers such 
an explanation when he proposes that authoritarian political stances might be 
construed as an ‘objective correlative’ of the self’s extreme regression: 
 
 73 
To understand the extremes of the political process, it may be necessary to 
examine the extremes of human regression and, even more important, to listen 
for the origins of those extremes in the self’s intrapsychic history. Selves have 
histories just as nations do. It may therefore be useful to look for the 
motivating states and polities in the dynamics of psychological development 
and the vicissitudes of psychosis.88 
 
Glass makes the provocative point that there is a correlation between political 
progress and emotional development, such that the authoritarian character is, in the 
psychological sense, still an infant. The reasoning behind Glass’ position is that the 
autocratic individual exists in a state of suspended development, as he seeks sanctuary 
in outmoded, almost psychotic forms of thinking and of relating. Indeed, the 
psychodynamic view posits that the fundamental characteristic of the authoritarian 
individual is that he is a ‘reality-denier’, as he may not be psychotic per se, but, at the 
very least, there is a psychotic and regressive dimension to his personality.  
Assuming that this psychodynamic view provides a cogent account of the 
psychology of authoritarianism, the following question may be asked: how does the 
autocratic self’s ‘regression’ affect its style of thinking and relating? To answer this, 
at least provisionally, we must first consider the psychological mechanism known as 
projective identification (PI). In the following two excerpts, Kleinian commentators 
offer a succinct definition of the phenomenon before elaborating upon how PI actually 
serves as a defence mechanism: 
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Projective identification is an unconscious phantasy in which aspects of the 
self or of an internal object are split off and attributed to an external object. 
The projected aspects may be felt by the projector to be either good or bad.89 
 
Projective identification has manifold aims: it may be directed towards the 
ideal object to avoid separation, or it may be directed towards the bad object to 
gain control of the source of danger. Various parts of the self may be 
projected, with varying aims: disowned parts of the self may be projected to 
avoid separation or keep them safe from bad things inside or to improve the 
external object through a kind of primitive projective reparation.90 
 
The above descriptions suggest that PI determines the autocrat’s being-in-the-world in 
three fundamental ways. Firstly, an individual, who uses the mechanism of PI does 
not try to resolve his inner conflicts in any kind of dialectical manner; instead, he 
externalises his purportedly ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aspects, as he transforms an inner battle 
into an outer conflict, where he can choose ‘sides’. This explains why the autocrat 
desperately seeks ‘salvation’ through the resolution of schematic and partisan political 
conflicts. Secondly, and following on from this, the authoritarian character’s use of PI 
means that he lives according to a dualistic worldview, as beliefs and people are 
categorised as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. It is this lamentable tendency to rigidly 
dichotomise that accounts for why the authoritarian character holds such inflexible 
and simplistic views. Finally, and perhaps most revealingly, an individual that uses 
the primitive mechanism of PI as their default position is condemned to a solipsistic 
existence, as they either identify with certain features or denigrate them, not realising, 
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of course, that they are their own traits. It is this misrecognition that lends a tragic 
dimension to the authoritarian’s existence, because no matter how much he pretends 
that he belongs to a community of like minds, he is precluded from the fulfilments of 
true relatedness. Genuine relatedness, after all, requires the individual to acknowledge 
both similarity and difference, whereas the authoritarian’s plight is that he only 
acknowledges the ‘ideal’ or the ‘debased’.      
The above discussion allows us to draw several important, albeit somewhat 
provisional, conclusions: the autocrat’s dichotomous worldview finds authoritarian 
societies a plausible form of government, because they provide the illusion of 
certainty, and the perceived virtue that peace will reign when the enemy is ‘taken out’. 
Nevertheless, there are deeper, more hidden motivations than these ones, which Glass 
makes reference to when he explains why the autocrat fails to engage in political 
dialogue: 
 
Psychosis or delusion precludes such meditations [i.e., an awareness of 
otherness, ambivalence and tolerance] because of the absolute, all-or-nothing 
quality of delusional projection and definition. To move, then, from the 
isolation of infancy and phantasies of omnipotence to ‘being with’ others is to 
find oneself in a political world, a world of mediation, compromise, otherness, 
relationship, mutuality, and so on.91 
 
The telling phrase here is ‘phantasies of omnipotence’, as Glass implies that the 
authoritarian exists, existentially speaking, at a liminal stage, as he regresses to a state 
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of delusory omnipotent control, because the ‘world of mediation’ demands, so he 
thinks, a relinquishing of his power and a giving over to irresolvable uncertainty. 
 In order to understand better why the autocratic personality can oscillate 
between omnipotent power and profound impotence, and between righteous certitude 
and floundering doubt, it is helpful to examine some of Winnicott’s theories 
concerning the initial stages of emotional development (i.e., the first six months of 
life). In the following passage, Winnicott describes how the mother’s adaptation, 
when it is ‘good enough’, allows the infant to believe temporarily in its own 
‘omnipotence’: 
 
In the first case the mother’s adaptation is good enough and in consequence 
the infant begins to believe in external reality, which appears and behaves as 
by magic (because of the mother’s relatively successful adaptation to the 
infant’s gestures and needs), and which acts in a way that does not clash with 
the infant’s omnipotence. On this basis the infant can gradually abrogate 
omnipotence. The True self has a spontaneity and this can be joined up with 
the world’s events.92 
 
Winnicott articulates quite a complex, almost paradoxical picture here, as he believes 
that, in order for the infant to have the existential nerve to abrogate omnipotence, he 
must be first convinced about his omnipotent control. In simpler terms, what 
Winnicott posits is that the young infant lives solely according to the pleasure 
principle, which means, in essence, that he must be sufficiently convinced that the 
world will dutifully obey his insistent callings; in fact, as Winnicott suggests, it is 
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only when such demands are consistently met that the infant is willing to relinquish 
his omnipotent control, since he possesses enough faith in the world’s reliability. 
Now, if such an abrogation indeed begins to take place, Winnicott calls this a move 
from ‘object-relating’ to ‘object-use’, which he believes is the decisive, and most 
difficult step in human development: 
 
In the sequence one can say that there is object-relating, then in the end there 
is object-use; in between, however, is the most difficult thing, perhaps, in 
human development; or the most irksome of all the early failures that come for 
mending. This thing that there is in between relating and use is the subject’s 
placing of the object outside the area of the subject’s omnipotent control; that 
is, the subject’s perception of the object as an external phenomenon, not as a 
projective entity, in fact recognition of it as an entity in its own right.93    
 
According to Winnicottian theory, the authoritarian personality is a casualty of 
‘insecure’ omnipotence followed by a deep-seated angst about relinquishing control 
and acknowledging otherness. More fully, in his early life, the autocratic individual 
could not quite muster the existential conviction in his omnipotence, because when 
his mother, on occasion, did not arrive, he felt profoundly alone and powerless; this is 
why as an adult he is now susceptible to despairing impotence if he cannot attach 
himself to a secure ‘object correlative’ of his ‘good’ part i.e., an authoritarian system. 
Likewise, the authoritarian originally fled, as it were, from the ‘cliff edge’ of object-
usage, because externalising the object meant only the admittance of defeat, as 
otherness, with its conspicuous independence, thwarted his control; it was indeed 
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better, he unconsciously thought, to remain at the stage where everything is conceived 
as a mirror image of the self. In Winnicott’s view, this attempt to domesticate 
otherness might be successful most of the time, but he suggests that the authoritarian 
personality never really forgets that traumatic ‘fling’ with the contingent, as he 
continually and desperately tries, in his adult life, to avoid the ‘fall’ from omnipotence 
and certitude that it brings in its wake.  
     (B) 
In this sub-section, I wish to explore the nature of what could be termed the 
autocratic body ego, as this notion constitutes the central aspect of my analysis of 
Party Time. To begin the discussion: according to Freud, the self is no Cartesian soul, 
as it is fundamentally a corporeal form: ‘the ego is first and foremost a body ego’.94 
He goes on to explain the connection as follows: 
 
The ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those 
springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental 
projection of the surface of the body.95  
 
In terms of the autocratic personality, the type of body ego it possesses can be called a 
kind of body ‘armour’, as it is intended to create a rigid demarcation between the 
‘outer’ and the ‘inner’. One way of explaining why this is so is to consider the notion 
of hypermasculinity, which Michael Kimmel defines as a pathological accentuation of 
what a culture deems masculine: 
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Although many beliefs or behaviours may be generally ‘masculine’ in 
appearance, the prefix ‘hyper’ implies a sense of extremes, and in so doing it 
suggests that what is ‘hyper’ masculine has become masculine in the wrong 
way. It is masculinity somehow out of control…Hypermasculinity always 
exists oppositionally in relation to forms of femininity (and, theoretically, 
hyperfemininity). What is hypermasculine, then, is always hyper-not-
feminine.96   
 
If femininity, as a construction, is typically construed as being both yielding and 
‘open’, hypermasculinity, in contrast, is evidently both domineering and ‘closed’. 
Indeed, providing that we accept Freud’s thesis about psychophysical parallelism (i.e., 
that the mental sphere has a ‘parallel’ feature in the organic sphere), then the notion of 
‘hypermasculinity’ accords well with what we would expect of an autocratic body 
ego, as the authoritarian’s inflexible beliefs and his enforced separation from what is 
disowned are a mental projection of an ‘armour’ that maintains rigid, unyielding 
boundaries. In a very real sense, then, this account is merely a corporeal retelling of 
the Winnicottian theory presented earlier, as the fear of ‘permeable’ physical 
boundaries is analogous to the profound anxiety that comes from the power-hungry 
self opening itself up to otherness. In fact, the authoritarian’s body is like his mind, as 
nothing deemed different from the self is allowed to ‘penetrate’.   
 Nevertheless, although all of the above may indeed be the case (providing, of 
course, that we accept some of the postulates of classical Freudian theory), there is 
still the question of how this ‘hypermasculine armour’ originates, and what this 
‘armour’ means in terms of concrete human relations. Whilst I have alluded to how 
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this body armour might come into being according to Winnicottian theory, I find it 
more useful to contemplate the process in terms which were laid down by another 
object-relations theorist, namely Margaret Mahler. More fully, her notion of the 
symbiotic stage of development (a stage that concludes at five months of age) 
proposes that the originally unclear distinction between subject (baby) and object 
(mother) ends if the caregiver has provided enough empathic mirroring for the infant, 
as this mirroring strengthens the baby’s sense of self on a mental and somatic level. 
Here are a few salient quotes from Mahler: 
 
All other conditions being equal, symbiosis was optimal when the mother 
naturally permitted the young infant to face her; that is, permitted and 
promoted eye contact.97 
The primary method of identity formation consists of mutual reflection during 
the symbiotic phase.98 
To be found by mother; to be seen by her (that is to say, to be mirrored by her) 
seems to build body awareness.99 
 
What Mahler appears to be suggesting is that the baby’s emotional and somatic life is 
made ‘real’ by the mother reflecting back what he feels, and it is this ‘reflecting’ that, 
for the first time, ‘individuates’ the baby.  Indeed, whilst this individuation process is 
by no means over by the time that the symbiotic stage draws to a close, a successful 
negotiation of this phase means that self and other are beginning to be clearly 
differentiated. 
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 Given this notion of ‘symbiosis’ it is therefore quite straightforward to provide 
one possible explanation for the formation of a hypermasculine armour. According to 
Mahler’s theory, those individuals who need to erect a strong armour to clearly 
differentiate between self and other are those that never successfully negotiated the 
symbiotic stage. This has two main consequences. Firstly, there will be a pronounced 
fear of instinctual excitation, particularly of the sexual kind, as this requires a 
‘merger’ between self and other in order for the instinct to be satisfied. The reason 
why this is so frightening is that there is a visceral fear of engulfment, as a fragile, 
non-individuated self, can easily become symbiotically intertwined with the object. 
Secondly, and related to the first point, such individuals require various kinds of 
‘buffers’, as these buffers purportedly offer protection against a merger between self 
and other. The most notable kind of buffer, which will be discussed later, is a 
‘devivifying’ one, as this is a means of keeping instinctual excitation to a minimum.        
II  
In his biography of Pinter, Michael Billington explains that One for the Road was 
written as a damning riposte to Turkish state oppression: 
 
It was also written in response to a very particular situation: Pinter’s growing 
awareness of the systematic use of torture by the Turkish state and its 
oppression of writers, intellectuals, peace campaigners and racial minorities. 
Whereas in the past there had been a long gestation period between the image 
and its expression, in this case Pinter was driven to write the play in a state of 
controlled fury.100   
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Since Pinter is a psycho-political playwright, it is nevertheless to be expected that this 
work achieves a greater degree of generality than the specific situation, which 
motivated the writer to pen the play. Consequently, Charles Grimes’ apt description of 
the play makes no mention of Turkey itself, but instead depicts it as a study of the 
autocratic personality: 
 
The play examines the relationship between individual psychology and power, 
exploring the notion of whether there is a type of personality attracted to 
positions of power and dominance. One for the Road also investigates the 
psychology of a torturer or leader who kills or sacrifices others for his ideals, 
country, group, or faith, posing the recurrent, but perhaps unanswerable, 
question of how such a person may reconcile murderous deeds with a positive 
self-image.101     
 
Grimes describes this work as an attempt, in dramatic form, to explore a 
psychological ‘illness’, which manifests itself as an acute and worrying contradiction: 
an ‘afflicted’ individual holds the most stringent of ideals, yet commits the most 
reprehensible of acts. Of course, Pinter, quite astutely, recognised that there is no 
underlying contradiction: authoritarians construe murderous acts as a means of 
upholding their stringent ideals. As Pinter appreciated, the underlying question 
becomes this: what is the existential purpose of upholding these beliefs?     
 The play itself opens on a typically mordant note, as the first scene 
demonstrates how callously power can be wielded. A bruised and dejected rebel 
named Victor is ushered into the room of a state official named Nicholas, only to then 
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be subjected to a rather bizarre exchange. After remarking that they are both 
‘civilised’, Nicholas springs to his feet, and moves his fingers in front of the victim’s 
eyes: 
 
What do you think this is? It’s my finger. And this is my little finger. This is 
my big finger and this is my little finger. I wave my big finger in front of your 
eyes. Like this. And now I do the same with my little finger.  I can also use 
both…at the same time. Like this. I can do anything I like. Do you think I am 
mad? My mother did. He laughs.102 
 
Nicholas clearly enjoys, in his own twisted fashion, exercising great power over his 
victim, as he boasts, unlike a true civilised man, that his actions will face no 
opposition: ‘I can do anything I like’. Already Pinter has established the fundamental 
irony of the authoritarian personality, as Nicholas depicts himself as a man that has 
achieved a high degree of moral integrity, when, in reality, he shows the true cost of a 
misguided integrity. Indeed, his conviction about his apparently unconditional power 
derives part of its sustenance from this malign integrity, because, with the support of 
the state itself, no violent act is ruled out for those that ‘fail’ to adhere to his ideals. In 
a sense, then, upholding justice is too easy for people like Nicholas, as there are no 
‘scales’ of justice, determining the likelihood of being guilty or innocent. 
Nicholas may vaunt his ‘boundless’ power, and he may have the state sanction 
his moral idiocy, but Pinter understood a key unwavering truth about such victimisers: 
they torture as a way of alleviating the pain of their own tortured selves. It is for this 
very reason that Nicholas has power over his victims, but he falls short of being a 
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powerful man, as his insidious need to always prove his ‘power’ suggests that, 
existentially speaking, he is walking on a tightrope poised above some maligned, yet 
unnamed, fate. For example, Nicholas must have his victim’s attention, so that he can 
witness their fear and acquiescence. This is why he is obsessed with their eyes: 
 
Why am I so obsessed with eyes? Am I obsessed with eyes? Possibly. Not my 
eyes. Other people’s eyes. The eyes of people who are brought to me here. 
They’re so vulnerable. The soul shines through them.103 
 
Nicholas’ obsession with ‘vulnerable’ eyes is an excellent illustration of the 
authoritarian’s use of the mechanism of projective identification, as he is 
unconsciously bound to that which lends a corporeal form to his own underlying 
‘weakness’. More fully, this explains both the potency and the danger of confronting 
his enemies because, on the one hand, PI allows him to attack, so it would seem, his 
vulnerability directly; this can lead to feelings of triumphant exultation. On the other 
hand, Nicholas can become bewitched, and therefore undermined, by looking into the 
mirror image of his own purported weakness.  Of course, these tensions cannot be 
overall resolved as long as the authoritarian disowns and persecutes his ‘bad’ feelings, 
which is why Nicholas stoically continues his cruel behaviour, since he is condemned 
to act out set pieces in order to establish his contrived, and thus never fully credible, 
end.  
After looking into those ‘vulnerable’ eyes, Nicholas himself starts to feels 
undermined, as Victor represents his underlying fears. Unsurprisingly, this 
discomfiting confrontation leads to a re-assertion of authority: ‘Everyone respects me 
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here. Including you? I think that is the correct stance’.104 Rather courageously, Victor 
decides not to reply to this question, which then forces Nicholas to affirm his power 
by issuing an order: 
 
Stand up. 
VICTOR stands. 
Sit down. 
Victor sits. 
Thank you so much.105   
 
Nicholas’ petty display of authority does not, of course, convince him that he has won 
his victim’s respect, as he has only been able to alter his enemy’s physical position 
rather than his attitude. He now decides to change his strategy, as he tries to openly 
court approval: 
 
Tell me…one for the road I think… He pours whisky. 
You do respect me, I take it?  
He stands in front of Victor and looks down at him. Victor looks up. 
I would be right in assuming that? 
Silence.  
VICTOR: (Quietly) I don’t know you. 
NICHOLAS: But you respect me.  
VICTOR: I don’t know you. 
NICHOLAS: Are you saying you don’t respect me? 
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Pause. 
Would you like to know me better? 
VICTOR: What I would like…has no bearing on the matter. 
NICHOLAS: Oh yes it has.106 
 
This seems to be a deeply ironic exchange, as it is perhaps counterintuitive that the 
victimiser would openly try to court the approval of the victim. Yet this neediness, if 
it can be called that, on the part of Nicholas signifies the fault-line in the authoritarian 
attitude: Nicholas needs to have his ideological role confirmed as being absolutely 
right, which means he is fated, again and again, to trying to win the assent of the 
dissenters.  Nicholas himself knows that this proving that he has ‘limitless’ power is 
an arduous, almost impossible task, which is why he pours himself a drink, saying for 
the first time, ‘one for the road’.107 Indeed, he has to brace himself for the rocky road 
‘journey’ ahead. 
  Despite Nicholas’ pleas, Victor’s unwavering silence proves, if proof were 
even needed, that he is never going to win his victim’s respect. After a moment of 
acute frustration, the state official quickly decides that self-flattery should be the next 
strategy to console his flailing ego. Consequently, he chooses to laud over his victim 
the supposed benefits of being on his side of the ideological divide: 
 
Who would you prefer to be? You or me? 
Pause. 
I’d go for me if I were you. The trouble about you, although I grant your 
merits, is that you’re on a losing wicket, while I can’t put a foot wrong. Do 
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you take my point? Ah God, let me confess, let me make a confession to you. I 
have never been more moved, in the whole of my life, as when- only the other 
day, last Friday, I believe–the man who runs the country announced to the 
country: we are all patriots, we are as one, we all share a common heritage. 
Except you, apparently. 
Pause. 
I feel a link, you see, a bond. I share a commonwealth of interest. I am not 
alone. I am not alone!108 
 
Nicholas’ description of winning and losing political sides may seem more than a 
trifle cynical, but, in reality, it betrays how the authoritarian perceives his society: his 
government of choice does not so much represent him, as save him. In fact, as 
Nicholas’ monologue implies, it is through a ‘commonwealth of interest’ that he can 
achieve ‘omnipotent’ control over events (‘I can’t put a foot wrong’), thereby keeping 
at bay the threat of impotence that comes from being alone, without anyone to guide 
him. In a subtle and innocuous way, then, what Pinter therefore intimates is that the 
fundamental source of Nicholas’ angst is that, without some kind of stable political 
‘anchor’, he is condemned to be forever blighted by paralyzing impotence and 
profound doubt. Eric Hoffer described this phenomenon when he wrote that, without a 
passionate, blind affirmation of a cause, the authoritarian personality only knows 
dejected isolation: 
 
The fanatic is perpetually incomplete and insecure. He cannot generate self-
assurance out of his individual resources–out of his rejected self–but finds it 
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only by clinging passionately to whatever support he happens to embrace. The 
passionate attachment is the essence of his blind devotion and religiosity, and 
he sees in it the source of all virtue and strength.109 
 
As Hoffer argues, the autocratic personality lacks any intrinsic conviction in his 
capacities for reasoning, which is why he longs for any form of ‘revelatory’ guidance. 
In Nicholas’ case, this longing is evidenced in his contempt for Victor’s lack of 
‘certainty’: 
 
You don’t believe in a guiding light? 
Pause. 
What then? 
Pause. 
So…morally…you flounder in wet shit. You know…like when you’ve eaten a 
rancid omelette.110 
 
This is a rather telling monologue, as Nicholas surmises that Victor’s silence is due to 
him not possessing any starkly clear answers, and so he attributes to him what he feels 
when he is a bereft of a ‘guiding light’: ‘so…morally…you flounder in wet shit’. 
What we have here, then, is Nicholas performing an act of unconscious ventriloquism, 
as the dissident becomes the mouthpiece for his own abject fear of being found, at any 
point, bereft of ‘guidance’. Of course, what continually ‘saves’ Nicholas from this 
fate is that he has associated with the ‘right’ revelatory movement (as he puts it, ‘God 
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speaks through me’111), which is why he passionately clings to authoritarian 
ideologies, as their communitarianism negates underlying isolation, and their moral 
absolutism supports phantasies of omnipotent control, since their schemas purportedly 
represent the world as it is.   
At the conclusion of the play, Victor pleads for Nicholas to end his suffering 
by killing him. As one would expect, the state official expresses no sympathy for his 
plight, but instead admonishes him for giving into ‘despair’: 
 
I hate despair. I find it intolerable. The stink of it gets up my nose. It’s a 
blemish. Despair, old fruit, is a cancer. It should be castrated. Indeed I’ve 
often found that that works.112 
 
Since Nicholas clings to the illusion of omnipotent power, he is trapped in a world 
created by his own projections, which precludes any acknowledgement of Victor’s 
sadness. All he can do instead is propose that this despair ‘should be castrated’, as his 
unconscious logic tells him that, after this decisive act, his own feelings of impotence 
need threaten him no more. Indeed, Nicholas praises death for this very reason, as he 
loves to kill others, and enforce a state of ‘harmony’: 
 
What about you? Do you want death? Not necessarily your own. Others’. The 
death of others. Do you love the death of others, or at any rate, do you love the 
death of others as much as I do? […] 
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Death. Death. Death. Death. As has been noted by the most respected 
authorities, it is beautiful. The purest, harmonious thing there is. Sexual 
intercourse is nothing compared to it.113 
 
Nicholas’s remark that death is the ‘purest, harmonious thing there is’ may seem 
unintelligible at first, but it can be understood if one takes into account that the 
authoritarian seeks peace through the killing of others. According to the authoritarian 
mind-set, murder promises inner harmony, for the reason that his projected ‘bad’ self 
is also expected to meet its demise. In reality, no such harmony can ever be achieved 
in the autocratic soul, as the ‘enemy’ is never truly outside, but actually within.  
Vindication that this is true comes at the end of the play when Nicholas orders 
the removal of Victor’s tongue, so that he can ‘kill’ a dissenting voice. This is indeed 
a barbarous and cruel act, but it is ultimately, above all else, a despairing one: 
Nicholas evidently cannot afford to listen to the voice of dissent, as it would 
undermine the perilous equilibrium that he tries to maintain by living, in the 
ideological sense, at an Olympian height. Thus, as the curtain falls, the audience may 
come to understand that the authoritarian’s conspicuous acts of violence are acts of 
despair, as Nicholas needs to desperately believe that harmony reigns when the 
opposition is silenced.   
III 
When Party Time premiered in October 1991, many London critics dismissed the play 
as only a minor work in the ‘worn out’ Pinter style. Charles Spencer, for example, 
remarked that ‘it is all so glibly and glumly predictable that you feel like 
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screaming’.114 Not all critics, though, were so damning or so patronising, as a few, 
like Irving Wardle, saw the play as a damning indictment of ‘the reported iniquities of 
Africa and Latin America in the perspective of a London Pinter knows inside out’.115 
In terms of the present discussion, Party Time can indeed be construed as an implicit 
critique of specific Fascist governments. Still, Billington makes the commendable 
point that the work was composed in order to explore a more fundamental and general 
topic, namely authoritarian societies’ ‘moral myopia’: 
 
Pinter is not literally suggesting that roadblocks are being set up in Holland 
Park or round-ups are taking place in Belgravia. What he does imply is that 
one of the preconditions of Fascism–a myopic and self-preoccupied wealthy 
elite, totally indifferent to the decisions taken in its name–is becoming 
dangerously apparent in Britain.116  
 
Billington, in my view, is correct that Party Time is an examination of how the 
wealthy, right-wing elite order their moral universe, such that they can be complicit 
with state oppression. Yet, as much as Billington has identified a key theme of the 
play, I believe we must ask that cardinal question: what are the psychological 
characteristics that predispose an individual to uphold an absolutist moral code? Now, 
as the previous reading had demonstrated, Pinter has already offered a penetrating 
examination of the autocratic mind. What distinguishes Party Time from One for the 
Road is that Pinter depicts, in this play, the authoritarian as embodying a form of 
‘hypermasculinity’. In other words, in this work, Pinter takes seriously Freud’s point 
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 92 
that the ego is, first and foremost, a body ego, and so he explores the connection 
between moral code, and gendered corporeal form. 
Party Time begins with a scene that perfectly illustrates the privileged, 
hermetic world of the upper classes: whilst being waited upon by conscientious 
butlers at a dinner party, Terry tells his associate and host, Gavin White, about a club 
he joined recently, where you can play tennis, swim and even receive a hot towel as 
you drink by the pool. The only potential problem is that the club is ‘naturally’ an 
exclusive one: 
 
…But no, these towels I’m talking about are big bath towels, towels for the 
body, I’m just talking about pure comfort, that’s why I’m telling you, the place 
has got real class, it’s got everything. Mind you, there’s a waiting list as long 
as–I mean you’ve got to be proposed and seconded, and then they’ve got to 
check you out, they don’t let any old spare bugger in there, why should 
they?117 
 
Although Essex-man ‘heavy’, Terry, is ostensibly discussing the nature of an 
exclusive health club with his boss, the discerning theatregoer can nevertheless note 
that the speech perfectly encapsulates the authoritarian mentality. As Terry intimates, 
a large part of the appeal is that one has to be chosen for membership, as its 
exclusivity means that the debased, and more importantly, the contingent is denied 
access: ‘they don’t let any spare bugger in there’. These sentiments, of course, accord 
well with the authoritarian personality’s worldview, as this type of character can only 
survive, in the existential sense, if he feels both selected, and saved from the 
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vicissitudes of fate. Dame Melissa echoes these sentiments when she later talks more 
openly about its ‘virtues’: 
 
But our club, our club–is a club which is activated, which is inspired by a 
moral sense, a moral awareness, a set of moral values which is–I have to say–
unshakeable, rigorous, fundamental, constant.118 
 
This speech may be, as far as political rigour goes, vacuously abstract, but it 
nevertheless expresses the viewpoint that provides solace to the autocrat, who divides 
his or her world according to the logic of projective identification. In the case of 
Dame Melissa, she, like the state terrorist, Nicholas, is empowered through her 
identification with an ‘unshakeable’ cause, and she decries the wider world for its 
moral relativism. It never occurs to Dame Melissa that her unyielding convictions are 
only symptomatic of her lust for certainty and for power. 
Although the party talk continues on a self-congratulatory level, it is not long 
before Pinter exposes the partygoers’ moral myopia. The first note of discord is struck 
when Terry’s wife, Dusty, asks about the whereabouts of her brother, Jimmy: 
 
DUSTY: Did you hear what’s happened to Jimmy? What’s happened to 
Jimmy? 
 TERRY: Nothing’s happened. 
 DUSTY: Nothing? 
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GAVIN: Nobody is discussing this. Nobody’s discussing it, sweetie. Do you 
follow me? Nothing’s happened to Jimmy. And if you’re not a good girl I’ll 
spank you.119 
 
It is intimated in the play that the host, Gavin, is responsible for the roadblocks 
outside and for the policing, and so it is quite possible he has some answers. Rather 
disturbingly, however, he, like his henchman, Terry, does not so much deny Dusty’s 
important question, as dismiss it as irrelevant. Evidently, the homosocial world of 
party politics dictates that political affiliations are more important than personal ties, 
as there is more than a hint of a suggestion that a wife’s ‘place’ is not to ask 
bothersome questions: ‘if you’re not a good girl I’ll spank you’. Such an impression is 
confirmed when Dusty says that her brother’s absence is on her ‘agenda’, as Terry, in 
a patronising and misogynistic way, puts her in the picture: 
 
 TERRY: What did you say? 
 DUSTY: I said it’s on my agenda. 
TERRY: No, no, you’ve got it wrong there, old darling. What you’ve got 
wrong there, old darling, what you’ve got totally wrong, is that you don’t have 
any agenda.  Got it? You have no agenda. Absolutely the opposite is the case. 
(To the others.) I’m going to have to give her a real talking to when I get her 
home, I can see that. 
GAVIN: So odd, the number of men who can’t control their wives. 
TERRY: What? 
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GAVIN (to MELISSA): It’s the root of many ills, you know. Uncontrollable 
wives.120 
 
The rigid moralism of authoritarianism cannot descend to the level of the concrete or 
the personal, as its beliefs are not so much tested by reality, as imposed on the world. 
It is for this reason that certain women are deemed ‘uncontrollable’, as they enforce 
an ‘agenda’ based on ties of affection that counteract the austere indifference of the 
male autocrat. Somewhat typically, the authoritarian’s frontline response to this threat 
is to distort reality so that it fits his worldview, which is why Terry nullifies the word 
‘agenda’ so that his wife is denied her sense of moral agency. In fact, this is a covert 
attempt to blunt Dusty’s nascent sense of moral discrimination, in the hope that she 
can remain as a narcissistic socialite, whose only ‘onerous’ duty is to write a cheque. 
Unsurprisingly, Dame Melissa epitomises the authoritarian’s ideal woman, as she 
considers the sinister signs of state intervention as a mere ‘trifle’: 
 
The town’s dead. There’s nobody on the streets, there’s not a soul in sight, 
apart from some…soldiers. My driver had to stop at a …you know…what do 
you call it? A roadblock. We had to say who we were…it really was a 
trifle…121 
 
Given that ‘uncontrollable wives’ are ‘the root of many ills’, according to 
Gavin, it would seem that they serve no constructive purpose for the authoritarian 
male. As the play progresses, however, Pinter’s offers a counterintuitive, insightful 
perspective on this matter, as he intimates that the authoritarian male enjoys 
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triumphing over the sexually aroused female. This can be noted when Dusty 
somewhat teasingly asks Terry if her rebellious behaviour means she is going to be 
killed: 
 
 TERRY: Yes, you’re all going to die together, you and all your lot. 
 DUSTY: How are you going to do it? Tell me. 
TERRY: Easy. We’ve got dozens of options. We could suffocate every single 
one of you at a given signal or we could shove a broomstick up each 
individual arse at another given signal or we could poison all the mother’s 
milk in the world so that every baby would drop dead before it opened its 
perverted bloody mouth. 
DUSTY: But will it be fun for me? Will it be fun? 
TERRY: You’ll love it. But I’m not going to tell you which method we’ll use. 
I just want you to have a lot of sexual anticipation. I want you to look forward 
to whatever the means employed with a lot of sexual anticipation.122 
 
This is one of the more unusual forms of sexual seduction, as both Terry and Dusty 
imagine the punishment for a political ‘crime’ as a sadomasochistic romp. Such a 
perverse view implies several things, both of which reveal a great deal about the 
authoritarian male. Firstly, the sexually aroused female represents for the authoritarian 
male his ‘dirty’, nonconformist side, for the reason that the sexual act is an intense 
form of merger; consequently, it constitutes a very threatening potential loss of 
boundaries, which implies, for the authoritarian, that they could be ‘floundering in 
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wet shit’123, as dissenters apparently do. Thus, the sexual act, for the authoritarian 
male, must be construed as a form of violence, indeed as an attempt to phallically 
conquer that which threatens the dissolution of the self: ‘we could shove a broomstick 
up each individual arse’.  
Secondly, the above discussion implies that the autocrat possesses a rigid body 
ego (or what might be better termed a ‘body armour’), as the act of merger is found to 
be so threatening to them. This would make sense, as the authoritarian must use the 
mechanism of projective identification, which separates the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ by 
projecting the latter ‘outside’. More fully, as a result of this unconscious manoeuvre, 
the authoritarian must reinforce his body ego boundary, lest he either comes in too 
close contact with that which represents the ‘bad’, or that which threatens the 
dissolution of the boundary due to excitation. Unsurprisingly, then, the authoritarian’s 
body ego must assume a ‘hypermasculine’ form: ‘hard’ and ‘unyielding’.  
One of the ways in which this is achieved is intimated by the social critic, 
Klaus Theweleit, who argued that the authoritarian male pays tribute to the domestic 
female, because her moral ‘unity’ and calm exterior help bolster his body armour: 
 
 
She [the authoritarian’s spouse] produces order in domestic space and 
functions as a barrier to ward off sexual danger; she is a subordinate 
and devivified buttress to the ‘unity’ of the soldier male. He might 
almost be said to use her as part of his body-armour.124 
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The domestic female poses no threat to the integrity of the body armour, as her 
maternal and wifely solicitude poses no threat of merger; furthermore, the supposed 
purity of her motives creates a sanitised domestic space that reinforces the body 
armour’s demarcation of ‘pure’= ‘inside’, and ‘impure=outside’. Pinter himself 
alludes to this worshipping of a ‘pure’ domestic space when he has Terry sing Dusty’s 
praises as a mother:  
 
 
But this girl here, this little girl here, do you know what she did? She looked 
after those twins all by herself! No maid, no help, nothing. She did it herself–
all by herself. And when I got back from my travelling I would find the flat 
immaculate, the twins bathed and in bed, tucked up in bed, fast asleep, my 
wife looking beautiful and my dinner in the oven.125 
 
 
While Pinter does not make any explicit reference to the authoritarian male’s 
body armour, in an allusive fashion, he proposes that the autocratic male 
unconsciously conceives of his society as being analogous to strong body armour. 
This can be observed when Douglas and Fred talk about stopping the protests on the 
streets, as the former articulates the kind of peace that they envision: 
 
 FRED: I admire people like you. 
 DOUGLAS: So do I. 
 FRED clenches his fist. 
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 FRED: A bit of that. 
 DOUGLAS clenches his fist. 
 DOUGLAS: A bit of that. 
 Pause. 
 FRED: How’s it going tonight? 
DOUGLAS: Like clockwork. Look. Let me tell you something. We want 
peace. We want peace and we’re going to get it. 
FRED: Quite right. 
DOUGLAS: We want peace and we’re going to get it. But we want that peace 
to be cast iron. No leaks. No draughts. Cast iron. Tight as a drum. That’s the 
kind of peace we want and that’s the kind of peace we’re going to get. A cast 
iron peace.126 
 
Douglas describes the kind of ‘peaceful’ society that they want as being similar to a 
cast iron container, as this is an expression of his party’s unconscious need to possess 
a body ego that is also hard and unyielding. Pinter supports this interpretation when 
he has Charlotte compliment Fred on his fitness, as her use of the word ‘regime’ to 
describe his lean body implies that the authoritarian worldview is coupled with firm 
and tense body armour: 
 
CHARLOTTE: God, your looks! No, seriously. You’re still so handsome! 
How do you do it? What’s your diet? What’s your regime? What is your 
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regime by the way? What do you do to keep yourself so…I don’t 
know…so…oh, I don’t know…so trim, so fit?127 
 
As these passages suggest, the authoritarian’s being-in-the-world is a precarious one, 
as his body ego must be protected and reinforced, first and foremost, through 
identifying with the embodiments of his chosen ideology (e.g., his regime’s uniform). 
The other, less obvious way is to dominate the sexually aroused female, as the 
authoritarian’s dominance, his unwillingness to ‘yield’ to his partner, bolsters his 
existential conviction that he can confront the sexualised other, without giving into 
the terrifying threat of merger.  
In conclusion, Party Time’s examination of gender roles in an authoritarian 
society conveyed Pinter’s views on why these regimes can be characterized as 
hypermasculine, and how this hypermasculinity is maintained on a corporeal level. 
More fully, since the autocrat adheres to strict, uniform views, they must, on a bodily 
level, adopt physical forms that reinforce an unyielding difference between that which 
is ideologically supported, and that which is part of the self, but rejected through 
projection. Pinter intimates several ways that this rigid body ego is maintained. 
Firstly, the autocrat moves in ‘select’ circles, whether it be social clubs, parties, or 
indeed living arrangements that are separated from those ‘bad’ dissenters by the 
erection of firm boundaries, such as roadblocks. Secondly, the identification with a 
‘pure’ domestic space helps to rigidly exclude whatever is deemed, in an ideological 
sense, as corrupting. In gender terms, what this implies is that women, in general, 
must play submissive roles in an autocratic society, as Pinter suggests that the 
domestic role requires a subservient wife, who constructs, at home, what the 
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authoritarian demands for his own psychological integrity: an ordered world untainted 
by whatever is deemed morally unwholesome. Furthermore, the sexualised female 
must also submit to the autocratic male, because he has to control, as much as 
possible, the intensity of the sexual act, lest it leads to a dissolution of much-needed 
boundaries, and the existential predicament of losing the clear demarcations between 
the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’.        
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the question of why Pinter believes that authoritarian 
ideologies can be so seductive for both the oppressors and the oppressed. In this 
concluding section, I wish to summarise Pinter’s ‘diagnostic’, psycho-political 
understanding of the psychological ‘illness’ that supports and reinforces authoritarian 
political structures. 
 The Birthday Party explored how Stanley Webber’s self-effacement (or, more 
precisely, his self-murder) was a cathartic release from his deeply entrenched guilt 
feelings, which were originally caused by his hubristic quest for ‘exceptionality’. 
More fully, Pinter implied that Stanley’s resultant submission did not arise from his 
deep-seated wish to vaunt the self through allegiance to tradition; on the contrary, his 
compliance was due to a rebound effect, as he, with his worshipping of his ‘unique 
touch’, had vaunted his own self too much. Generally speaking, then, what Pinter 
suggested is that authoritarian societies have the potential to seduce the guilt-ridden, 
responsibility-denying ‘individualist’, as their overemphasis on collectivism and duty 
promises a much-needed form of self-erasure that acts as a punishing corrective to his 
excessive worship of ‘death-defying uniqueness’. What Pinter therefore proposed in 
this work is that the Stanley Webbers of this world are seduced by autocratic political 
structures because their submission is a guilt-expiating, masochistic act that replaces 
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one form of extremism with another. An alternative way of putting this is that The 
Birthday Party proposes, as its essential dramatic theme, that the punitive paternalism 
of authoritarian societies can be welcomed if the individual’s unconscious moral 
‘centre’ wishes the ‘exceptional’ individual to be thoroughly punished for his 
exploitation of others. 
One for the Road is Pinter’s in-depth exploration of what can be called the 
‘authoritarian personality’. In this work, Pinter is implicitly asking the question, ‘Why 
are people like Nicholas so drawn to a barbarous and simplistic political ideology?’ 
His answer, as detailed earlier, is quite complex and sophisticated, as it consists of 
two interdependent ‘layers’. Firstly, Pinter suggests that the authoritarian individual is 
seduced by autocratic ideologies, as he is compelled, like the regime itself, to split the 
world into dichotomous factions (e.g., ‘good’ and evil; ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; the 
‘saved’ and the ‘sinful fallen’). As Pinter intimates, such individuals have a split 
psyche, as they are driven to divide both the world and themselves according to the 
logic of projective identification; in other words, they project out their ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ parts, which then leads them to identify with a regime that embodies the former, 
whilst persecuting a scapegoat that represents the latter. Of course, what they are 
conspicuously unable to do is tolerate ambivalence, as both their thoughts and their 
feelings are dominated by a metaphysics of ‘either/or’. Such an extremist worldview 
has dire ethical consequences, as authoritarians, like Nicholas, can see nothing 
redemptive in their enemies, nor are they able to acknowledge their own human 
tendency to err.       
Secondly, Pinter also provides, at least implicitly, an underlying reason for the 
autocrat’s embracing of a dichotomous worldview: by means of his depiction of the 
state-sanctioned terrorist, Nicholas, he surmises that the authoritarian personality is 
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‘reduced to becoming omnipotent’128, as Wilfred Bion puts it. Indeed, like Winnicott, 
Pinter suggests that the autocratic individual is trapped at a regressive stage of 
emotional development where he cannot acknowledge ‘otherness’, as he can only 
either exult in an ‘unassailable’ sense of righteousness, or experience a terrifyingly 
lonely and humiliating loss of control that comes with a loss of contact with the 
world. This almost ‘bi-polar’ oscillation can be observed, for example, when Nicholas 
says he ‘can’t put a foot wrong’,129 which was a means of suppressing the underlying 
dreaded feelings of abject loneliness: ‘I am not alone. I am not alone!’130 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Pinter suggests that the daimonic drive of  the 
authoritarian personality is for power and epistemic security, as  he needs to believe 
that there is a ‘non-contingent anchor’ in the world that he can unwaveringly rely on, 
otherwise he plummets into a profoundly impotent and solipsistic state. In other 
words, this vacillation between unequivocal power and acute desolation is due to the 
authoritarian personality being unable to accept, or even recognise, that any realistic 
relationship to others is founded upon the acceptance of similarity and difference; all 
he knows instead is either all-embracing identification or dis-identification. 
Consequently, the authoritarian personality does not relate to people, but instead to 
signifiers of his own (dis)owned self; for example, in the play itself, Nicholas is 
unable to empathise with Victor’s ‘vulnerability’ and ‘despair’, but sees them as 
grounds for excising his tongue.  All in all, it is only someone who is so profoundly 
isolated and doubtful that wishes to hold such a sanitised world in so tight a grasp. 
Party Time furthered Pinter’s exploration of the authoritarian personality, as it 
highlighted what could be called the embodied dimension of their pathology. 
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According to the playwright, the autocrat’s body ego must make a clear demarcation 
between ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ (or, to put it another way, between the ‘good’ and the 
‘bad’), which means that he must support this ‘border’ by aligning himself with 
physical embodiments that offer a strong identity, otherwise he can easily find himself 
caught in a terrifying existential predicament that Mahler’s theory describes i.e., a 
‘descent’ into symbiotic engulfment with the other. 
 In terms of the play itself, Pinter suggests two ways in which this body ego is 
‘propped up’ by an autocratic society and its ideology. Firstly, using allusive means, 
Pinter has two of his autocratic partygoers discuss the kind of ‘peaceful’ society that 
they envision, which is predicated upon it being ‘No leaks. No draughts. Cast iron. 
Tight as a drum.’131 What Pinter is drawing attention to here with these metaphors is 
that, just as the authoritarian personality needs strong epistemic boundaries, he also 
requires to erect a body armour that will neither ‘leak’ the goodness he has identified 
with, nor allow anything he disowns to ‘blow’ through. A good example of this is the 
setting of Party Time, as the room is in an exclusive area, which has been bordered off 
by the state police. 
Secondly, by means of his depiction of the sexual politics of the play, Pinter 
shows that an authoritarian personality is drawn to autocratic regimes, as their gender 
divisions resonate with his ‘hypermasculine’ corporeality. More specifically, 
classifying women as either pure as snow wives or dangerous sluts serves the 
autocrat’s purpose of being able to physically bond with something ‘untainted’, whilst 
phallically conquering that which threatens him with the dissolution of his identity. In 
both these cases, the autocrat is, with his hypermasculine emphasis, dominating 
women, as he either reduces them to acting as a shield, or he ‘conquers’ them so that 
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he does not, through sexual excitement, lose his divisive orientation through merger. 
Overall, Pinter intimates that the misogynistic gender relationships further reinforce 
the ‘container’ which the autocrat inhabits. 
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Chapter 3: The Territorial Imperative: rooms as ‘burrows’ 
Introduction 
In a 1960 BBC interview, Pinter spoke candidly about what had gripped his 
imagination as a playwright, as he explained that what ‘invited’ him into his plays 
was a recurring image pregnant with meaning: 
 
Two people in a room–I am dealing a great deal of the time with this image of 
two people in a room. The curtain goes up on stage, and I see it as a very 
potent question: what is going to happen to these two people in a room?132  
 
No one could disagree that the originary scenario of two people in a room does indeed 
raise many plot questions; Pinter nevertheless defines this scenario as raising a ‘very 
potent question’. At another point in his interview, Pinter remarks upon his 
characters’ relationship to their rooms, which sheds some light on the importance of 
the scenario, and why this governing image is believed to be so ‘potent’:   
 
[His characters are] scared of what is outside the room. We are all in this 
[situation], all in a room, and outside is the world…which is most inexplicable 
and frightening, curious and alarming.133  
 
For Pinter, two people in a room is not merely a situation; on the contrary, it is an 
inherently dramatic predicament, as such characters are set against a world that can 
seem, at its worst, a frightening and overpowering adversary. 
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 Although the basic meaning of the conflict of ‘room against the world’ is clear 
enough, one of the important questions in Pinter criticism is this: what is the thematic 
significance of this conflict? One answer is that this conflict between room and world 
represents, for Pinter, a tendency in human nature towards a paranoiac being-in-the-
world. More fully, Pinter’s characters are individuals so frightened by the indefinable 
world outside that they quickly ensconce themselves within the comforting familiar 
walls of their homes. Essentially, then, Pinter’s characters embody a territorial 
imperative that is born out of fear of what lies beyond the consciously known and 
accepted; indeed, it is this fear that makes them prize safety too much, blunting their 
awareness of the fact that the seemingly protective walls could be instead the 
boundaries of a prison cell, where their frightened and stifled spirit is held hostage.     
In this chapter, I wish to examine several ways in which Pinter has explored 
what could be called a pathological territorial imperative, as his insular characters are 
driven to make their homes into a compensatory world. Firstly, I will consider A 
Slight Ache (1958), as this play illustrates the consequences of the sustained use of the 
psychological mechanism of projection i.e., where the precarious ‘boundaries’ of the 
mind are maintained by displacing the ‘dirt’ of the psyche onto the outside world, 
beyond the confines of the home. As will become clear, the use of projection is the 
fundamental feature of the Pinteresque territorial imperative, as what Pinter’s 
characters flee from is a world that mirrors their own anxieties, inadequacies, and 
sometimes their deepest, most unarticulated needs. More fully, in terms of A Slight 
Ache, I will argue, using the Freudian notion of the ‘uncanny’, that the imperative to 
carve out a homely, if somewhat castle-like, territory is due to the occupant defining 
their identity as though it were a piece of land to be protected from assailants; 
nevertheless, as Pinter’s play shows, this defensive and reclusive way of being-in-the-
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world can easily be punctured when a special kind of intruder (i.e., a ‘familiar 
stranger’) returns, and transforms the homely into the unhomely. Furthermore, once 
this more general point has been established, I intend to argue that the psycho-
political significance of this play is that Pinter’s invocation of the concept of 
projection helps one to understand better how class distinctions are supported and 
maintained.    
Secondly, I will provide a reading of Pinter’s first play, The Room (1957). 
What I intend to argue, using the Winnicottian notion of the holding space, is this: the 
territorial imperative can sometimes be an expression of an attempt to secure a 
facilitating, holding environment, where the dependent, nascent self can be nurtured 
in a world free of threat and filled with love; in other words, the territorial imperative 
can sometimes represent a need to ‘incubate’ the self in that most primordial of 
settings: home. Indeed, the Winnicottian notion of the holding space will be shown to 
be a useful way to explicate the psycho-political subtext of the play, as Winnicott’s 
idea that the self must use the environment to not only incarnate itself in the body, but 
also to achieve adult independence, serves as a means to understand Pinter’s 
contention that domestic servitude is a woman’s desperate attempt to initiate a 
maturational process. 
Finally, my reading of The Caretaker (1960) will propose that the play 
explores, quite strikingly, how our territories, our homes, can act as a phantasmal 
space that promises the deluded, frightened mind that the individual’s need for love, 
security and esteem can be found in his room rather than in the supposedly hostile 
world outside. More fully, using the Winnicottian notion of transitional space, I intend 
to demonstrate that a compelling reading of this play is that all of the characters battle 
for territory, because each of them, in their own idiosyncratic way, wishes to make the 
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room into a pathological transitional space i.e., an actual room that nevertheless 
serves the individual’s delusion that it satisfies some of his most basic needs.  
After this reading of The Caretaker has been established, I will later show that 
the psycho-political significance of this work is that it dramatizes how in a capitalist 
society each individual is prone to treating the other in a utilitarian fashion, such that 
practically no-one is his brother’s keeper; furthermore, I will also contend that the 
play demonstrates that in a society plagued by modest scarcity, those that are most 
victimised by the shortage retreat into a reclusive world, where their relational needs 
are satisfied by means of unnourishing and ultimately empty delusions.           
A Slight Ache 
      I 
In the previous chapter, projective identification was described as the principal 
psychological defence of the authoritarian personality. For the purposes of this 
section, I now want to explore the relationship between the psychological mechanism 
of projection, and the drive (or compulsion) to carve out a territory. Roy Schafer’s 
definition is a helpful reminder of the main features of projection: 
 
Projection is a process by which an objectionable internal tendency [either an 
id impulse or superego attitude]…is unrealistically attributed to another person 
or to other objects in the environment instead of being recognised as part of 
one’s self.134 
 
Schafer’s definition implies that the process of projection is used to create what can 
be called the ‘territoriality of the self’. As David Bell highlights, projection involves a 
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‘psychic conflict being transformed into a spatial one’135, as the individual 
externalises the disowned part, before dividing the world into two camps separated by 
so-called ‘enemy’ lines. In essence, this process of externalisation can be said to be a 
form of territorial imperative, as the beleaguered individual must erect a wall of 
defence against an enemy that purportedly exists ‘over there’. Indeed, whether their 
territory is their home, neighbourhood or country, such separatist individuals are 
compelled by their paranoid temperament to create an ideological and physical divide 
that is built upon the foundations of blame and self-exculpation. 
These kinds of individuals can be characterised, in one sense, as impostors, as 
their paranoiac logic creates a moral system that is driven by their self-serving, if 
largely unconscious, interests. Freud confirms this when he once famously remarked 
that paranoiac delusions are ‘a caricature of a philosophical system’136, as they reflect 
certain conceptual distinctions about the world, but those very rigid and dichotomous 
distinctions are founded upon untested and invariably specious premises. 
Consequently, their ethical beliefs are both self-serving and self-flattering, as they 
avoid confronting their own perceived weaknesses by blunting their self-awareness 
through indulging in giddy feelings of self-righteousness. In fact, they can easily 
become ‘injustice collectors’, because, in their own imposter-like way, they assume 
morals airs, but never consider their own culpability.  
 Given that the paranoiac lives, on a metaphorical and physical level, within 
circumscribed boundaries, it is to be expected that those who try to cross his threshold 
may possess the power to unsettle his very being. Such individuals can be termed 
‘familiar strangers’, as their presence within the home unwittingly serves to re-
introduce that unsettling, unfamiliar element, which had been previously been 
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externalised and ‘expelled’. This rupture caused by ‘strange familiarity’ can be 
defined as the emergence of the ‘uncanny’, which Nicholas Royle describes as 
follows:  
 
The uncanny is not simply an experience of strangeness or alienation. More 
specifically, it is a commingling of the familiar and unfamiliar… It can consist 
in a sense of homeliness uprooted, the revelation of something unhomely at 
the heart of hearth and home.137 
 
In some respects, what Royle means by the ‘uncanny’ is the ‘return of the repressed’, 
as he implies that impulses or superego attitudes which have been disowned possess 
the power to disturb, in a radical fashion, the enforced homeliness that constitutes the 
ego; indeed, Freud himself remarks in his essay on ‘The Uncanny’ that it is not only 
the homely, but also the unhomely, that bears the trademark sign of being a familiar 
part of the individual’s identity, as repression can never transform the transgressive 
into the alien: 
 
The uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, buts something which is 
familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from 
it only through the process of repression.138      
 
If the unhomely constitutes a kind of paradoxical form of familiarity (i.e., an almost 
assaultive recognition of a familiar strangeness), then the Freudian notion of home 
must be construed as a comforting fiction, which, like the ego itself, ensures a degree 
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of psychological stability and equilibrium in a world that has the innate capacity to 
undermine its sometimes staid harmony. The French theorist, Gaston Bachelard, for 
example, concurs with this view, as his poetic description of what it means to be ‘at-
home’ in the world emphasises that our homes are our origins, a monument of 
stability built out of the human need for some respite from the ever-changing and 
ever-threatening reality outside: 
 
In the life of man, the house thrusts aside contingencies, its councils of 
continuity are unceasing. Without it, man would be a dispersed being. It 
maintains him through the storms of the heavens and through those of life. It 
is body and soul. It is the human being’s first world. Before he is ‘cast into 
the world’, as claimed by certain hasty metaphysics, man is laid in the cradle 
of the house. And always, in our daydreams, the house is a large cradle. A 
concrete metaphysics cannot neglect this fact, this simple fact, all the more, 
since this fact is a value, an important value, to which we return in our 
daydreaming. Being is already a value. Life begins well, it begins enclosed, 
protected, all warm in the bosom of the house.139 
 
Assuming Bachelard’s description to be true in an existential sense, the uncanny 
therefore has the potential to undermine an individual’s psychological stability (or, in 
his terms, ‘continuity’), as a ‘familiar stranger’, carrying the burden of his projections, 
can expose him to the disowned, much-maligned parts of his self when that stranger 
enters his private sanctum. In a very real sense, the ‘unhomely’, or the ‘uncanny’ is 
the shadow side of the paranoiac’s territorial imperative, as a world that is based on 
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the logic of a warring inner geography can never provide the individual with a secure 
sense of being ‘at-home’: those ‘familiar strangers’, embodying what has been 
banished from self-awareness, are always, psychically-speaking, standing on the 
threshold, threatening to intrude and transform the homely into the uncanny.       
II 
A Slight Ache begins with what could be called a slight misunderstanding: a middle-
class couple, Edward and Flora, sit at the breakfast table, clarifying what flowers 
really are in their country estate garden: 
 
 FLORA: Have you noticed the honeysuckle this morning? 
 EDWARD: The what? 
 FLORA: The honeysuckle. 
 EDWARD: Honeysuckle? Where? 
 FLORA: By the back gate Edward. 
 EDWARD: Is that honeysuckle? I thought it was…convolvulus, or something. 
 FLORA: But you know it’s honeysuckle. 
 EDWARD: I tell you I thought it was convolvulus. 
 [Pause.]140 
 
Although Flora’s opening conversational gambit is innocuous, perhaps even a little 
vacuous, Edward nevertheless struggles to answer her question about the 
honeysuckle, as he seems both confused and distracted. For Flora, this failure to 
recognise a flower that he should know is grounds for reproach, but, for the discerning 
audience member, who is familiar with Pinter’s work, this offbeat occurrence is as 
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portentous as the twitch of a trigger-finger: as the play progresses, the audience will 
come to appreciate that this mistake symbolises a more pernicious disorder of 
perception, as Edward, in his self-deceiving and paranoiac way, has a tendency to 
misrepresent certain things that he sees.  
This impression is quickly confirmed when Edward is cautious about 
accepting his wife’s offer to write outside, as he describes, for some reason, a sunny 
day as ‘treacherous weather’:         
 
 
 EDWARD: The canopy? What for? 
 FLORA: To shade you from the sun. 
 EDWARD: Is there a breeze? 
 FLORA: A light one. 
 EDWARD: It’s very treacherous weather, you know. 
 [Pause] 
 FLORA: Do you know what today is? 
 EDWARD: Saturday. 
 FLORA: It’s the longest day of the year. 
 EDWARD: Really? 
 FLORA: It’s the height of summer.141 
 
If Flora’s depiction is to be believed, then this is the height of summer, where the day 
promises to be long and sunny with no threatening clouds; quite evidently, this is a 
radically different portrayal to Edward’s singular conviction that the weather is 
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‘treacherous’. Nevertheless, this puzzling inconsistency can be resolved by taking into 
account that Edward betrays the free-floating and pervasive mistrust that dogs the 
acute paranoiac, as his otherwise bizarre statement makes sense when it is construed 
as a symptom of his ‘bunker’ mentality, since his house is being treated as though it 
were a shelter from some wily and unpredictable enemy outside. What this suggests 
about Edward is that he is guilty of transposing his own inner moral climate onto the 
world, as his ‘battle’ against the elements is due to them bearing the imprint of his 
own untrustworthy and mercenary soul.    
Edward’s talk about the weather succinctly shows that the tangential need not 
be the inconsequential. Further evidence for this truth can be seen when a wasp 
disturbs the couple’s breakfast tranquillity by invading the marmalade pot: 
 
EDWARD: Cover the pot. There’s a wasp…Don’t move. Keep still. What are 
you doing? 
 FLORA: Covering the pot. 
 EDWARD: Don’t move. Leave it. Keep still. […] 
FLORA: It’s going to the pot. 
 EDWARD: Give me the lid. 
 FLORA: It’s in. 
 EDWARD: Give me the lid. 
 FLORA: I’ll do it. 
 EDWARD: Give it to me! Now….Slowly… 
 FLORA: What are you doing? 
EDWARD: Be quiet. Slowly…carefully…on…the…pot! Ha-ha-ha. Very 
good. 
 116 
 He sits on a chair to the right of the table.  
 FLORA: Now he’s in the marmalade. 
 EDWARD: Precisely.142 
 
Edward–and Flora’s– frightened reaction to the wasp is, without question, excessive, 
as they should know that wasps are not dangerous, even if they possess a sting. For 
the audience watching these comic antics, their behaviour seems more consistent with 
two people trying, in the dead of night, to ambush a burglar looting their possessions 
rather than entrapping a bothersome wasp. Still, the whole drawn out saga illustrates 
Edward’s peculiar sensitivities, as he objects to the ‘monster’ that ‘invades’ his home 
for its own material gain. Accordingly, the punishment he doles out is cruel and 
vindictive:     
 
 
 EDWARD: Put it in the sink and drown it. 
 FLORA: It’ll fly out and bite me. 
EDWARD: It will not bite you! Wasps don’t bite. Anyway, it won’t fly out. 
It’s stuck. It’ll drown where it is, in the marmalade. 
 FLORA: What a horrible death. 
 EDWARD: On the contrary. 
 [Pause.] 
 FLORA: Have you got something in your eyes? 
 EDWARD: No. Why do you ask? 
 FLORA: You keep clenching them, blinking them. 
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 EDWARD: I have a slight ache in them.143 
    | 
    | 
 
EDWARD: Ah, yes. Tilt the pot. Tilt. Aah…down here…right 
down…blinding him…that’s…it. 
FLORA: Is it? 
EDWARD: Lift the lid. All right, I will. There he is! Dead. What a monster. 
[He squashes it on a plate] 
FLORA: What an awful experience. 
EDWARD: What a beautiful day it is. Beautiful. I think I shall work in the 
garden this morning. Where’s that canopy?144 
 
To kill a wasp is, of course, no crime, but it is significant and somewhat disturbing 
that what gives Edward peace of mind (at least temporarily) is ambushing and killing 
a perceived enemy that embodies his own impulsive and exploitative nature. Quite 
obviously, this sadistic act is a form of remedial therapy for a man that construes parts 
of the external world as personifications, yet what he tragically misperceives is that he 
can destroy the player, but never, in this way, the role. His ‘slight ache’ in his eyes is 
indeed a testament to this disorder of perception, this excessive squinting that turns 
the world into a personal drama, with Edward as the main persecuted character.   
If the wasp was ‘monstrous’, as Edward would have it, it had at least the virtue 
that it could be easily dispensed with. However, not all ‘pests’ are so straightforward 
to deal with, as one in particular has been the bane of Edward’s existence for several 
                                                 
143 A Slight Ache, p.156. 
144 A Slight Ache, p.158. 
 118 
months now. We, the audience, first learn about this ‘monster’ in the guise of an old 
blind matchseller when Edward bitterly complains to Flora about the human blot on 
the landscape: 
 
It used to give me great pleasure, such pleasure, to stroll along the long grass, 
out through the back gate, pass into the lane. That pleasure is now denied me. 
It’s my own house, isn’t it? It’s my own gate.145 
 
Edward reveals his petulant and self-pitying character here, as he assumes, like the 
paranoiac does, that the old man is not simply standing at the gate, but wilfully 
obstructing his path. This is because his persecutory mentality is all too willing to 
conflate frustrations with malign intentions, which means that he, with his ‘slight 
ache’, overlooks a very basic fact: the old man may be standing beside the gate, but he 
is on a public footpath. Edward, of course, distorts this picture, as he construes the 
matchseller in the same way as the wasp, since both are perceived as trying to 
encroach on his territory.          
 Edward’s fear, as we have seen, was excessive in dealing with the wasp, and it 
seems an even more pathological reaction to a presumably harmless old man. Yet his 
persistent fear of the matchseller is logical, in a sense, as the old man’s human form 
has a greater potential to be used as an embodiment of Edward’s multifaceted and 
ensnaring anxieties. One of these is Edward’s fear of the exploited lower class, which 
is evoked by the decrepit and plebeian matchseller, as Augusta Walker explains: 
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In contrast to [Edward and Flora], he appears the most miserable of living 
things. He seems blind, deaf, dumb, and barely able to move. He’s at the 
bottom of the human scale. He is that part of the race that has been squeezed 
dry to produce these glittering aristocrats, his superiors, and he has taken up 
his post at their gate as if he were a spectre of his class, their discarded refuse, 
come to haunt them.146 
 
Certainly, Walker’s reading of the matchseller would explain why Edward might fear 
the old man, as capitalist exploitation, according to socialism, is an unfair hoarding of 
wealth, a form of stealing that makes the rich jealously guard their money against any 
so-called working-class looters. Edward’s comments at the scullery window about the 
‘absurdity’ and ‘falsity’ of the matchseller’s existence seem to confirm further 
Walker’s view that the old man is a guilty reminder of class exploitation, as Edward 
cannot stand to witness what happens when someone fails to be a success: 
 
It’s quite absurd, of course. I really can’t tolerate something so…absurd, right 
on my doorstep. I shall not tolerate it. He’s sold nothing all morning. No one 
passed. Yes. A monk passed. A non-smoker. In a loose garment. It’s quite 
obvious he was a non-smoker but still, the man made no effort. He made no 
effort to clinch a sale, to rid himself of one of his cursed boxes. His one 
chance, all morning, and he made no effort. 
[Pause.] 
I haven’t wasted my time. I’ve hit, in fact, upon the truth. He’s not a 
matchseller at all. The bastard isn’t a matchseller at all. Curious I never 
                                                 
146 Augusta Walker, ‘Messages from Pinter’, Modern Drama 10 (1967), 1-10 (p.7). 
 120 
realized that before. He’s an impostor…how ridiculous to go on calling him 
by that title [of matchseller]. What a farce. No, there is something very false 
about that man. I intend to get to the bottom of it.147 
 
 
On one level, as Walker intimates, Edward feels deeply uncomfortable watching the 
matchseller try and earn a living long after his capacity to work, while he, in his 
retirement, languishes on his country estate; even for blinkered Edward, such 
exploitation is hard to ignore. On a deeper level, though, what makes Edward even 
more unnerved is that there is a symbolic affinity between the two men, as the 
matchseller is a ‘familiar stranger’, who represents the lay scholar’s fear of being 
cursed with the irredeemable mark of failure by his superego. It is for this reason that 
Edward feels so acutely frustrated over the old man failing to sell even one of his 
‘cursed’ matchboxes, as Edward has lived a life that constitutes a flight from failure, 
since failure, in a capitalist society, means the death of the self that constitutes one’s 
identity i.e., the enterprising self. Overall, the old man embodies that acculturated fear 
of ‘nothingness’, which Jules Henry describes below: 
 
The possibility of becoming nothing appears in dreams of failure, as being 
lost, crushed, or put in prison. In dreams each single fear is a concentration of 
a multitude; hence the power of dreams to urge us on–out of one fear into 
another. It is the destiny of all fearful things to escape from one fear, merely 
for to have it rise as a new one from behind the next rock. But the fear of 
nothingness is the basic one–the pattern, the mould, and the matrix–from 
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which all others issue. Why argue about ‘man’s fear of death’? Whether or not 
we fear death, what we encounter in our dreams is a polymorphous fear, which 
presents itself now as death, now as failure, now as being lost, caught in the 
act, or as imprisonment for nameless crimes. There are therefore many fears 
that are not of death, but only one fear of death. The fears of non-death, the 
historically generated fears, are the basic question.148  
 
 
The matchseller acts as one big arrowhead pointing towards nothingness, as his 
chronically impaired hearing and eyesight, coupled with his age, signifies physical 
dissolution and impending extinction; furthermore, as Henry might argue, he also 
represents the ‘historically-generated’ anxiety about failure, as the old man is a 
‘loser’, who is devoted to the Sisyphean task of perpetually returning to sell his wares. 
Facing the embodiment of such a grim outcome, it is small wonder that Edward 
comes to the conclusion that the man must be an ‘impostor’, as he tries to convince 
himself that a worker cannot possibly do what he is not good at. Yet the quickness to 
label and to deride betrays Edward’s uneasiness, as he knows on some unarticulated 
level that, if success is the ultimate arbiter of authenticity, he himself is also an 
impostor, since his scholarly articles, languishing unread in scullery drawers, are not 
dissimilar to the unwanted, accursed matchboxes. 
After several months of being ‘plagued’ by the matchseller, Edward has now 
come to a grim and yet inevitable conclusion: the old man is not going to budge 
unless he himself takes action. With this in mind, he gets Flora to invite the old man 
inside, which may seem to be a curious plan until we recall what had happened to the 
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wasp in the marmalade pot. Indeed, like all paranoiacs, Edward’s fear is enlivened by 
his hatred and vindictiveness, which means that his offer must be construed as a form 
of entrapment, an attempt to conquer him by subjecting him to Edward’s cultural 
power. It is not without significance that the first thing Edward tells the matchseller to 
do is take a seat, as he wants the old man to assume a submissive position: 
 
Now, now, you mustn’t…stand about like that. Take a seat. Which one would 
you prefer? We have a great variety as you see. Can’t stand uniformity. Like 
different seats, different backs. Often when I’m working, you know, I draw up 
one chair, scribble a few lines, put it by, draw up another, sit back, ponder, put 
it by…149     
 
Meeting in the study is part of Edward’s plan, as he has chosen a setting that is 
designed to convey the weight of his learning, and reinforce the impression to the 
matchseller, and to himself, of how different he is, as a middle-class man, from the 
old salesman. This plan never comes to fruition, however, not even from the 
beginning, as Edward is neither able to get the matchseller to talk, nor can he even 
negotiate him into the submissive position of sitting down. Instead, his middle-class 
politeness must fill the vacuum between intent and accomplishment, and so he starts 
to monologue about his essayistic attempts: 
 
Now and again I jot down a few observations on certain tropical phenomena–
not from the same standpoint, of course. [Silent pause] Yes, Africa, now. 
Africa’s always been my happy hunting ground. Fascinating country. Do you 
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know it?  I get the impression that you’ve been around a bit. Do you by any 
chance know the Membunza Mountains? Great range south of 
Katambaloo…150 
 
What the setting failed to do, Edward tries to do with words, as this chitchat about 
Africa is an attempt to distance himself from the matchseller by reminding himself 
that he has visited, and above all else, ‘triumphed’ in exotic places that the old 
working-class man could never be acquainted with, let alone journey to. What Edward 
therefore inadvertently reveals is that he is more of a materialist than his scholarly 
persona would otherwise admit, as the phrase ‘happy hunting ground’ encapsulates 
that he has a plundering, acquisitive mentality. This provides further confirmation, if 
any were needed, that Edward has lived his life as an impostor, who must now, in 
facing the embodiment of his fears, deny his ineffectuality by hearkening back to past 
‘conquests’. Clearly, his study will be, in spite of his intentions, no happy hunting 
ground.     
Edward’s pompous talk about the exotic fizzles out rather quickly, as even he 
is aware that this topic is hardly going to get the matchseller to start talking. He tries 
instead to strike up a rapport by talking about his own difficult times in ‘commerce’: 
 
Yes, I…I was in much the same position myself then as you are now, you 
understand. Struggling to make my way in the world. I was in commerce 
too…Oh yes, I know what it’s like–the weather, the rain, beaten from pillar to 
post, uphill and down dale…the rewards were few…winters in hovels…up till 
all hours working at your thesis…yes, I’ve done it all. Let me advise 
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you…Never mind what the world says. Keep at it. Keep your shoulder to the 
wheel. It’ll pay dividends.151  
 
In this ‘how-to-succeed-in-business’ spiel, Edward may have conceded that he was 
once in the same position as the matchseller, but his pompous reference to selling as 
‘commerce’, and his self-congratulatory talk of having ‘done it all’, suggest that he is 
only erecting another barrier, so to speak, between them. In fact, his clichéd advice 
about the virtue of ‘persistence’ serves a defensive function, as it is an attempt to 
conceal a very fundamental fact: this crippled, old man cannot keep ‘his shoulder to 
the wheel’, waiting for success to come along, as he represents the forces of death and 
decay. Edward’s psychological defence is indeed a fragile and rather ineffective 
strategy, as it involves denying what is otherwise most obvious.  
In the final phase of the play, Pinter orchestrates the undoing of Edward’s 
psychological defences, as he comes to acknowledge that the matchseller embodies a 
painful and frightening truth about himself. Pinter depicts this process when the old 
man suddenly drops his tray of shoddy wares, which compels Edward to pick them 
up: 
 
Eh, these boxes are all wet. You’ve no right to sell wet matches, you know. 
Uuuuugggh. This feels suspiciously like fungus. You won’t get very far in this 
trade if you don’t take care of your goods. [Grunts, rising.] Well, here you 
are.152  
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When Edward earlier described the matchboxes as ‘cursed’ he could not have realised 
how apt his expression was, as the soggy matches, like the old man himself, are 
useless as far the capitalist system is concerned; quite evidently, the fungus on the 
boxes, with its pervasive decay, disgusts Edward, as it intimates to him that failure is 
death. Infected with this mood of futility, Edward feels that he must at least do 
something in order to prove that he is capable of purposeful action, and so, for the 
first time in the play, he adopts an aggressive stance by trying to push the old man 
into the corner. Nevertheless, Edward is unable to dominate his own space as a 
predator would, as he is, at root, too frightened by the matchseller, which is why he is 
happy to allow the old man to take a seat: 
 
Aaah! You’re sat. At last. What a relief. You must be tired. [Slight Pause.] 
Chair comfortable? I bought it in a sale. The same sale. When I was a young 
man. You too, perhaps. You too, perhaps. 
[Pause.] 
At the same time, perhaps! 
[Pause.] 
[Muttering.] I must get some air. I must get a breath of air.153 
 
 
Edward’s relief at seeing the old man sit down is reminiscent of his pleasure at 
witnessing the ‘monstrous’ wasp being pinned down in the marmalade jar, as he no 
doubt hopes that he can now re-assert his dominance over his study, given that to be 
seated is to submit to the role of guest. Yet what Edward does not realise is that it is 
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he who is now ‘in’ the marmalade pot, because when he invited this ‘familiar 
stranger’ over his threshold, he was inviting back his own repressed and projected 
feelings of inauthenticity and of futility. Consequently, now that he has him up close 
and sitting down, the repressed asserts itself with an inexorable force, as thoughts of 
being ‘in much of the same position’ lead onto a strangely powerful disclosure: 
Edward and the old man may have crossed paths when he bought chairs in a sale. This 
realization is so appalling for Edward to even contemplate that he starts gasping for 
air, as it touches upon, in a somewhat covert way, two of his main anxieties. Firstly, 
his underlying guilt over his class exploitation is exposed, as part of what horrifies 
him is that they may have started at the same level in life, but now he has come to 
‘own’ poor, unfortunate souls like the matchseller; it is for this reason he talks as 
though the old man was bought along with the chair: ‘I bought it in a sale. The same 
sale. When I was a young man. You too, perhaps. You too, perhaps.’ 
 Secondly, what horrifies Edward even more is the anguished recognition that 
he shares with the matchseller a common present as well as a common past: the lay 
scholar, who writes about the ‘dimensionality and continuity of space… and time’154 
yet somewhat discouragingly identifies Africa as a country, peddles academic wares 
that are about as useful and as needed as soggy matches. Edward, of course, does not 
articulate this, but it is still the case that he and the matchseller are kindred spirits, as 
both are failures due to their marked unsuitability for their roles. Unsurprisingly, such 
a realization is not freeing, as Edward finds it a ‘suffocating’, life-negating truth, 
which suddenly submerges him in a deep sea of futility.   
  Edward leaves the house for the first time in the play, only to return once his 
wife has had her chance to mollycoddle the matchseller. On this occasion, Edward’s 
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manner of speaking is much more resigned than before, as if he has accepted, like a 
dying Empire, that it is only nostalgia that can now assuage his flailing ego: 
 
 The garden, too, [yesterday] was sharp, lucid, in the rain, in the sun. 
 [Pause.] 
 My den, too, was sharp, arranged for my purpose…. 
 [Pause.] 
The house, too, was polished, all the banisters were polished, and the stair 
rods, and the curtain rods.  
 [Pause.] 
 My desk was polished, and my cabinet. 
 [Pause.] 
I was polished. [Nostalgic.] I could stand on the hill and look through my 
telescope at the sea. And follow the path of the three-masted schooner, feeling 
fit, aware of my sinews, their suppleness, my arms lifted holding the telescope, 
steady, easily, no trembling, my aim was perfect…my grasp firm, my 
command established, my life was accounted for, I was ready for my 
excursions to the cliff, down the path to the back gate, through the long grass, 
no need to watch for the nettles, my progress was fluent, after my long 
struggling against all kinds of usurpers, disresputables, lists, literally lists of 
people anxious to do me down, and my reputation down, my command was 
established…155 
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The ‘yesterday’ that Edward speaks of cannot literally be the previous day, but rather 
a time long before the matchseller became the unwanted guard at the back door. This 
was a time when Edward felt the strength and suppleness of youth, and his house 
reflected his untarnished (or, as he puts it ‘polished’) reputation. Now circumstances 
are much different, as the matchseller is ensconced outside, and he embodies, like the 
nettles and the grubby matchboxes, all that ‘stings’ or ‘tarnishes’. Edward has thus 
now lost his ‘command’, as he can no longer walk down to the back gate, since, in his 
mind, a blocked path outside his home and territory implies that he has ultimately 
failed in overcoming his ‘usurpers’. Near the conclusion of the play, then, the 
relationship between the territorial imperative and the imperious, self-righteous 
character is made especially clear, as it is evident that home, with its exclusory 
boundaries, is a space that can be used by the self-deceiving ego to define a rigid and 
inauthentic self-image.   
 Since Edward subscribes to the paranoiac worldview of ‘attack or be usurped’, 
and that he is now feeling so dejected and impotent, it is unsurprising that he offers no 
resistance to being displaced from his own territory. In the final moments of the play, 
all he can do is offer a whimsical eulogy for a time when he had been untouched by 
the hand of death: 
 
Yes, I would seek a tree, a cranny of bushes, erect my canopy and so make 
shelter. And rest. 
[Low murmur.] 
And then I no longer heard the wind or saw the sun. Nothing entered, nothing 
left my nook. I lay on my side in my polo shorts, my fingers lightly in contact 
with the blades of grass, the earthflowers […] 
 129 
[Pause.] 
But then, the time came. I saw the wind. I saw the wind, swirling, swirling, 
swirling, and the dust at my back gate, lifting, and the long grass, scything 
together… 
[Slowly, in horror.] You are laughing. You’re laughing. Your face. Your body. 
[Overwhelming nausea and horror.] 
Rocking…gasping…rocking…heaving…rocking…. 
You’re laughing at me! Aaaaahhhh!156 
 
The ‘slight ache’ for Edward was, like the first grey hair, a muffled note signifying 
impending old age and death. Now, at this juncture, Edward tolls the death knell 
himself, as he talks about a time when he was, quite literally, sheltered from the 
world, but follows it up with a grim acknowledgement that the ‘time came’ when 
death announced itself. As the audience knows, death has not come in the garb of the 
grim reaper, but in the guise of a crippled matchseller, who now administers the fatal 
blow to Edward’s ego by finding his existence extremely funny. In response, Edward 
can only but let out what is, in essence, an existential howl of pain, as he sees with 
horrifying clarity that his life is indeed so absurd and so much a failure that, when 
Flora takes the matchseller on a tour of ‘his’ garden, Edward does not protest being 
reduced to the status of matchseller. Now that his inflated and distorted ego has been 
fatally wounded, he feels no need to defend his territory.   
III 
When Freud wrote on the subject of psychological defences, he famously and 
succinctly remarked, ‘The ego is not even master in its own house’.157 To put this 
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matter more prosaically, what Freud meant was that, as long as the ego denies and 
represses certain instincts, it cannot sustain, with great confidence, the role of a 
commanding and rational agent. On the contrary, the ego is condemned to assert a 
defensive territoriality of the self, as its strategic aim is to keep continual guard, so 
that repressed material never irrupts into consciousness. Still, as Freud suggests, this 
strategy never definitively works, as the repressed material is capable of gaining entry 
as a familiar stranger, and can, in severe cases, wreak havoc. 
In A Slight Ache, the audience witnesses Edward trying to maintain, in a 
territorial fashion, the ‘sanctity’ of his self. Indeed, the ‘lord of the manor’ can only 
pretend to be master in his own house by disavowing many painful thoughts and 
feelings, which are attributed to members of society that live outside his ‘hunting 
ground’. Nevertheless, after his long, and seemingly one-sided debacle with the 
match-selling familiar stranger, Edward’s self-image becomes thoroughly dismantled, 
as the psychological truth usurps his self-concept, whilst the old man, goaded on by 
Flora, usurps him from his territory.  At the conclusion of the play, Pinter could not 
therefore give a clearer indication of how much he construes the territorial imperative 
as a defensive psychological manoeuvre, as his character, Edward, had transformed ‘a 
psychic conflict into a spatial one’.  
Regarding this section, I wish to offer a real life example of this territorial 
imperative before examining whether Pinter’s portrayal of the psycho-dynamics of 
class divisions possesses any cogency.  
Dealing with the former issue first, an excellent real-life example of a 
collective assertion of the territorial imperative is how UKIP-supporting Brits possess 
a strong desire to control the country’s boundary so that ‘asylum seekers’ cannot 
                                                                                                                                            
157 Freud, qtd in Arthur H. Modell’s, The Private Self (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993), 
p.171.  
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‘infiltrate’ the UK. Here are some of the main bullet-point comments made in their 
2005 Pocket Policy guide to Immigration: 
 
UKIP will: 
 
*End mass uncontrolled and unlimited immigration 
*Regain control of our borders 
*End support for multiculturalism and promote one, common British 
culture.158   
 
 
These policy claims are persuasive to a group of people, who are subject to the 
following paranoid worldview: 1) they believe their country (as their territory) is 
being ‘polluted’ by people of divergent cultures, such that what constitutes 
‘Britishness’ is becoming ‘diluted’; 2) they believe that what their country needs are 
‘strong’ borders that will provide the antidote to the present ‘uncontrolled and 
unlimited leakage’.  
 There are, of course, many reasons for the (re) emergence of this worldview, 
but, in my opinion, David Bell provides a plausible psycho-political explanation for 
this collective reaction in the following passage: 
 
Entry of the immigrant is experienced, in a certain manner, as the return of the 
repressed; or, as Jeremy Harding has aptly put it, ‘the asylum seeker is now 
the luminous apparition at the foot of the bed’. Further support for this 
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projective system derives from the fact that, through our colonial history, we 
are all implicated in the horrors from which so many are fleeing. Through 
these processes, any guilt that might arise from such awareness is evaded. The 
more the in-group is whipped up into such hatred, the more difficult it 
becomes to confront the damage caused, which would bring unmanageable 
feelings of guilt. In the case of asylum seekers, this appears to reach a kind of 
climax with the announcement of detention camps and ‘fast-track’ disposal.159  
 
Bell’s suggestion that British prejudicial attitudes towards immigrants are a symptom 
of our guilt over our colonial past is intriguing, but what is most relevant for our 
discussion is that he provides a cogent and straightforward explanation for why this 
divisive perspective inevitably involves a territorial defensiveness over one’s identity 
as well as over one’s physical space: in a similar manner to Pinter’s Edward, these 
people erect a literal border that acts as a means of preventing contact and 
engagement with those that carry the burden of their projections.  Indeed, Edward and 
UKIP supporters differ only to the extent that the former’s territorial imperative has 
more ‘demoniac mastery’ over his personality, which suggests that the more the ego 
represses out of fear, the more the physical boundaries of the safe and the acceptable 
constrict.  
Considering now Pinter’s portrayal of class relations, it can be argued that his 
play is most insightful in its depiction of the psycho-political factors that contribute 
towards establishing and maintaining class divisions. To see that this is so, one must 
first consider the fact that there is no such thing as a ‘raw’, unmediated emotion; 
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rather, as William Miller puts it, emotions are always ‘inflected’ by social and cultural 
contexts: 
 
Emotions are feelings linked to ways of talking about these 
feelings…Emotions, even the most visceral, are richly social, cultural and 
linguistic phenomena…Emotions are feelings connected to ideas, perceptions 
and cognitions and to the social and cultural contexts in which it makes sense 
to have these feelings and ideas…They give our world its peculiarly animated 
quality…160 
 
The terms ‘lower class’, ‘middle class’ and ‘upper class’ illustrate Miller’s point , as 
these social designations are emotionally evocative, in such a way that it would be 
impossible to understand their significance without considering the cultural context. 
Nevertheless, Miller’s constructionist theory of emotion does acknowledge that 
cultural practices do utilise universal feelings (even if we can never separate them 
from their contextual expression and encounter them directly); indeed, one of the 
most important ones for the present discussion is a most visceral feeling, namely that 
of disgust. More fully, disgust is a feeling that is appropriated by those that wish to 
maintain the status quo, as they can label certain classes as ‘lower’, thereby creating 
an unflattering parallel between the ‘body’ politic and the animal functions of the 
human body. Sara Ahmed succinctly explains this process as follows: 
 
When thinking about how bodies become objects of disgust, we can see that 
disgust is crucial to power relations…disgust at ‘that which is below’ 
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functions to maintain power relations between above and below, through 
which ‘aboveness’ and ‘belowness’ become properties of particular bodies, 
objects and spaces.161 
 
In A Slight Ache, Edward’s complaint about the matchseller’s ‘stench’ and his 
nausea at touching the damp, rotting matchboxes, expose his underlying disgust 
towards the working classes. However, what is particularly interesting about Pinter’s 
play is that he does not only allude to the connection between disgust and the 
maintenance of class divides, since he also shows how the emotion of disgust is a 
desperate attempt to re-erect the territoriality of the self. In fact, Pinter’s portrayal of 
how the matchseller ‘induces’ Edward’s vertiginous nausea is remarkably similar to 
the psychoanalytical idea of the ‘abject’. Hyun-Jung Lee describes this concept as 
follows: 
 
Capable of destabilising the ego by its mere presence, the abject is that which 
has been ejected/rejected in the immemorial past in order to establish the 
boundaries of the self. In the retching that occurs at the sight of the object, the 
body registers an oblivion that was forcibly equated in the originary moment 
that gave birth to the ‘I’.162      
 
Lee’s explanation of the nature of the abject suggests that it is has power to destabilise 
the bounded ego, because the presence of such an object intimates the return of the 
‘ejected’; consequently, in order to maintain its rigid demarcations (its ‘territory’) the 
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ego induces the emotion of nausea and disgust, as these are, psychologically speaking, 
forms of ‘spitting out’ offending material. In the play itself, Edward’s reaction to the 
matchseller confirms this psychoanalytical account, as the old man’s mere presence 
destabilises his very sense of middle-class identity, leading to the point where he 
suffers a form of psychological death, since what the matchseller represents had to be 
‘expelled’ in the originary moment when his inauthentic self-image was ‘born’.   
The Room 
In the previous section, we noted that Pinter posited a strong connection between the 
territorial imperative, the psychological mechanism of projection and self-alienation. 
In Pinter’s first play, The Room, the psychological dynamics are somewhat similar, 
but in this work the playwright is concerned with the territorial imperative as a 
reparative move, in the sense of an attempt to heal one’s alienation from one’s true 
self.  
To set the stage, as it were, for a discussion of this, consider first the role of 
territory in traditional domestic relations. Hanna Scolnicov provides one such 
account: 
 
The structural division of space into the interior and exterior of the house 
carries with it social and cultural implications. Gender roles are spatially 
defined in relation to the inside and the outside of the house. Traditionally, it is 
the woman who makes the house into a home, her home, while the world of 
commerce, war, travel, the world outside, is a man’s world…From the spatial 
point of view, the world of man and the world of woman meet on the 
threshold.163  
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The way in which these traditional gender roles are structured by space may seem 
quite innocuous, as women are consigned to the warm bosom of the house, whilst 
men attend to the economic necessities imposed on them by the outside world. Yet, in 
reality, this is no egalitarian arrangement, since, as Michael Kaufmann, for example, 
contends, masculinity, in a patriarchal society, is a quest for power: 
 
Through a very complex process, by the time a boy is five or six he claims for 
himself the power and activity society associates with masculinity. He 
embraces the project of controlling himself and controlling the world. He 
comes to personify activity. Masculinity is a reaction against passivity and 
powerlessness, and with it comes a repression of a vast range of human desires 
and possibilities: those that are associated with femininity.164 
 
Kaufmann readily equates patriarchal masculinity with dominance, control and the 
forever-imminent threat of violence, which suggests that the relegation of women to 
the domestic sphere was the concrete expression of a power relationship, where men 
expected to be served by their faithful and subordinate wives. Indeed, perhaps this 
power relationship is at its most obvious when men became violent, as domestic 
violence was an assertion of dominance and a release of aggression against wives that 
could act as both servants and punch bags. In the passage below, Kaufmann explains 
why the domestic sphere was quite often a colosseum of cruelty: 
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Within relationships, forms of men’s violence such as rape, battery, and what 
Meg Luxton calls the ‘petty tyranny’ of male domination in the household 
must be understood both ‘in terms of violence directed at women and against 
women as wives’. The family provides an arena for the expression of needs 
and emotions not considered legitimate elsewhere. It is one of the only places 
where men feel safe enough to express emotions. As the dams break, the flood 
pours out on women and children. The family also becomes the place where 
the violence suffered by individuals in their work lives is discharged.165    
 
In The Room, Pinter explores many of these themes, as the psycho-political 
question that animates this work is this: what needs and phantasies compel women to 
comply with a domestic power structure, which exploits them and leaves them 
continually open to the threat of male violence? Pinter’s somewhat surprising answer 
is that women, in a patriarchal society, are not given enough emotional nourishment 
to grow into authentic and autonomous individuals, which means that they 
compulsively cling to their ‘rooms’ and to their husbands in the hope that they will 
receive the love and acceptance that they need. More fully, according to Pinter, what 
particularly powers this process is the phantasy that the domestic sphere can act as an 
‘intimate space’, which is a place where the fragile authentic self can safely emerge 
and become itself in a loving and supportive atmosphere.  
Pinter’s position, it must be admitted, might seem contrived and convoluted, 
as he certainly posits what would appear to be unobvious connections between the 
territorial imperative, the drive-to-authenticity and domestic oppression. In the 
following section, I wish to preface my close reading of the play with a brief account 
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of several key Winnicottian ideas, as they offer one plausible explanation for the 
purported connection between self-actualisation, and the need for an intimate 
‘holding’ space.  
I 
Perhaps the most useful and relevant way to begin the discussion of the connection 
between the actualisation of an authentic self and the appropriation of a holding space 
is to consider again the key existentialist concept of the ‘sheltered being’. For the 
reader’s convenience, I have re-quoted Bachelard: 
 
In the life of man, the house thrusts aside contingencies, its councils of 
continuity are unceasing. Without it, man would be a dispersed being. It 
maintains him through the storms of the heavens and through those of life. It is 
body and soul. It is the human being’s first world. Before he is ‘cast into the 
world’, as claimed by certain hasty metaphysics, man is laid in the cradle of 
the house. And always, in our daydreams, the house is a large cradle. A 
concrete metaphysics cannot neglect this fact, this simple fact, all the more, 
since this fact is a value, an important value, to which we return in our 
daydreaming. Being is already a value. Life begins well, it begins enclosed, 
protected, all warm in the bosom of the house. 
 
In this richly poetic meditation on what it means to be a ‘sheltered being’, Bachelard 
describes several of its key features that are worthy of further examination. Firstly, 
and most basically, Bachelard suggests that, in the earliest stages of life, the human 
being must exist in an enclosed, protected space; as he himself puts it, ‘Life begins 
well, it begins enclosed, protected, all warm in the bosom of the house’. What he 
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means is that long ‘before [the individual] is cast into the world’ he must exist in a 
protected space (his ‘first world’), as the human baby, who is growing both physically 
and psychologically, needs to live in a world that is tailored to him. In object relations 
theory, this originary space, which nurtures and protects the emerging authentic self, 
is known as a facilitating environment, because it acts to eliminate anything that 
interferes with the baby’s self-actualization.    
 Another important point that Bachelard makes in the above passage is that 
home’s ‘councils of continuity are unceasing’, which means that man is not ‘a 
dispersed being’. My understanding of Bachelard is that he is suggesting that a 
protected space anchors the human being in the world, such that he feels ‘centred’, 
rather than having to react to a multitude of different external and intrusive 
impressions. Clearly, the infant’s original protected space is the ideal example of this, 
as this space fosters authentic action, since the nascent self, in its fragile integrity, is 
the originator of all the individual’s behaviour.  
 Assuming that this psychological theory about the primacy of the ‘protected 
space’ is indeed true, one of its most important implications is that those individuals 
who have never achieved an original protected space have had little opportunity for 
their authentic selves to be incarnated in the world; instead, they exist as ‘dispersed’ 
beings, who conform to a number of false and alienating roles. This is why Bachelard 
implies that the existence or non-existence of a protected space determines an 
individual’s very being.  
 With these fundamentals in mind, I want to establish how Winnicott argues 
for the position that the original nurturing space (his term is ‘holding environment’) 
constitutes an incubator for selfhood. In the following passage, Winnicott proposes 
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that what allows the self (‘the kernel’) to grow is the mother’s nurturing environment 
(‘the shell’): 
 
The centre of gravity of the being does not start off in the individual. It is in 
the total set-up. By good-enough child care, technique, holding, and general 
management the shell becomes gradually taken over and the kernel can begin 
to be an individual…The human being now developing an entity from the 
centre can become localized in the baby’s body and so can begin to create an 
external world at the same time as acquiring a limiting membrane and an 
inside.166 
 
According to Winnicott, the authentic self can only emerge and be ‘incarnated’ in its 
body if the mother nurtures the infant in what can be termed a holding space. This 
point is reinforced in a well-known passage from another work, where he pinpoints a 
number of factors, which allow the baby to achieve, for the first time, a rudimentary 
form of identity: 
 
No doubt the instinctual experiences contribute richly to the integration 
process, but there is also all the time the good enough environment, someone 
holding the infant, and adapting well enough to changing needs. That someone 
cannot function except through the sort of love that is appropriate at this stage, 
love that carries a capacity for identification with the infant, and a feeling of 
adaptation to need is worthwhile. We say that the mother is devoted to her 
infant, temporarily but truly… 
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I suggest that this I AM moment is a raw moment; the new individual feels 
infinitely exposed. Only if someone has her arms round the infant at this time 
can the I AM moment be endured, or rather, perhaps, risked.167 
 
This passage depicts a scenario that accords well with Bachelard’s views, as 
Winnicott insists that what facilitates the emergence of the fragile authentic self is that 
it feels that it can assert itself without fear of being attacked by harmful impingements 
from the wider world. These are points that he puts even more directly in the 
following passage, where he makes a Bachelard-like reference to the continuity of 
being: 
 
With the care it receives from its mother each infant is able to have a personal 
existence, and so begins to build up what might be called a continuity of 
being. On the basis of this continuity of being the inherited potential gradually 
develops into an individual infant. If maternal care is not good enough then the 
infant does not really come into existence, since there is no continuity of 
being; instead the personality becomes built on the basis of reactions to 
environmental impingement.168 
 
 Another, less obvious feature that Winnicott mentioned in the above passage 
is that a key component of this holding environment is the mother’s love, in particular 
her empathic mirroring of the infant’s moods and expressions. As he remarks in the 
above passage, it is essential that the love that the mother shows the infant at this 
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stage ‘carries a capacity for identification’. This can be understood more fully if we 
consider another excerpt from his writings: 
 
What does the baby see when he or she looks at the mother’s face? I am 
suggesting that ordinarily, what the baby sees is himself or herself. In other 
words, the mother is looking at the baby, and what she looks like is related to 
what she sees there. All this is too easily taken for granted. I am asking that 
this which is naturally done well by mothers who are caring for their babies 
shall not be taken for granted. I can make my point by going straight over to 
the case of the baby whose mother reflects her own mood, or, worse still, the 
rigidity of her own defences.  In such a case, what does the baby see? First 
their own creative capacity begins to atrophy, and in some way or other they 
look around for other ways of getting something of themselves back from the 
environment…The mother’s face is not then a mirror.169 
 
As Winnicott implies, the reason the holding environment can be called an intimate 
space that ‘incubates’ the self is that it not only provides a secure boundary in which 
the authentic self can act, but it also mirrors, or reflects, the infant’s emerging 
subjectivity; indeed, this nurturing space allows the self to feel that the world affirms 
its existence rather than it being its antagonist, and so a crucial existential conviction 
is formed. In essence, the mother’s face as ‘mirror’ metaphorically ‘holds’ together 
the infant’s fragile subjectivity, as her mutable, empathic expressions reflect the 
changing moods of her baby, and thus give them continuity and a sense of being 
grounded in the actual world. Kenneth Wright puts it this way: 
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Under these circumstances, being looked at gives the self a sense of continuity 
that would otherwise be lacking. It is as though such a person can say: ‘I am 
seen, therefore I am’.170 
      II 
In the opening stage directions of The Room, Pinter provides his readers with a 
description of the play’s austere setting: 
 
Scene: A room in a large house. A door down right. A gas-fire down left. A 
gas-stove and sink, up left. A window up centre. A table and chairs, centre. A 
rocking-chair, left centre. The foot of a double-bed protrudes from alcove, up 
right.171 
 
This room constitutes a stark setting, as their life is circumscribed by their basic needs 
rather than driven by their wants. Indeed, the room describes and defines its occupants 
as the type of people whose basic needs for warmth, food and shelter are being just 
met and no more. Later in the play, Pinter will develop the emotional resonance that 
this room carries, but, for the moment, he presents his audience with what looks like 
the setting for a naturalistic ‘kitchen sink’ drama.    
 The opening scene depicts a good example of ‘domestic tyranny’, as Rose 
Hudd serves her husband, Bert, his dinner, whilst he sits reading a magazine, in a pose 
that suggests that he is, emotionally speaking, unreachable. Evidently, this is no 
loving home, as Bert shows absolutely no interest in his wife’s tea-time prattle, which 
nevertheless fails to discourage Rose from talking. Already Pinter has sketched what 
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could be called the choreography of domestic oppression, as Rose’s quick, servile 
movements are matched by Bert’s unimpeachable, yet lackadaisical stillness. On an 
emotional level, it could be said that Rose is ‘dancing to Bert’s tune’, as she, as wife 
and servant, runs about to receive love and attention, whilst he, as master, quietly sits, 
waiting on what he wants to come to him. Above all else, what powers this 
relationship from Rose’s point of view is the hope of reciprocation, and the hope of 
recognition. So desperate are these hopes that Rose fails to see the obvious: Bert is 
incapable of appreciating and loving her.   
Rose’s chatter becomes more pronounced as the play unfolds, and 
consequently, she reveals, albeit inadvertently, how her emotional needs fuel both this 
exploitative relationship and her recurring phantasies. She provides the first clue 
about the actualities of her predicament when she obscurely refers to an ‘illness’ that 
prevents her from leaving her room. A quote from Bachelard on the ‘sheltered being’ 
will help to explicate the significance of her remark:  
 
In the most interminable of dialectics, the sheltered being gives perceptible 
limits to his shelter. He experiences the house in its reality and in its virtuality, 
by means of thoughts and dreams.172 
 
Bachelard makes quite a simple point here, namely that an intimate space (one’s 
home, in other words) is created by the person ‘infusing’ that space with a deeply 
personal meaning. In the play itself, this is shown by Rose’s dialogue implicitly 
suggesting that her room is both a literal space and a phantasmal construction, as she 
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is compelled to repeatedly describe it as a shelter from the cold. Two examples make 
this clear:    
 
You can feel it in here. Still, the room keeps warm. It’s better than the 
basement, anyway.173 
  
No, this room’s all right for me. I mean, you know where you are. When it’s 
cold, for instance.174 
 
On one level, Rose’s mention of the importance of a warm home would not seem like 
an odd reference to audiences, because, as Claire Langhamer explains, the warmth of 
a 1950s working-class household was one of the key features of a good home: 
 
‘Home’ is a fluid concept, open to multiple meanings: a house is not 
necessarily a home. As outlined by Richard Hoggart in his semi-
autobiographical account of working-class culture, the ‘good’ 1950’s 
working-class house boasted warmth and a ‘good table’.175 
 
On a deeper level, however, Rose’s recurring thoughts about the cold outside and the 
purported warmth inside are signs of an obsession, as the housewife’s inability to 
leave the room suggests that the cold represents something terribly frightening, 
perhaps even annihilating. More to the point, what Rose’s rocking chair musings 
indicate is that she lives in a phantasmal space, which she portrays, somewhat self-
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deceivingly, as being warm, so that she can repress her anxieties over the prospect of 
being thrown out by Bert into the cold, abandoning world outside. In truth, then, what 
Rose’s teatime digressions indicate is that she lacks a nurturing or holding 
environment that mirrors the stirrings of her authentic self. Due to this lack she 
endures a subjugated way of life, as her patriarchal role as housewife involves an 
exploitation of these anxious feelings, no matter how much she might otherwise insist 
that the room is ‘warm’.   
 Rose, as we have noted, suffers from distressing phantasies that are all 
centred on the unacknowledged theme of abandonment. Consequently, her reveries 
come to reveal that her authentic self has already been rejected by her way of life in 
the room; indeed, just like any other act of self-deception, Rose’s monologue makes 
reference to that which she is trying to deny, which is that her authentic self has 
become a stranger to her, because she lives in such a ‘cold’ environment.  In terms of 
what she actually says, her talk circles around the symbolic import of the basement, as 
it is a place that both frightens and yet fascinates her, since it is supposed to harbour 
‘foreigners’176 that she has never seen. At one point in particular her inner restlessness 
is especially evident, as she tries, without success, to find out from Bert who lives 
down there: 
 
I’ve never seen who it is. Who is it? Who lives down there? I’ll have to ask. 
I mean, you might as well know, Bert. But whoever it is, it can’t be too cosy. 
Pause. 
I think it’s changed hands since I was last there. I didn’t see who moved in 
then. I mean the first time it was taken. 
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Pause. 
 Anyway, I think they’ve gone now. 
 Pause. 
But I think someone else has gone in now. I wouldn’t like to live in that 
basement. Did you ever see the walls? They were running…177 
 
Rose’s suspicion that the basement is occupied might seem a strange thing to say, as 
she cannot know who lives down there; what makes it comprehensible, though, is that 
this space has been colonised by her imagination in order to represent the 
subterranean elements of her psyche. Bachelard confirms that such a thing is possible 
when he remarks that, in general, the lower parts of the house become a phantasmal 
space, which comes to represent what is both repressed and feared: 
 
It [the cellar] will be rationalized and its conveniences enumerated. But it is 
first and foremost the dark entity of the house, the one that partakes of 
subterranean forces. When we dream there, we are in harmony with the 
irrationality of the depths.178 
 
Bachelard’s reference to ‘subterranean forces’ seems ominous, but, in Rose’s case, 
what the basement represents is that her authentic self has become ‘foreign’ to her, 
because her life with Bert represents such a ‘cold’ world that any warmth that is 
proffered can never keep the ‘damp’ from surrounding the imprisoned, yet barely 
insulated self. What can therefore be said is that this is a self that is trapped, and yet 
nakedly exposed, as it is crying out in its own veiled way for intimacy, in particular an 
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intimate space where it can be loved and nurtured. Of course, as intimated earlier, 
Rose herself consciously protests against acknowledging this profound lack of 
intimacy, as she has become a propagandist for her way of life with Bert in order to 
convince imagined interlocutors:      
 
If they ever ask you, Bert, I’m quite happy where I am. We’re quiet, we’re all 
right. You’re happy up here. It’s not far up either, when you come up from 
inside. And we’re not bothered. And nobody bothers us.179 
 
Rose’s remark that she is ‘quite happy’ is an ironic comment, but what is most ironic 
is claiming that ‘nobody bothers us’, as she is persistently hounded by her own 
alienated self. In fact, as much as Rose protests otherwise, what she really needs is 
someone to ‘bother her’, so that the ‘foreign’ self that is ‘locked away’ in the 
basement can be encouraged to come forward and become embodied. If this were to 
happen, then it can be said that Rose will have truly have come ‘home’. 
 A candidate for this role does not immediately arrive, however, as Mr Kidd, 
the supposed landlord, visits instead. Upon arriving, Rose seizes the opportunity to 
find out who these ‘foreigners’ are, as she quite naturally assumes that Mr Kidd 
would know the answers. However, Mr Kidd is a rambling, perhaps senile old man, 
who cannot even give a direct answer to the question of how many floors there are in 
the building: 
 
MR KIDD: Floors. (He laughs). Ah, we had a good few of them in the old 
days.  
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ROSE: How many have you got now? 
MR KIDD: Well, to tell you the truth, I don’t count them now. 
ROSE: Oh. 
MR KIDD: No, not now. 
ROSE: It must be a bit of a job. 
MR KIDD: Oh, I used to count them, once. Never got tired of it…180 
 
Without question, Mr Kidd’s digressions serve a comic purpose, as they provide some 
light relief from the prevailing sombre, menacing tone of the play. Nevertheless, the 
main reason that Pinter introduces the bumbling Mr Kidd is that his digressions, in a 
similar manner to Rose’s, reveal certain unconscious desires and phantasies. More 
fully, as his name suggests, the landlord is symbolically associated with childhood, as 
his rambling descriptions intimate, in a most subtle way, not only why Rose is 
childishly drawn to Bert, but also what kind of figure can liberate her from her 
domestic bondage. Mr Kidd’s description of his life with his sister indeed suggests 
such features: 
 
Yes, that’s right, it was after she died that I must have stopped counting. She 
used to keep things in very good trim. And I gave her a helping hand. She was 
very grateful, right until her last. She used to tell me how much she 
appreciated all the–little things–that I used to do for her. Then she copped it. I 
was her senior. Yes, I was her senior. She had a lovely boudoir. A beautiful 
boudoir.181 
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Apart from giving a very condensed, and somewhat jarring, summary of his life with 
his sister, what we have here is that Mr Kidd’s sister played a part in an incestuous 
transference phantasy. This can be inferred from his tone, as Mr Kidd talks about his 
sister as though he doted on her and wanted to help his ‘mummy’, and his interest in 
her ‘beautiful boudoir’ is obviously sexual in nature. Yet what is even more indicative 
of his incestuous phantasies is that he actually has to remind himself that he was her 
senior, as he had imagined her, in his phantasies, as his mother.  
 Mr Kidd’s talk may be somewhat incoherent, but it still resonates with Rose, 
as it prompts her to reveal, albeit unconsciously, her own incestuous transference 
phantasy: she is very curious, if not quite obsessed, about his bedroom, as he is, to 
some extent, a father-figure for her. More specifically, Rose, at first, admits that she 
thought his bedroom was in the back, although she confesses she never actually knew, 
whilst on another occasion she suddenly asks him where it is, as she is compelled to 
determine the location of his ‘lovely boudoir’: 
 
 ROSE: You full at the moment, Mr Kidd? 
 MR KIDD: Packed out. 
 ROSE: All sorts, I suppose? 
 MR KIDD: Oh yes, I make ends meet. 
 ROSE: We do, too, don’t we, Bert? 
 Pause. 
 Where’s your bedroom now, Mr Kidd?182 
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What Pinter implies with these correspondences is that Rose and Mr Kidd often talk at 
cross-purposes, but they dream in parallel. In both cases, it can be inferred that these 
characters are drawn to parental substitutes that provide them, so it is hoped, with 
some love and security, even if it is conditional on making themselves ‘useful’, as Mr 
Kidd did with his sister. The thematic meaning that therefore emerges after this short 
scene is that the domestic subjugation that Rose tolerates, in fact even embraces, is an 
attempt from her to foster a parent-child relationship, where she can be nurtured in an 
intimate space to the point of her self being released. If a visitor is thus to come, he 
must be, as far as Rose is concerned, a father substitute, as her authentic self yearns 
for the support and encouragement of a loving parent. 
 After Bert and Mr Kidd leave the room, embarking on their separate 
ventures, the audience can see most tangibly how much Rose is dependent on a parent 
substitute. Left to her own devices, Rose feels that she must distract herself so that she 
can try and ignore the encroaching loneliness that almost envelops the room. 
Unsurprisingly, given her clingy disposition, Rose finds it difficult to disregard Bert’s 
absence, and she is almost tempted to gaze out of the window to get one last look at 
her husband before he departs into the night time wilderness: 
 
She stands, watching the door, then turns slowly to the table, picks up the 
magazine, and puts it down. She stands and listens, goes to the fire, bends, 
lights the fire and warms her hands. She stands and looks about the room. She 
looks at the window and listens, goes quickly to the window, stops and 
straightens the curtain…183 
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Although Rose fears that Bert may not return, and she will be left alone, to her 
surprise she discovers, when she opens the door, that a couple are disclosed on the 
landing. Pinter introduces the Sands couple at this juncture, as Mrs Sands has not yet 
been ‘domesticated’, and so the playwright wishes to depict what patriarchy, 
embodied in this young belligerent man, sees as its ‘antagonist’. One exchange in 
particular is rich with symbolic significance, as it suggests that patriarchy must squash 
what a woman ‘sees’, whether it be with their head or with their heart. This is when 
Mr Sands rules out the possibility that his wife saw a star: 
 
 MRS SANDS: Now I come to think of it, I saw a star. 
 MR SANDS: You saw what? 
 MRS SANDS: Well, I think I did. 
 MR SANDS: You think you saw what? 
 MRS SANDS: A star. 
 MR SANDS: Where? 
 MRS SANDS: In the sky. 
 MR SANDS: When? 
 MRS SANDS: As we were coming along. 
 MR SANDS: Go home. 
 MRS SANDS: What do you mean? 
 MR SANDS: You didn’t see a star. 
 MRS SANDS: Why not? 
 MR SANDS: Because I am telling you. I’m telling you, you didn’t see a star. 
 Pause.184 
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Mr Sands’ insistence that his wife did not see a star is frightfully immature, and 
because of this, their exchange may seem like a domestic spat with no underlying 
significance. In reality, it is a calculated gesture, as Mr Sands wishes, like any other 
authoritarian, to inculcate in his victim the perspective that the truth is always based 
on the reigning orthodoxy. He has not fully succeeded, though, as his wife is still 
prepared to assert the veracity of her own perceptions, even if she conceded ground 
on the matter of seeing the star: 
 
 MRS SANDS: You’re sitting down! 
 MR SANDS (jumping up): Who is? 
 MRS SANDS: You were. 
 MR SANDS: Don’t be silly. I perched. 
 MRS SANDS: I saw you sit down. 
MR SANDS: You did not see me sit down because I did not sit bloody well 
down. I perched.  
MRS SANDS: Do you think I can’t perceive when someone’s sitting down? 
MR SANDS: Perceive! That’s all you do. Perceive.185 
 
Mr Sands’ contempt for his wife’s ‘perceptions’ is most conspicuous here, as he 
wants Mrs Sands to see only what he wishes her to see. Overall, what Pinter is 
intimating is that, if women unconsciously seek a father figure, then their emotional 
dependency, their hunger for approval and recognition, ensures that they lose touch 
with their own truth. An alternative way of expressing this important point is that 
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transposing the past onto a dimly related present means not to ‘see’, as one’s 
overbearing and unresolved emotional needs distort reality. There is no better 
example of this within the play than Rose’s attitude towards Bert, as she is so attached 
to her husband that she wilfully mistakes infantile solipsism and aggression for 
emotional strength. She is, in a word, ‘blind’ to her situation.   
 Having established that, in his view, domestic relationships in a patriarchal 
society are based upon a truth-denying dependence, Pinter now puts Rose into direct 
confrontation with what she fears. Although the audience knows that this frightened 
housewife’s anxieties are caused by her own self-estrangement, and exacerbated by 
her own denial, she herself is blind to this; consequently, Mr Kidd’s insistence that 
she meet the man from the basement becomes a terrifying prospect, as it will be, so 
she thinks, an encounter with a persecuting ‘Other’. Nevertheless, Mr Kidd proves to 
be persuasive, and soon afterwards a blind black man emerges from the basement 
much to Rose’s horror, as his blackness inevitably associates him with the dark, 
forbidding basement. Feeling so overwhelmed by his presence, and so vulnerable due 
to Bert’s absence, Rose pretends that she is much stronger than she is so that she can 
discourage this supposed miscreant from taking advantage of her: 
 
You’ve got a grown-up woman in this room, do you hear? Or are you deaf 
too? You’re not deaf too, are you? You’re all deaf and dumb and blind, the lot 
of you. A bunch of cripples.186 
 
This cruel and hateful invective indicates that, from the moment Riley came into the 
room, he became a scapegoat for Rose’s domestic frustrations against Bert and 
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against her own weaknesses. In essence, Riley’s entrance reveals that Rose hates all 
men (‘A bunch of cripples’) because she, throughout her life, has been so 
unqualifiedly dependent on them, as her cloying, clinging behaviour betrays that she 
expects so much in return, and they have failed her. In fact, they have reduced her to 
the indignity of always feeling like a little frightened child, who is too scared to assert 
herself, lest she destroy an already very tenuous bond. Indeed, the fact that she breaks 
from her neurotic protocol with Riley is as much a sign that her domestic relationship 
constitutes, for her, a trade for affection, as it betrays the underlying hostility that 
comes when the implicit bargaining is not honoured and she is forced to confront the 
embodiment of her own self-alienation and of ‘crippled’ manhood.     
 Yet, as much as Riley may seem to be a nightmarish embodiment of her 
fears, his presence in her room proves to be a cathartic one. Although Rose is 
singularly unaware of this, the fact is that it is her domestic situation, and not Riley, 
that is the nightmare that she must awaken from. Very shortly afterwards, this 
mysterious, yet strangely familiar black man, proves to be the required parental figure 
that she needs, as he implores the embittered and scared housewife to come ‘home’: 
 
 RILEY: Your father wants you to come home. 
 Pause. 
 ROSE: Home? 
 RILEY: Yes. 
 ROSE: Home? Go now. Come on. It’s late. It’s late. 
 RILEY: To come home. 
 ROSE: Stop it. I can’t take it. What do you want? What do you want? 
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 RILEY: Come home, Sal.187 
 
Riley’s message to ‘come home’ conveys a truth that Rose has been blind to for many 
years, namely that her room is not her actual home and that she has, with an acute 
homesickness, been longing to return to the family hearth. Furthermore, and far more 
subtly, Riley also quietly implores her to leave the room so that she stops this neurotic 
masquerade, and returns to her home as her authentic self, Sal.  
 While she is reluctant to receive his message, Riley, as father figure, 
nevertheless persists in his mission, and significantly, he creates there and then an 
intimate space, a holding environment that Rose has been desperately searching for: 
 
 RILEY: Now I touch you. 
 ROSE: Don’t touch me. 
 RILEY: Sal. 
 ROSE: I can’t. 
 RILEY: I want you to come home. 
 ROSE: No. 
 RILEY: With me. 
 ROSE: I can’t. 
 RILEY: I waited to see you. 
 ROSE: Yes. 
 RILEY: Now I see you. 
 ROSE: Yes. 
 RILEY: Sal. 
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 ROSE: Not that. 
 RILEY: So, now. 
 Pause. 
 So, now.188 
 
In a play where physical intimacy and emotional connection have previously been so 
conspicuously absent, Riley’s gestures and remarks prove to be cathartic, because 
they embody and epitomise the two main features of a holding space. Firstly, a 
holding environment is when the carer literally holds the other in their arms (or in 
their hands, in this case) and provides a warm and safe boundary, where the nascent 
self feels secure and loved enough to make that decisive venture into being embodied. 
Riley’s ‘holding’ of Rose therefore provides that warmth and sense of protection that 
she had longed for in her room, but could not receive.  
 Secondly, and more importantly, Riley holds Rose in the metaphorical sense 
as well, as his maternal-like dedication to her mood music lends her feelings both 
tangibility and clarity, as they are given a definiteness of form when Rose is held in 
his ‘aural gaze’. Peter Wilberg describes the ‘aural gaze’ as follows: 
 
 
In a quite tangible way we can ‘hold’ someone in our gaze. In a similar way 
we can hold someone in our listening attention– in our ‘aural gaze’. We 
become aware of holding someone holding us in their listening gaze when we 
feel it subtly deepening the way we listen to ourselves as we speak. ‘Handling’ 
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is the silent modulation of the tone and touch of our listening gaze, turning it 
into a carrier wave on which messages are transmitted and received… 
To talk of ‘touch’ here is not a ‘mere’ metaphor. Listening is itself a form of 
‘inner vibrational touch’. As listeners we touch each other with the tendrils of 
our intent–the fibres of our listening body.189 
 
Wilberg describes the ‘aural gaze’ as occurring when the listener is listening so 
carefully and so empathically that the person feels that their meaning has, as the 
telling metaphor says, been ‘grasped’, and that their experience, as a self, has 
therefore been acknowledged and made real. Riley, of course, does this for the first 
time in Rose’s life, such that she is now able to embody her repressed, ‘basement’ 
self, and admit to feelings that were previously so vague and alien. In a word, Rose is 
now able to ‘see’, and thus acknowledge her entrapment in her room:  
 
  
 ROSE: I’ve been here. 
 RILEY: Yes. 
 ROSE: Long. 
 RILEY: Yes. 
 ROSE: The day is a hump. I never go out. 
 RILEY: No. 
 ROSE: I’ve been here. 
 RILEY: Come home now, Sal.190 
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Although Rose’s remark that ‘The day is a hump. I never go out’ is a cliché, it 
nevertheless captures her own ‘crippled’ state of being, such that it constitutes an 
admission that helps her move towards being whole (or, in psychoanalytic terms, 
‘integrated’). Indeed, with such an acknowledgement having been made, Rose has 
shed, at least temporarily, the mask of the housewife and become her authentic self, 
Sal. From Riley’s point of view, he is acutely aware of this change and he realises that 
this is the time to make his final, declarative plea: ‘Come home now, Sal’.  
 Tragically, such a plea is barely uttered, however, when Bert returns from 
his van deliveries only to find an intruder in his home, in particular a black man. True 
to his character, Bert recognises, with an animal-like intuition, his wife’s closeness to 
this stranger, and he realises, rather quickly, that this poses a threat to his established 
way of life in the room. Proceeding very carefully, Bert talks about his hazardous trip 
out on the icy roads before he launches his vicious and racist attack: 
 
He takes the chair from the table and sits to the left of the NEGRO’S chair, 
close to it. He regards the NEGRO for some moments. Then with his foot he 
lifts the armchair up. The NEGRO falls on to the floor. He rises slowly. 
RILEY: Mr Hudd, your wife– 
BERT: Lice! 
He strikes the NEGRO, knocking him down, and then kicks his head against 
the gas-stove several times. The NEGRO lies still. BERT walks away. 
Silence. 
ROSE stands clutching her eyes. 
ROSE: Can’t see. I can’t see. I can’t see.191 
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Bert’s attack on Riley is undoubtedly a successful attempt to regain dominance over 
both his territory and his wife, as he not only silences his opponent, he also reinstates 
Rose’s previous ‘blindness’: her repeated exclamations that she ‘can’t see’ constitute 
the concluding lines of the play, suggesting that The Room ends on a decidedly tragic 
note because an intimate space may have been formed, but it did not achieve that 
‘council of continuity’192, to use Bachelard’s apt phrase.  
 Due to this lack of a sustained nurturing space, then, Rose’s authentic self is 
fatally undermined, such that she returns, albeit with an acute awareness of her loss, 
to her blind, ‘crippled’ state of being. Pinter thus underscores his conviction that there 
may be a longing for an intimate space, and there may also be indeed a drive towards 
self-actualisation, but if society does not provide a ‘facilitating environment’, these 
needs go unrecognised, much to the benefit of a patriarchal society. 
     III 
In this section on The Room, we have observed that Pinter has established intriguing 
connections between the territorial imperative, the drive-to-authenticity and domestic 
oppression. Dealing with the former two first, Pinter suggested that the territorial 
imperative in this case (i.e., that need to defend one’s home) is an expression of the 
longing of the authentic self for an intimate space, where it can dwell and be itself 
without harmful intrusions from the outside world. Rose Hudd, of course, epitomises 
this quest for a nurturing space, because she wishes, on some deep and unarticulated 
level, to come home so that she can live again as Sal. Indeed, what Pinter essentially 
shows in this play is that the territorial imperative can be a search for love and 
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security, as the individual seeking, albeit unwittingly, to become her authentic self is 
looking for a parental figure that will foster such a facilitating environment. 
According to Pinter, it was this hope of a warm and loving environment that kept 
Rose in domestic bondage to Bert until the arrival of Riley provided what had 
otherwise seemed like a radical and unlikely possibility. 
 Regarding the psycho-political significance of this work, Pinter’s portrayal 
of the connection between home and authenticity can be said to have some credibility, 
providing that we accept certain ideas from psychoanalytical theory. Where matters 
become more difficult, however, is in justifying his viewpoint that these 
psychodynamic factors contribute to patriarchal oppression within the household, in 
the sense that it was women’s lack of emotional autonomy that imprisoned them in 
their rooms, with their ‘petty tyrant’ husbands.  
 In response, what should first be noted is that Pinter was accurately 
reflecting contemporary working-class gender roles; for one thing, as Stephen Brooke 
remarks, the relationship between gender and the working-class was shaped overall by 
an ideology that argued that women’s place was essentially in the home: 
 
In the formation and development of the British working classes in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the articulation of class was often 
intertwined with gender. The idea of the skilled independent worker, for 
example, was not only an expression of a class ideal, but also a valorisation of 
a particular gender ideology. Within such an ideology, femininity had to serve 
as a counterpoint to the male breadwinner; if work defined the gender and 
class identity of men, maternity did so for working class women. Domestic 
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work in the private sphere, including maternity, rather than paid work in the 
public sphere was seen as the normative state of working class femininity.193 
 
This segregation of roles and responsibilities was still prevalent during the period that 
Pinter’s play was written, as confirmed, for example, by a study conducted by 
Elizabeth Bott: 
 
In her study of twenty families between 1953 and 1957, seven of which were 
working-class, Elizabeth Bott noted little change over time in gender relations. 
The Newbolts a working class couple from Bermondsey demonstrated a 
significant amount of conjugal separation in social life and domestic work, a 
feature Bott suggested was also notable in other working class couples.194 
 
 Given that the home life of working-class couples in the 1950s reinforced, in 
general, this segregation of roles, it may be asked if Pinter’s psycho-political account 
of why they endured patriarchal oppression in the home is credible. At first glance, 
‘no’ appears to be the definitive answer, because, as the previous excerpts have 
suggested, ideological pressures would have normalized these roles. Nevertheless, 
such a position may be a hasty and uncomprehensive rebuttal, as it overlooks the 
nature of Pinter’s perspective, which is focused on the emotional hunger that 
inadvertently serves to perpetuate domestic oppression. More fully, a case can also be 
made that gender roles are the product of childhood impotence ‘married’ to certain 
insidious power relations. Michael Kaufman, in his essay on male violence, explains 
this as follows: 
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In this process [of rejecting feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness] the 
boy not only claims for himself the activity represented by men and father. At 
the same time he steps beyond the passivity of his infantile relationship to the 
mother and beyond his overall sense of passivity. He embraces the project of 
controlling himself and controlling the world. He comes to personify activity. 
Masculinity is a reaction against passivity and powerlessness and with it 
comes a repression of all the desires and traits that a given society defines as 
negatively passive or as resonant of passive experiences. The girl, on the other 
hand, discovers she will never possess men’s power, and henceforth the most 
she can aspire to is to be loved by a man-that is, to actively pursue a passive 
aim.195   
 
Providing that we accept that gender roles in a patriarchal society are a particular way 
of transcending the impotency of childhood, then it can be said that Pinter’s depiction 
of domestic subjugation becomes more credible. Indeed, as Kaufman suggests, 
women in a patriarchal society are unable to achieve a sense of independence and 
autonomy, as the world at large implicitly tells them that security only arises through 
emotional dependence on a man. If we construe this dynamic in psycho-political 
terms, then the resultant situation is similar to what Pinter depicted, as an emotionally 
insecure and immature woman would find the role of housewife a means to find love 
through servitude. Consequently, as Pinter intimates, it is possible for the insidious 
domestic power relations to be constituted and maintained by a patriarchal society that 
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does not permit women to develop confidence in their own potential for autonomy 
and for authentic living. 
 Nevertheless, with all this having been said, it would be inaccurate to claim 
that Pinter, from a psychological point of view, provided an undistorted depiction of 
the predicament of women like Rose. One criticism that comes particularly to mind is 
that Pinter omits the role of the mother in Rose’s life, thus suggesting that women, in 
a maternal capacity, play no fundamental role in establishing an individual’s secure 
feeling of authentic selfhood. From a psychoanalytical point of view, this omission is 
a grave one, as Winnicott, for one, stressed, with a tireless persistence, how essential a 
role the mother plays in the child’s psychological development, and yet Pinter seems 
to transfer the onus of this loving care solely onto ‘crippled’ men, who know how to 
intimidate but not how to love.  
 Pinter’s refusal to engage with the maternal element in Rose’s life makes her 
a singular case, but this does not mean that the ‘illness’ she suffers from is so unusual 
that it cannot, from a psycho-political perspective, be taken as representative in some 
way. Consider, for example, Masud Khan’s amendment of the Winnicottian view, 
which proposes that inauthenticity is caused by a series of insidious impingements on 
the developing self over the course of the individual’s childhood and adolescence. He 
called this phenomenon ‘cumulative trauma’, describing its cause as follows: 
 
My argument is that cumulative trauma is the result of the breaches in the 
mother’s role as a protective shield over the course of the whole child’s 
development from infancy to adolescence–that is to say, in all those areas of 
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experience where the child continues to need his mother as an auxiliary ego to 
support his immature and unstable ego-functions.196 
 
If we accept what Khan is proposing here (i.e., that the child’s true self–its ego– does 
not achieve a secure form of existential security unless it is supported by a parental 
figure over the course of their formative years), and we couple it with Kaufman’s 
suggestion that young girls, in a patriarchal society, are given the implicit message 
that they must continually seek protection from men, who, in their quest for 
dominance and power, can never in reality provide them with emotional nourishment, 
then it follows that women can have a prolonged need to have a ‘protective shield’. 
More fully, irrespective of how much their mothers have emotionally supported them 
in their earliest years, women can still be seeking as adults a protective shield and for 
others to be an auxiliary ego, because patriarchal society encourages, in the adolescent 
years, a transfer of dependence from mother to a potential husband, as it fails to 
provide the facilitative conditions that nurture the development of their own authentic 
selves. Viewed this way, Rose may indeed be an acute case, due to the extent of her 
emotional deprivation, but she still possesses a representative quality, as her 
dependence shows how much women may condone domestic tyranny in their search 
for emotional nourishment, and for a loving, nurturing space that would allow them to 
become their own authentic selves. 
The Caretaker 
In his speech at Bristol University, Pinter made one of the most significant and 
characteristic remarks of his career when he attacked the view that his plays imply 
that people are unable to communicate: 
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We have heard many times that tired, grimy phrase: ‘Failure of 
communication’…and this phrase has been fixed to my work quite 
consistently. I believe the contrary. I think that we communicate only too well, 
in our silence, in what is unsaid, and that what takes place is a continual 
evasion, desperate rearguard attempts to keep ourselves to ourselves. 
Communication is too alarming. To enter into someone’s life is too 
frightening. To disclose to others the poverty within us is too fearsome a 
possibility.197  
 
In this passage, Pinter reminds his audience that communication does indeed take 
place, even if the conversations are edgy, ambiguous, and, in a word, ‘Pinteresque’. 
His main point is that his characters do inadvertently communicate with each other, as 
they desperately try to hide their vulnerabilities, but it is their shiftiness that 
undermines and exposes them. Pinter’s characters therefore crave for the kind of 
power that ‘keeps the other in its place’, as such power (so it is hoped) prevents others 
from unmasking one’s presentational self in order to expose an unenviable image.  
 Nevertheless, Pinter’s rebuttal must be tempered with a reminder that his 
characters are not always seeking to evade others. A more accurate description of 
their interpersonal style would be that they, dramatically speaking, play a game of 
‘hide and seek’, which involves making a guarded advance towards others within a 
pervasive atmosphere of distrust; after all, they reason that people’s motivations are 
not always intelligible, and social niceties are often a front for barbarous instincts. 
More fully, whilst Pinter’s characters long to be secure, to belong and to be esteemed, 
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they can only satisfy these needs, so they believe, if they adopt an oblique, 
manipulative style that is both camouflage and armour. Their essential problem is that 
these intransigent traits of wariness and coerciveness are self-defeating, as this 
interpersonal style precludes genuine feelings of love and appreciation from 
flourishing. To put it bluntly, even Pinter’s most powerful and ‘successful’ characters 
only ever win a battle, which never amounts to fostering a community.  
 Perhaps the most obvious, and characteristic, way that this tragic failure to 
connect is shown in a Pinter play is through the battle over territory. Indeed, unable to 
integrate into a larger world that both frightens and compromises them, Pinter’s 
characters seek to create a private domain, an extended sphere of influence, where 
they try to both win the ‘battle’ and satisfy their basic interpersonal needs. Yet in 
reality this territorial imperative only leads to hatred and conflict, which precludes 
receiving the love and the esteem that they so much need. In Pinter’s world, the wish 
to become director of one’s own private stage is what sets those living together 
against one another, making it a battle for territory that is, at root, a primal 
confrontation. 
 In this section, I wish to offer a close reading of Pinter’s play, The 
Caretaker, as I believe that it explores, more than any of his other works, how the 
territorial imperative can be a defensive means to try and satisfy the need for safety, 
for love and for esteem. This is because in this play these three men want to claim 
ownership of the dilapidated room as much as they want to connect with one another, 
but the battle over territory prevents any lasting bond from being formed, such that its 
tragic ending constitutes a collective failure. Indeed, although the tramp, Davies, is 
evicted at the conclusion of the play, due to his deceitful, selfish and prejudicial 
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behaviour, the playwright suggests that all three men are responsible for failing to be 
their ‘brother’s keeper’. 
 I will preface my close reading of this play with a brief account of 
Winnicott’s seminal concept of the transitional space, as this key idea can provide a 
cogent explanation for why Pinter’s characters are such territorial, insular creatures 
that can barely accommodate other people in their rooms. In particular, I will argue 
that, although one’s home is a phantasmal construction, Pinter’s characters represent a 
developmental impasse, as they abide in this transitional space to the point of 
indulgence, since they wish to be sheltered from reality, which is why they cling to 
their delusions as much as they defend their territories; indeed, I seek to show that 
each character erects a pathological transitional space, which serves as a desperate 
attempt to satisfy, through the distortive means of phantasy, some of their most basic 
needs. 
     I 
In my earlier discussion of The Room, I referred to Bachelard’s description of the 
tenant as a ‘sheltered being’, who lives in a protected space, which is also a 
phantasmal construction. According to Bachelard, the sheltered being constructs a 
protective space both out of what is objectively found and what is attributed to it 
through phantasy: 
 
In the most interminable of dialectics, the sheltered being gives perceptible 
limits to his shelter. He experiences the house in its reality and in its virtuality, 
by means of thoughts and dreams.198 
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For Bachelard, home is a space forged out of the dialectic of reality meeting phantasy, 
as he intimates that this need to give ‘perceptible limits to [one’s] shelter’ expresses a 
need that is, in essence, an existential necessity. More fully, to be sheltered, to feel 
that this space is one’s home, is to be protected from the pains of absolute 
estrangement, as we, as human beings, would otherwise confront a world that 
assumes a strange and hostile face. In fact, we cannot live for long without having a 
place as home, otherwise the radical divide between ourselves and the world creates a 
separation anxiety that is too acute to bear. We are, after all, creatures that began our 
lives as sheltered beings, and we venture out into the world with the expectation that 
we can find another protective space. 
 If it is indeed the case that there is an existential need to find shelter, as 
Bachelard, for one, suggests, then it would seem that the territorial imperative is a 
drive that is so pressing that it can override many other considerations; in other words, 
the need to find a home can be construed as so powerful a need that the most meagre 
of spaces will be appropriated for this end, even if it is an affront to one’s dignity. In 
particular, at its most destructive, the territorial imperative can assume a demoniac 
quality, where it dominates the psyche and speaks in a cacophonous voice; this is an 
indication of an unbalanced person, such as a Rose Hudd, who has literally entrapped 
themselves through their overvaluation of security and their despair over their needs 
not being readily satisfied. In his book, Metamorphosis, psychoanalyst Ernest G. 
Schachtel elaborates on this point through his discussion of the dialectic between what 
he calls embeddedness-affect and activity-affect: 
 
The decisive difference between these two types of affect is that one is 
characterised by helpless distress (embeddedness-affect), the other by active 
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coping with a drive tension or by active relating to the environment (activity-
affect). They represent two different ways of dealing with the separation from 
the intrauterine situation of continuous supply and shelter. One implies 
basically a wish for the return to this stage or frustration, anger, impotence that 
such a return is not possible; the other represents the adaptation to the new, 
separate form of existence.199 
 
Schachtel contends that human beings embody and express two contrary tendencies, 
where one (embeddedness affects) is a sign of resignation, as it seeks to regress to a 
point of insular, womb-like security and easy gratification; the other (activity affects) 
is a potentiating force, as it encourages the person to explore the world and to satisfy 
their needs.  
 Although Schachtel does not explicitly discuss the pathological form of 
territorial imperative, the parallel is nevertheless easy to establish, as this kind of 
imperative is driven by embeddedness-affects (e.g., anxiety and resignation). For such 
a person, home is a second-best womb, where one retreats from a seemingly harsh, 
unyielding world, only to try in vain to satisfy one’s needs through the quick, but 
distortive means of phantasy. Indeed, this refusal to engage with the larger world 
implies that there is not only a rejection of forever-encroaching reality, but also that of 
the wider community; such a person, in other words, is burdened by their obsessions, 
as they hide in their burrow, too afraid to peek out and engage with life.  
 This ‘type’ description, in general, fits well with the typical Pinter character, 
as they are driven by a pathological territorial imperative that involves colonising a 
space, and shutting out the harsh and frightening world outside. As I will show in my 
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close reading, this pathological trend is explored in-depth in The Caretaker, as the 
essential conflict is not simply over territory; rather, what divides them is the question 
of who gets to create a phantasmal space that suits their particular neurotic 
requirements.  
 Considering now Winnicott’s theory of the transitional (or potential) space, 
this key idea explains how a phantasmal space can be constructed, and more 
importantly, how it can become a prison with invisible bars. In his paper on 
‘Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena’, Winnicott makes his essential 
statement on what he means by the transitional space: 
 
  
From birth… the human being is concerned with the problem of the 
relationship between what is objectively perceived and what is subjectively 
conceived of, and in the solution of this problem there is no health for the 
human being who has not started off well enough by the mother. The 
intermediate area to which I am referring is the area that is allowed to the 
infant between primary creativity and objective perception based on reality 
testing. The transitional phenomena represent the early stages of the use of 
illusion, without which there would be no meaning for the human being in the 
idea of a relationship with an object that is perceived by others as external to 
that being.200 
 
Evidently Winnicott views human development as a gradual movement from the stage 
of omnipotence (where the infant believes that his phantasy is reality) to the stage of 
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objective apperception, where the world can be apprehended in its ‘realness’ without 
it seeming to be a forbidding, pleasure-denying realm. For Winnicott, then, human 
maturation depends, as it did for Freud, upon a balance between the Pleasure and 
Reality principles; where he differs, though, from his predecessor is that he stresses 
the importance of creatively constructing a personal meaning in the world. The reason 
why Winnicott makes this amendment is that, in his opinion, the Reality principle 
must indeed be accepted, but with the following crucial reservation: reality must not 
become our master, forcing us to capitulate to a world that is too radically divorced 
from our inner pleasure-dominated life.  
 Winnicott proposes in his writings that the creative resolution of those two 
titanic principles of mental life is possible because there exists a third ‘habitat’, which 
is neither exclusively inner nor outer, but a fusion of the ‘created’ and of the ‘found’. 
This realm he terms the intermediate area (the transitional space), mainly as a 
reminder of its original purpose in the first phases of development, since this potential 
space originally arises as a means of using illusion to endow the world with a personal 
meaning. More specifically, as Winnicott intimates in the above quote, if the human 
being were not able to creatively appropriate what it has objectively found (that is, if 
it were not able to integrate the world into his inner life), then there would be no 
incentive to further explore the rich diversity of the outer world. Winnicott therefore 
makes clear that the transitional space represents, at first, a transitional phase, where 
the infant has relinquished the pleasures of primary creativity (that is, the period 
where the world entirely seems the creation of one’s phantasies), but has not yet 
established the ability to fully reality test. At this point, the transitional space is a 
‘place’ where the individual can rest, or lie fallow, as it allows the person to begin 
apprehending the objective world without it assuming an alien aspect. In other words, 
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the transitional space acts as a shelter, a ‘place’ where the richness and the variety of 
the objective world can be somewhat discerned without the realness becoming so 
intrusive and overwhelming that it is difficult for the individual to incorporate it into 
their inner life.  As Winnicott himself describes it, the transitional area exists at all 
subsequent stages of life as a ‘resting place for the individual engaged in the perpetual 
human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate and yet inter-related’201; 
indeed, the ‘recuperative’ qualities of the transitional space are due to it being, 
literally or figuratively, an arena of play, where phantasy can temper, yet not entirely 
exclude, the ‘real’ world. 
 Since the transitional space is a ‘place’ to linger, a way of keeping outer and 
inner reality separate, yet inter-related, what is important, in terms of the present 
discussion, is to stress that there is a danger that an individual will remain there for 
too long. In these cases, such a pathological use of the transitional area constitutes a 
retreat from the objective, communal world, which means in essence that one’s 
phantasies are no longer subject to creative development; instead, they become fixed 
delusions, which are a way of keeping an alienating reality at bay. James M. Glass 
expresses it this way: 
 
 
To remain in the intermediate area of illusion becomes a ‘special indulgence’, 
tolerable for the infant but pathological for the adult-Narcissus, for example, 
riveted to his image in the pool. The pathological illusion (‘narcissism’) 
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prevents movement toward or engagement with external reality; it eventually 
encases the self and becomes elaborated as delusional presence.202 
 
What Glass intimates here is that to remain for too long in the transitional area implies 
that an individual exists within a delusional, hermetic world that ultimately is a 
reflection of their own unmet needs and their own exaggerated ideas and ideals. In 
this case, what is lacking is what could be termed a form of existential confidence, 
which Winnicott describes in the following passage as being based upon the world 
being seen as capable of partnering with one’s phantasies: 
 
I am claiming that every baby has his or her own favourable or unfavourable 
experience here. Dependence is maximal. The potential space happens only in 
relation to a feeling of confidence on the part of the baby, that is, confidence 
related to the dependability of the mother figure or environmental elements, 
confidence being the evidence of dependability that is becoming introjected.203 
 
Although Winnicott is discussing the establishment of that foundational sense of 
confidence, his remarks nevertheless pertain to the later stages of life too, as an 
individual will be capable of engaging with the external world if he feels that the 
‘found’ (that element that he discovers out with his own subjectivity) does exist and 
that it is dependable and amenable enough to be incorporated into his inner life. This 
form of existential confidence is therefore developed or undermined depending upon 
how much the individual at any point in their life feels that the world is an answering 
reply to their innermost needs.  
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 It is worthwhile to explicate this idea of existential confidence more fully, as 
it will explain this notion of the pathological use of the transitional space. Winnicott, 
in his writings, acknowledged that the transitional space is the ‘place where we 
live’204, which was his way of describing, in his occasional poetic style, the idea that 
this intermediate area is where we are ‘at-home’ in the world. His reasoning behind 
this memorable statement was that the transitional space is the ‘place’ where the 
individual can render the objective world personally meaningful by creatively fusing 
it with the richness of his inner life; furthermore, it is also a ‘shelter’, where one can 
linger before ‘venturing out’ into wider engagement with the objective world.  
 Nevertheless, it is also true that one’s potential space, otherwise known as 
one’s home, can assume a negative, imprisoning form, as it can become a place of 
indefinite refuge.  In the latter case, this occurs when the individual’s basic needs 
cannot be readily met by the outside world, and so, in fear and despair, he turns away 
from that inhospitable reality. One’s home therefore becomes an edifice of denial, a 
phantasmal Band-Aid of sorts that is intended to cover over or efface the divisive split 
between self and outer world, when in reality it only deepens one’s delusions and 
isolates the individual from communal living. Thus, such a home is not ‘merely’ an 
individual’s territory, which has to be defended because it is a part of physical space 
that provides shelter and is one’s own abode; instead, the individual feels that he must 
jealously guard and protect it because it constitutes a shelter from the threat of 
nakedly confronting an inhospitable, alienating world that provides, so it seems, little 
solace and satisfaction for one’s own frustrated needs, desires and dreams. In reality, 
though, this inability to reside temporarily and intermittently in the transitional space 
signifies that the phantasmal world is no longer defined by the imaginative 
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possibilities of ‘as if’; rather, such individuals are caught in a community-defying 
situation where phantasy has begun to assume the obstinacy and fixity of fact.   
 In the following section, it will become clear that all of the characters in The 
Caretaker are, in their respective ways, neurotically impelled by a territorial 
imperative that involves a pathological use of the potential space. Briefly, what I 
intend to show is that, whilst Mick desires, with quiet desperation, to provide the 
room with a ‘make-over’ so that he can deny that his life consists only of small 
accomplishments punctuated by grandiose, unrealisable plans, Aston intends to make 
his room into a little self-sufficient world, where he need no longer depend upon a 
world that committed him to a mental institution. As for Davies, he too treats the 
room as an inflexibly constructed phantasmal space, as the house is to become, so he 
hopes, his own bourgeois sanctuary, where he can sit in his lounge wearing his 
smoking jacket; indeed, the room will shelter him from the fact that, as much as he 
might protest otherwise, his identity papers are all in order, and he is, in the eyes of 
society, nothing but a work-shy tramp.  
     II 
Unlike many of Pinter’s ‘room’ plays, The Caretaker begins with an act of kindness: 
an aged tramp is invited, without much ceremony, into Aston’s home after a fight 
broke out at a local cafe. Such generosity, and above all else, such trust is indeed 
unusual in a Pinter play, as ‘visitors’ are nearly always treated as intruders, who 
intend, once they get comfortable, to displace the tenant from his room. For those 
acquainted with Pinter’s dramatic world, it is very difficult to believe that this opening 
actually heralds the beginning of a friendship between two lonely misfits.    
 This pessimistic prognosis is confirmed once we hear more from Davies and 
how he came to be invited into this room. Once Aston settles down and tries to fix a 
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toaster, Davies replays his own self-serving version of what happened at the café, and 
what becomes obvious is that the tramp is an argumentative skiver, who is enlivened 
by his own hostility and by his own misbegotten sense of entitlement. For Davies, the 
fight may have been messy, perhaps even life threatening, but, in the comfort of 
Aston’s abode, all that lives on is his indignation and his resentment over a Scotsman, 
of a similar rank as himself, ‘ordering’ him to take out a bucket. Somewhat 
ominously, he admits, with a degree of impatience, that even if it were his duty, he 
would only allow his boss to tell him what to do: 
 
Yes, well say I had [to take out the bucket]! Even if I had! Even if I was 
supposed to take out the bucket, who was this git to come up and give me 
orders? We got the same standing. He’s not my boss. He’s nothing superior to 
me.205     
 
What Davies is unwilling to admit to himself is that he was disinclined to take the 
bucket out, because he does not like fulfilling his work responsibilities, and he suffers 
from a thinly veiled sense of entitlement that encourages him to only capitulate to 
those with actual power. According to the psychoanalyst and character ‘anatomist’, 
Karen Horney, this combative, hierarchal mentality is typical of the arrogant-
vindictive character’s worldview: 
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He feels that the world is an arena where, in the Darwinian sense, only the 
fittest survive and the strong annihilate the weak…A callous pursuit of self-
interest is the paramount law.206 
 
The incident at the café underscores Horney’s description of the type, as Davies feels 
not so much exploited by his position in society as misidentified: as the debacle with 
the Scotsman shows, he ‘pounces’ when someone conflicts with his own private 
‘religion’, which puts him on a self-worshipping pedestal. Of course, this need-to-
triumph attitude is a logical outgrowth of his arrogant-vindictive temperament, as he 
encounters the world with poised and venomous fangs that are ready to avenge 
anyone that makes him feel weak or a ‘nobody’, thus ‘proving’ his own strength and 
superiority. Such a man is therefore incapable of forming close attachments, and 
honouring obligations, as these are construed as coercive ploys that are intended to 
derail one’s singled-minded focus on achieving the ‘prizes’ that vindicate his 
otherwise sorry existence. In the case of Aston, he might as well have invited a feral 
cat in for company, as Davies is an aggressive and exploitative loner, who is only 
looking for opportunities, and who will heed only threats. 
 One of those ‘opportunities’ soon presents itself when the diffident Aston 
offers Davies to stay in his room until he gets himself ‘fixed up’.207 At first, Davies 
refuses, feigning reluctance (‘[Sleep] Here? Oh I don’t know about that’208), as he 
does not, as an arrogant-vindictive type, wish to be too quick to accept, since this 
would be an admission of weakness that would hurt his pride. Nevertheless, he does 
not hold out for too long, as he quickly accepts before promising Aston that he will 
get himself ‘fixed up’ at some point in the near future. At this point, it is unclear if 
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Aston has any reservations about the tramp, but it is still obvious that Davies is 
providing a cover story that was fashioned long ago for exploitative ends. More fully, 
Davies informs Aston that, in order to be designated as the responsible citizen that he 
is, he needs to pick up his identity papers from an old friend in Sidcup; until then, he 
is stuck with a ‘mistaken identity’ and his paltry lot, which means settling for the four 
paltry insurance stamps associated with his ‘alias’: 
 
Jenkins. Bernard Jenkins. That’s my name. That’s the name I’m known by, 
anyway. But it’s no good me going on with that name. I got no rights. I got an 
insurance card here. 
 
He takes a card from his pocket. 
 
Under the name of Jenkins. See? Bernard Jenkins. Look. It’s got four stamps 
on it. Four of them. But I can’t go along with these. That’s not my real name, 
they’d find out, they’d have me in the nick. Four stamps. I haven’t paid out 
pennies. I’ve paid out pounds. I’ve paid out pounds, not pennies. There’s been 
other stamps, plenty, but they haven’t put them on…209 
 
These mock lamentations about ‘if only the weather would break,’210 and the talk 
about Sidcup are essentially stalling tactics, a way of buying time until Davies can 
think of some strategies that will allow him to stay in the room. Yet what is 
disconcerting is that Davies half-believes his own trite and implausible cover story, as 
he really does wish to suggest that he is not a work-shy tramp, but that he has been 
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misrepresented to the point of being misidentified i.e., underneath the ill-fitting, dirty 
clothes of Mac Davies/Bernard Jenkins lies the beating heart of a conscientious, 
hardworking citizen. In reality, though, all that Davies is doing is pathetically flirting 
with what he believes he should be, as he is, as an arrogant-vindictive type, devoted to 
not only an image that betrays no weaknesses (a conscientious, hard-working citizen), 
but also to a self-concept that acknowledges his triumphant superiority (‘ I’ve had 
dinner with the best’211). If Aston were prescient enough to recognise it, these 
character traits unequivocally spell disaster, as Davies avoids work if he can help it, 
and above all else, his inflated self-image longs to be realized, even though it can only 
be consolidated through exploitation. No doubt Davies is the kind of man that will 
hanker after the territorial appropriation of the room, as he, with his Machiavellian 
intentions, sees the abode as a tangible sign that he has reached his ‘true’ station in 
life.  
 If it could be said that Davies’ execrable qualities are on display from the 
beginning, Aston’s personal limitations, in contrast, do not seem worthy of inciting an 
audience’s censure. This is because Aston seems to be the victim of the downtrodden 
Davies, as his slow wittedness, and his apparent kindness, have already been 
exploited by the tramp. Yet, as the play unfolds, Aston’s actions refute any 
sentimental reading of his character, as his agenda discloses that he too has erected 
considerable barriers in his relationships, since he is so much more comfortable 
relating to things rather than people (in fact, he sometimes conflates them). For 
example, he moves from fixing some utensil to sorting out the tramp with some 
suitable shoes, as if he were dealing with the same kind of entity. Such behaviour 
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suggests that the D.I.Y. spirit, so prevalent in the 1950s212, has seeped into his very 
soul, infusing it with the spirit of community-denying individualism. 
 Perhaps the simplest explanation of Aston’s social ineptness is that he has 
lived for a long time as a recluse, who never has had to attend, like a dutiful husband 
and father, to anybody else’s needs; consequently, he can follow the trails carved out 
by his own private obsessions. Still, this explanation overlooks some deeper, less 
obvious reasons for his anti-social nature, as Aston is not simply, or even mainly, a 
creature of bad habits: he is, in fact, as territorial, and therefore as self-assertive, as 
the other two characters. For example, from the very beginning of the play, Aston told 
the tramp to ‘Sit down’,213 which reveals not only his bad manners, but also that, 
within the boundaries of this room, it is he who must be obeyed. Later in the play, 
Aston’s unyielding ‘individualism’ is even more conspicuous, as his failure to let 
Davies close a window shows that he could never adopt a communal way of life. 
 It is worth exploring further why Aston is so anti-social, and how this relates 
to his pathological territorial imperative. In my view, what distinguishes Aston from 
Davies is that the latter wants to ruthlessly seize the room and assume proprietary 
rights over it, whilst the former has the desire to retreat to his room and live a life, so 
he thinks, of almost complete self-sufficiency. Aston’s behaviour and motivations are, 
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in fact, reminiscent of Horney’s ‘moving away from’ personality type as described by 
Bernard J. Paris: 
 
The basically detached person worships freedom and strives to be independent 
of both outer and inner demands. He pursues neither love nor mastery; he 
wants, rather, to be left alone, to have nothing expected of him and to be 
subject to no restrictions…He may react with anxiety to physical pressure, 
long-term obligations, and inexorability of time and the laws of cause and 
effect, traditional values and rules of behaviour, or, indeed, anything that 
interferes with his absolute freedom. He wants to do as he pleases, when he 
pleases; but, since he is alienated from his spontaneous desires, his freedom is 
rather empty. It is a freedom from what he feels as coercion rather than a 
freedom to fulfil himself.214 
 
Horney proposes that this kind of character craves freedom more than anything else, 
but, as she also stresses, this is freedom as a neurotic conceives it, given that it is 
negatively defined i.e., a freedom from rather than a freedom to do.  
 This characterisation explains, first of all, why Aston is so bewitched by 
utilities, as they promise a life of self-sufficiency, and they, unlike people, never ask 
for anything in return, which would compromise his ‘freedom’. Furthermore, 
Horney’s description also explains why Aston is such a chronic procrastinator, who 
obsessively accumulates junk that serves no ostensible practical purpose, as his self-
alienation only ‘articulates’ what he must escape from, but not what constructive and 
authentic goal he can definitively attain; in other words, Aston is compulsively 
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attached to a way of being-in-the-world that can never be realistically achieved, as 
there will never be a point where he feels that he has enough tools to be independent, 
since he is so fixated on a continual flight from dependence upon others. 
  Another, more in-depth way of construing this ‘accumulation is all’ 
philosophy is that Aston has constructed a pathological transitional space, which not 
only prevents him relating to the objective world, but it also precludes him from 
creatively appropriating objects into his inner life, whether they be pieces of junk or 
people. Consider, first of all, Winnicott’s statement on what constitutes a ‘good 
object’ for the infant: 
 
A good object is no good to the infant unless created by the infant. Shall I say, 
created out of need?  Yet the object must be found in order to be created. This 
has to be accepted as a paradox.215 
 
Winnicott’s description articulates the ‘paradox’ of creative and authentic living, as 
the object (whatever that may be) has to be found, and yet is must also be created. 
According to Winnicott, the paradox is resolved when the object is construed as an 
‘answer’ to the individual’s inner, true self needs, as this means that it is both found 
and created, since it constitutes an intermingling of the objective and the subjective. 
In the case of Aston, then, the existential problem with his neurotic freedom is that he 
can only accumulate objects rather than creatively assimilate them, as the objects that 
he finds, and brings back to his room, cannot be dynamically incorporated into his 
inner life, since he is only interested in quantity rather than in their qualities, due to 
him being alienated from his spontaneous desires. This therefore explains why his 
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territorial imperative constitutes a utilitarian, and essentially uninterested approach to 
others, as he incorporates, for example, the tramp into his room, but only as a piece of 
junk that needs to be fixed so that it might come in handy at a future date. In essence, 
Aston’s room is an ‘introjective’ space, as there is an accumulation of stuff without 
any attempt to creatively transform their properties.   
 If it is indeed the case that these two men were doomed from the beginning 
from becoming friends, then Mick’s appearance in the second act only serves to 
undermine even further this tenuous acquaintanceship. Yet from Mick’s point of view 
the dissolution of their relationship constitutes no tragedy, as he, as self-appointed 
‘caretaker’ of his brother, wishes to protect Aston from rogues like Davies. Mick’s 
caution and suspiciousness is no doubt a consequence of him being all too aware that 
his slow-witted brother is open to exploitation, and that nobody would befriend the 
reclusive Aston without some hidden agenda. Appropriately enough, as Mick tackles 
the tramp to the ground, his first words to Davies are, ‘What’s the game?’216 as his 
abrasive demand for honesty shows how keen he is to find out the tramp’s intentions.  
 Since Mick pins the tramp down, brashly asking what he is ‘playing at’, it 
might be expected that he will remove Davies immediately from the room. This is not 
what happens, however, as the direct approach morphs into something more oblique, 
since Mick indulges his malicious streak by digressing at great length about several 
people who were apparently the ‘spitting image’217 of the tramp. Such talk confuses 
Davies, understandably enough, but he nevertheless realises that Mick is issuing a 
warning to the effect of, ‘I know your type’. Indeed, on an animal-like level, Davies 
intuits that this strange and domineering man is playing cat and mouse.  
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 After Mick performs his opening gambit, what could be called the politics of 
the room becomes clearer, as Mick’s ‘old scoundrel’ is not thrown out of the house. 
This puzzling ‘charitable’ act is never explained in the play, giving rise to several 
competing explanations: on the one hand, Mick may not actually possess the authority 
to evict Davies, as Aston could be the owner. On the other hand, Mick may, in fact, be 
the landlord, but he does not want to be blamed by Aston for evicting what the latter 
might construe as a possible companion; this explanation is a more complex and 
compelling one, as it acknowledges that Mick is, in his indirect way, his brother’s 
keeper (or caretaker). Whatever the reason, Mick decides to proceed in an Iago-like 
fashion, which implies that, in the meantime, Davies’ position within the room 
appears to be secure. 
 Given that Mick must make a tactical concession to Davies, this requires 
him to exploit the fatal flaws of Davies’ character, so that the tramp falls prey to his 
own weaknesses. After playing his malicious prank on Davies involving a vacuum 
cleaner, he sits down with the tramp and asks, with mock sincerity, for his advice:   
 
Uuh…listen…can I ask your advice? I mean you’re a man of the world. Can I 
ask your advice about something? 
            DAVIES: You go right ahead. 
            MICK: Well, what it is, you see, I’m…I’m a bit worried about my brother.218 
 
What Mick discusses here are some legitimate concerns of his (he is, no doubt, 
worried about Aston’s ‘inwardness’), but he raises them with the tramp only for 
strategic reasons. What underlies his approach is a clear-eyed awareness that Davies 
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is a typical opportunist, who will uncritically accept any proposal that advances his 
position and flatters his not inconsiderable ego. Before offering this proposal, Mick 
primes his unsuspecting victim by pretending to ‘confide’ in the tramp that he 
believes his brother to be a ‘slow worker’, as the interior-decorating job he ‘assigned’ 
Aston has not been completed: 
 
He’s supposed to be doing a little job for me…I keep him here to do a little 
job…but I don’t know…I’m coming to the conclusion he is a slow worker.219 
 
Even though it is impossible to determine whether Mick did assign such a job, the 
main point is that Davies believes Mick is changing allegiances, and that there is 
therefore an opportunity to insinuate himself into the power structures that govern the 
room. Consequently, when Mick makes the proposal of offering Davies the job of 
caretaker, the tramp, true to form, focuses on his gain in status, even if it means 
overlooking the fact that he has displaced Aston from doing work that was originally 
his job to do. As Mick expected, the rupture in Davies’ relationship with his brother 
has already begun, as the only thing that this ruthless character is interested in is 
making sure that Mick is the ‘boss’: 
 
 DAVIES: Yes, well…look…listen…who’s the landlord here, him or you? 
 MICK: Me. I am. I got the deeds to prove it. 
 DAVIES: Ah… 
 Decisively. 
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Well listen, I don’t mind doing a bit of caretaking, I wouldn’t mind looking 
after the place for you.220 
 
 Davies’ behaviour soon changes after his ‘promotion’ to the role of 
caretaker, as the tramp no longer feels that he needs to show Aston, his ‘inferior’, any 
gratitude. This is quite apparent when Aston hands him a bag of clothes that he had 
bought for the tramp: 
 
DAVIES takes two check shirts, bright red and bright green, from the bag. 
He holds them up.      
 Check. 
ASTON: Yes. 
DAVIES: Yes…well, I know about these sort of shirts, you see. Shirts like 
these, they don’t go far in the wintertime. I mean that’s one thing I know for 
a fact. No, what I need, is a kind of shirt with stripes, a good solid shirt, with 
stripes going down. That’s what I want.221 
 . 
This last statement is a bold and brazen remark from someone who relies on charity, 
as Davies now feels, as the ‘caretaker’, that he is entitled to tell Aston what he wants, 
and be dismissive of anything that does not match his standards. It comes as no 
surprise, then, that the only piece of clothing that catches Davies’ fancy is a smoking 
jacket, as it signifies, for him, his upwardly mobile lifestyle: 
 
 He takes from the bag a deep-red velvet smoking jacket.  
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What’s this? 
ASTON: It’s a smoking jacket. 
DAVIES: A smoking jacket? 
He feels it. 
This ain’t a bad piece of cloth. I’ll see how it fits. 
He tries it on. 
You ain’t got a mirror here, have you? 
ASTON: I don’t think I have. 
DAVIES: Well, it don’t fit too bad. How do you think it looks? 
ASTON: Looks all right. 
DAVIES: Well, I won’t say no to this, then. 
ASTON picks up the plug and examines it. 
No, I wouldn’t say no to this.222 
 
Pinter presents, at this juncture, an excellent example of dramatic irony, as Davies’ 
choice of the smoking jacket is a preposterous fit for someone so badly dressed and so 
inopportunely placed in the world. Still, from the tramp’s perspective, it makes 
perfect sense, as he imagines that his recent promotion means that he is only one step 
away from obtaining the prize of being the owner of the room. Indeed, as delusional 
and as self-aggrandising as Davies’ perspective is, his dreams capture, in a carnival-
mirror kind of the way, the spirit of the age. As Langhamer explains, the post-war 
period was well-known for its ‘lust’ for home ownership, as there was the implicit 
belief that the ruinous, slum-ridden past could be transformed anew, thereby making 
way for a more affluent and self-determining lifestyle: 
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Certainly a cross-class dream of attaining a ‘home of one’s own’ was not new 
to the post-war period: it had a persuasive appeal for middle- and working–
class men and women able to rent or buy homes beyond the slum conditions of 
inner city life in the years up to the second world war as well as beyond. In the 
years before and after the war, the dream became a reality for ever-growing 
numbers. Four million new homes were built during the interwar period, of 
which 1.5 million were state-funded: the post-war government presided over 
the building of 900,000 new houses and by 1957, 2.5 million flats and homes 
had been constructed, the majority by local authorities. Large-scale slum 
clearance schemes and the development of new estates actively changed both 
the physical environment of home and the meanings invested in home and 
community life.223  
 
According to Langhamer, the post-war ideology was that the state, like some great 
benefactor, would provide, and that the populace could, with sufficient funds, own a 
property. Viewed in this light, Davies’ expectations are, to some extent, a parodic 
version of this attitude, as the tramp expects a property to be available, and he, like 
the slum dwellers, believes that he has arisen from the ashes, as it were, by being 
transformed into one of the home-owning class.  
 Despite these superficial similarities, the tramp’s attitude is still of the 
pathological kind, as he suffers from a ‘redemptive’ territorial imperative, since he 
believes that being the caretaker of the house will satisfy his desperate need for self-
esteem, and his deep-seated desire to triumph over his own perceived impotence. 
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Davies is indeed playing, none too subtly, the ‘topdog’ game, as his neurotic 
compulsions demand a space where he has ‘divided and conquered’. In the case of 
Aston’s room, it has become, in phantasmal terms, a confirmatory place, as it is 
decked out in the garb of Davies’ own delusional needs.  
 To consider this more fully, what this means is that Davies, firmly 
ensconced in a room, has regressed to what Glass calls a ‘delusional reading of 
reality’, as he has little sense of actuality, given that he is enslaved to a flattering, but 
unreal self-image. Glass describes this process as follows: 
 
This competition among closed systems of belief, delusional readings of 
reality, and acceptance…of external reality constantly repeats itself. It is 
always an effort to avoid moving backward into solipsism and the re-
enactment of infantile omnipotence as enslavement to a perverse ego ideal.224 
 
Davies’ life is defined by an insidious gulf between reality and wish, as his ego ideal 
counsels him to be the triumphant aggressor, who drinks the ‘cream’ of life, whilst he 
wanders aimlessly in clothes that are not much better than reformed rags. In fact, it is 
only in a space that is hermetically sealed off from a disconfirming and disillusioning 
reality that Davies can achieve some status and believe, in his delusional way, that he 
is about to achieve what his ego ideal insists upon. What he cannot appreciate, of 
course, is that his ego ideal only leads him into conflict with others, as the quest for its 
fulfilment is predicated upon adopting an arrogant, callous and exploitative attitude. 
In concrete terms, what this implies is that his ‘promotion’ to ‘caretaker’, and his 
alignment with the supposed ‘topdog’ position, will create conflict with the only other 
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man that he shares the room with, namely Aston. Little does Davies know that such 
arrogance will contribute to his eventual eviction, as he will make the tragic 
miscalculation of believing that Mick careens through life upholding the same 
philosophy as he has, namely to give preferential treatment to those who are of most 
use to him. Characteristically, he overlooks the one constant in this otherwise 
precarious situation: Mick’s love and concern for his brother.       
 Undeniably, Davies is the most callous and egocentric of the three men, but, 
as the play progresses, Aston’s own selfishness begins to rear its ugly head, making 
life more difficult in the room than it need be. This is because Aston is a ‘lone wolf’, a 
man who, in seeking freedom from ‘constraints’, finds it almost impossible to honour 
obligations. One example of this neurotic fear of being trapped by another’s needs is 
when Davies implores Aston to close the window, as the rain is soaking him during 
the night:   
 
Yes, but listen, you don’t know what I’m telling you. That bloody rain, man, 
come right in on my head, spoils my sleep. I could catch my death of cold with 
it, with that draught. That’s all I’m saying. Just shut that window and no one’s 
going to catch any colds, that’s all I’m saying. 
            Pause. 
            ASTON: I couldn’t sleep in here without that window open.225 
 
This example shows that Aston’s preferences are implicit demands, as he exemplifies 
an attitude of veiled disdain to what other people want.  What therefore occupies his 
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attention is his own self-defined ‘projects’ (if his procrastinating actions can indeed be 
called this), even if he has been contracted by Mick to do some interior decorating: 
 
ASTON: Yes. I’m supposed to be decorating this landing for him. Make a flat 
out of it.   
            DAVIES: What does he do, then? 
            ASTON: He’s in the building trade. He’s got his own van. 
            DAVIES: He don’t live here, do he? 
ASTON: Once I get that shed up outside…I’ll be able to give a bit more 
thought to the flat, you see…226 
 
Aston is clearly a passive aggressive character, as he expresses his own needs through 
indirectly attempting to thwart those in conflict with his own. In some respects, he is 
dissimilar to the tramp, as he does not, like Davies, need people as people, since his 
own brand of defensive relating is implicitly stamped all over the junk that crowds the 
room. At one point in the play he unwittingly offers an explanation for why he 
objectifies others, and why, to put it bluntly, he no longer ‘bothers’ with people: 
 
But I don’t talk to people now. I steer clear of places like that café. I never go 
into them now. I don’t talk to anyone…like that. I’ve often thought of going 
back and trying to find the man who did that to me [gave him electroshock]. 
But I want to do something first. I want to build that shed out in the garden.227 
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Aston’s long monologue is a curious tale about his wilful disconnection from others. 
Indeed, the tragic subtext of his tale is that his befriending of Davies constitutes his 
first tentative attempt at forging a connection with another, since his traumatic 
psychiatric treatment. Previously, Aston, due to his embeddedness-affect of pervasive 
fear, had redirected his social needs into pipedream projects, but, with the appearance 
of the tramp, he now makes a rare attempt to have another bear witness to his 
confusion and pain. 
  Unfortunately, this ‘reaching out’ is complicated by a number of 
undermining factors, however. Firstly, Davies is an unsuitable audience for this kind 
of revelatory narrative, as Aston’s difficulties would be interpreted as a disclosure of 
weaknesses, which he could then exploit. Secondly, Aston’s attempt to connect is still 
very much on his own terms, as he neither expects, nor desires, for his narrative to be 
‘opened’ up through dialogue; rather, it is a monologue that is analogous to his 
pathological transitional space, as both are constructed to keep the tempering reality 
of the other at bay. Consequently, the monologue does not lead to Aston changing 
mental ‘gears’, as he still continues to treat the tramp as someone to be incorporated 
unresistingly into his space.  
 With these mounting tensions, the room becomes, in a sense, a pressure 
cooker, as the two men become even more determined to dominate the space. At the 
beginning of the third act, Davies’ strategy is to try and eliminate the competition by 
consolidating the bond that he thinks he has with Mick.  As he sits in a chair, sporting 
his smoking jacket, he tries to turn his ‘confidante’ Mick against his brother by 
portraying him in an unfavourable light: 
 
 194 
Couple of weeks ago…he sat there, he gave me a long chat…about a couple 
of weeks ago. A long chat he give me. Since then he ain’t hardly said a 
word. He went on talking there…I don’t know what he was…he wasn’t 
looking at me, he wasn’t talking to me, he don’t care about me. He was 
talking to himself! That’s all he worries about. I mean, you come up to me, 
you ask my advice, he wouldn’t never do a thing like that. I mean, we don’t 
have any conversation, you see? You can’t live in the same room with 
someone who…who don’t have any conversation with you.228  
 
Davies’ complaints about Aston’s ‘communication’ problems possess some truth, but 
he hubristically overlooks that he too has considerable difficulties with having a 
‘conversation’, as the tramp offloads his anger and resentment by talking at people. In 
reality, his actual problem with Aston is that he wants to be flattered, to be asked for 
advice, and above all else, to be put first, but his roommate is singularly incapable of 
doing this. Now that Aston is, in the tramp’s opinion, the worst kind of person (i.e., a 
useless inconvenience) Davies feels entitled to evict, by proxy, Aston from the room. 
He attempts to do this by forming a clique that excludes the procrastinating D.I.Y. 
man, as he proposes to Mick that he should tell his brother ‘that we got ideas for this 
place’:  
 
No, what you want to do, you want to speak to him, see? I got…I got that 
worked out. You want to tell him…that we got ideas for this place, we could 
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build it up, we could get it started. You see, I could decorate it out for you, I 
could give you a hand in doing it…between us.229 
 
With his animal-like cunning, Davies understands the value of aligning himself with 
the centre of power (as he imagines it to be), and he also knows that he can articulate, 
more than Aston ever could, the language of Mick’s interior decorating dreams. Of 
course, underneath all this scheming is the ill-founded hope that, if he becomes a 
figure of absorbing interest for Mick, then Aston will be treated, like his plug-free 
toasters, as being surplus to requirements.  What Davies still cannot appreciate, 
however, is that he is only a caretaker by name, whereas Mick is, in a sense, one by 
vocation, as he will always prioritize the needs of his naïve and reclusive brother. 
 In general, this ruthless, and ill-considered seizing of any ‘opportunity’ is 
typical from Davies, who always cared about assuming proprietorship of the room 
anyway. Now at this stage in the play, Davies no longer needs to worry about 
dissimulating, such as when Aston irritates him by wakening him up in the middle of 
the night. Disgruntled at the interruption of his sleep, Davies unleashes a callous and 
ultimately misguided attack on Aston, as he jeers at him for being in a ‘nuthouse’230, 
and he makes the deeply ironic threat that his roommate should learn to ‘keep his 
place’: 
 
So don’t you start mucking me about. I’ll be all right as long as you keep your 
place. Just keep your place, that’s all. Because I can tell you, your brother’s 
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got his eye on you. He knows all about you. I got a friend there, don’t you 
worry about that. I got a true pal there…231  
 
If Davies possessed some moral principles, he could have gently admonished Aston 
for his inconsiderateness in wakening him up; instead, being the ruthless individual 
that he is, all that matters to him is that someone has infringed the supposed pecking 
order. In a tragic sense, he has indeed got a point, as there is a pecking order to be 
respected, but he has failed to realise that he is still at the bottom of it, even if he has 
been ‘promised’ the role of caretaker. In fact, little does he know that if he had acted 
as a caretaker for Aston, then both brothers would have been content for him to 
remain in the room. Characteristically  though, Davies acts in an uncompassionate 
manner, and he even suggests, when Aston hints that he might need to leave, that it is 
he that will be the first to go: 
 
 DAVIES: Find somewhere else? 
 ASTON: Yes. 
 DAVIES: Me? You talking to me? Not me, man! You! 
 ASTON: What? 
 ASTON: I live here. You don’t. 
 DAVIES: Don’t I? Well, I live here. I’ve been offered a job here.232 
 
Davies’ incredulity betrays how his arrogance has blinded him to the stark realities of 
his life in the room, as he is, after his ‘promotion’, conceiving the space as the answer 
to his arrogant-vindictive phantasies of triumphing over ‘inferior’ others and 
                                                 
231 The Caretaker, p.107. 
232 The Caretaker, p.108. 
 197 
achieving a ‘high-ranking’ position. For Davies, although Aston is a mere 
encumbrance, a fly that he has deigned to not (yet) swat, his warnings show that he 
believes that he can exercise his power at any point through joining forces with the 
‘gaffer’ Mick. What Davies overlooks, amongst other things, is the possibility that 
Mick could take Aston’s side, as they are, after all, brothers, who have some love for 
one another.     
 After the heated late-night argument between Aston and Davies, the tramp is 
determined, more so than ever before, to ensure that it is not he who has to leave the 
room. He decides to talk to his ‘pal’ Mick, who he hopes can come around quickly to 
his point of view, as he self-flatteringly believes that Mick will grant his wish on the 
pretext that the aspiring interior decorator needs him. In a deeply ironic reversal, 
however, Mick now realises that his brother is aware of what a scoundrel Davies is, 
and so he feels that his Machiavellian plan has been realized. Without much further 
ado, he dispenses with his recently hired ‘caretaker’, citing the bogus reason that he 
has just ‘discovered’ that the tramp has no interior decorating qualifications: 
 
You come here recommending yourself as an interior decorator, whereupon I 
take you on, and what happens? You make a long speech about all the 
references you’ve got down at Sidcup, and what happens? I haven’t noticed 
you go down to Sidcup to obtain them. It’s all most regrettable but it looks as 
though I’m compelled to pay you off for your caretaking work. Here’s half a 
dollar.233 
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Mick’s cruel nod to their class differences (‘Here’s half a dollar’) shows, if proof 
were needed, that he was never, at any point, invested in helping Davies. Yet, even if 
the tramp was never to be the caretaker and an interior decorator, Mick, somewhat 
surprisingly, feels that, while executing his nefarious plan, he was able to at least 
entertain the possibility that the dilapidated house could be transformed according to 
his (supposedly) discerning tastes. After telling the tramp to clear out, he now realises 
that his love for his procrastinating brother has thwarted the only real chance he had 
of getting any actual decorating work done. In a fit of rage at his absent brother, Mick 
throws Aston’s beloved Buddha at the gas stove, which indirectly suggests that this 
ambitious man cannot, as the Eastern religions counsel, resign himself to the 
actualities of his existence; instead, due to his narcissistic tendencies, he has slipped 
from expansive overconfidence to bitterness and disillusionment. Paris believes that 
this is a characteristic pattern for such individuals: 
 
His bargain [with fate] is that if he holds onto his dreams and to his 
exaggerated claims for himself, life is bound to give him what he wants. 
Since life can never match his expectations, he feels, in his weaker moments, 
that it is full of tragic contradictions.234 
 
While Mick was never as ruthlessly selfish as Davies, nor as stubborn and as lazy as 
Aston, regarding the room, his bitter attitude suggests that he had his own territorial 
imperative: this was to turn the property into a ‘palace’, which would enhance his 
self-esteem by proving what a good building contractor he is. All that he has done 
instead is build an elaborate fancy, a pathological use of the transitional space, where 
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external reality was not supposed to obtrude, so that he could ‘transform’, in some 
alchemical move, the dilapidated room into a palace. What therefore distinguishes 
Mick from the other characters is that, near the play’s conclusion, he has been able to 
see the reality of his situation, as he painfully acknowledges that the house, like his 
brother, will never come to fulfil his high expectations.   
 In his characteristically manipulative way, Davies’ response to his dismissal 
is to change allegiances once again. Forcing himself upon the weary Aston, he 
suggests that he will now accept his roommate’s original offer of becoming caretaker: 
 
…So I reckon that’d be the best way out of it, we swap beds, and then we 
could get down to what we was saying, I’d look after the place for you, I’d 
keep an eye on it for you, for you, like, not for the other…not for…for your 
brother, you see, not for him, for you, I’ll be your man, you say the word, just 
say the word.235 
 
Davies obviously does not understand the basis of emotional logic, as he cannot seem 
to appreciate that his cruel words and his callous chasing after a ‘better’ offer have 
caused an irreparable rupture in his relationship with Aston. His manipulative 
behaviour has only served to further ossify Aston’s own neurotic compulsions, as his 
roommate is even less accommodating than he was before; a good example of this is 
when Aston refuses to change beds or let Davies help him build the tool shed: 
 
 ASTON: No, I couldn’t change beds.  
 DAVIES: But you don’t understand my meaning! 
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ASTON: Anyway, I’m going to be busy. I’ve got that shed to get up. If I 
don’t get it up now it’ll never go up. Until it’s up I can’t get started. 
 DAVIES: I’ll give you a hand to put up your shed, that’s what I’ll do! 
 Pause. 
I’ll give you a hand! We’ll both put up that shed together! See? Get it done 
in next to no time! Do you see what I’m saying? 
 Pause. 
 ASTON: No. I can get it up myself.236 
 
There is no doubt that Davies’ actions are unforgivable and that to keep him on as 
caretaker would be to forget too easily his ruthless behaviour. Yet Aston’s 
stubbornness, his misguided desire to want to go it alone, has not shown any signs of 
changing, in spite of the fact that his conduct is partly responsible for the impasse that 
they have now found themselves in; what he will never see is that, if he had not been 
so unyielding over fairly minor matters (such as closing a window), then Davies 
might not have sought to befriend Mick. In essence, while Aston is right to get rid of 
his roommate, his way of doing it (i.e., turning his back on Davies) is a worrying sign 
that he admits no culpability in what has happened between them; rather, he wants to 
deny reality and withdraw passive aggressively: 
 
 ASTON turns back to the window.   
 DAVIES: What am I going to do? 
 Pause. 
 What shall I do? 
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 Pause. 
 Where am I going to go? 
 Pause.237 
 
Aston does not answer Davies’ question, as he no longer takes any interest in the 
future of the tramp, as the reclusive Aston has turned his back on more than his 
roommate: we, the audience, can sense that he has shunned virtually all human 
contact with that final declarative, yet complacent gesture of rejection. The ending of 
this play is thus tragic, as neither of these two lonely and disaffected men realise that 
it was their pathological territorial imperative, their obstinate or ruthless attitude 
towards the proprietorship of the room that fatally undermined the possibility of 
developing the fragile bond between them. 
     III 
Considering The Caretaker explicitly from a psycho-political angle, two interrelated 
readings come immediately to mind: 1) the play is an indictment of capitalism, as 
Pinter suggests that a society based upon the principle of competition for modestly 
scarce resources encourages individuals to see one another in a utilitarian, if not 
overtly hostile, way; 2) related to this, in those particularly persecuted by the social 
Darwinism of capitalism, Pinter contends that there is a tendency for them to retreat 
from the world of community living into a private sphere governed by the delusive 
logic of phantasy, as this is a despairing attempt to satisfy their otherwise unmet 
needs.  
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 Let us begin establishing these readings by firstly entertaining Michael 
Monahan’s description of capitalism as a form of social organisation predicated upon 
the existence of relatively scarce resources: 
 
The basic features of capitalism (supply and demand, market value, 
diminishing returns, labour costs) all function within a context of scarce 
resources. As Robert Goodin points out, it is ‘modest scarcity’ which drives 
the market economy–if there were abundancy there would be no need for 
trade, while if there were extreme scarcity there would be little incentive to 
keep our contracts. Thus dominant market theories and political structures are 
all founded upon some notion of material scarcity.238      
 
Monahan’s description of relative scarcity proposes that it is the motivating force 
behind capitalist trade, as sellers and buyers come together to negotiate the transfer of 
modestly scarce resources and commodities. What Monahan does not add, however, 
is that scarcity itself can be construed as the social basis for antagonism between 
people, as scarce resources encourages individuals to compete fiercely for them. This 
was the view proposed by Jean-Paul Sartre: 
 
In pure reciprocity that which is Other than me is also the same. But in 
reciprocity as modified by scarcity, the same appears to us as anti-human in as 
far as this same man appears as radically Other–that is to say, as threatening us 
with death.239 
 
                                                 
238 Michael Monahan, ‘Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason and the Inevitability of Violence: 
Human Freedom in the Milieu of Scarcity’, Sartre Studies International, 14 no.2 (2008), 48-70 (p.50).    
239 Jean-Paul Sartre, qtd in Monahan, p.50. 
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Sartre paints a bleak picture of what it is like to breathe in an atmosphere of scarcity, 
as he suggests that the absence of abundance means that each individual cannot 
empathically identify with others, since they are, in reality, competitors, if not 
enemies, who seek to deny what one needs to live. As Sartre argues, each individual 
must see others as radically Other, as each individual is motivated by the will-to-live, 
such that a competitor becomes an ally of death.  
 If one accepts, as Sartre and others do, that capitalism is a system founded 
upon modest scarcity, then from a psychodynamic perspective people are construed as 
being propelled by what psychologist Abraham Maslow called ‘deficiency-needs’ i.e., 
needs that are experienced as a painful lack in the organism, which are in contrast to 
the ‘expansive’, self-actualising needs . In his own work, Maslow’s account of human 
psychology revolved around the differences between a deficiency and growth-
orientation; their salient features are described in the following passage: 
 
Where [cognition] is primarily deficiency-motivated, it is more need-
reductive, more homeostatic, more the relief of felt deficit. When behaviour is 
more growth-orientated, it is less need-reductive, and more a movement 
towards self-actualization, as it is more harmonious, more expressive, more 
selfless, more reality-centred.240   
 
Maslow’s definition implies that the ‘deficiency orientation’ possesses these 
prominent features: it creates a fundamentally antagonistic and utilitarian form of 
relating; it encourages safety and self-inhibition, rather than exploration and self-
expression; and, most important of all, it is (more or less) reality denying, as the 
                                                 
240 Abraham Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (New York: Harper & Row, 
1966), pp.66-67. 
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external world is apprehended and evaluated according to the nature and urgency of a 
particular need. Overall, what Maslow is suggesting is that those who are deficiency-
orientated are fundamentally motivated by a life philosophy that is based upon the 
perceived necessity of ownership, as what matters is securing those things, material or 
otherwise, that fulfil one’s needs and define one’s identity.  
 In his works, Erich Fromm defines this kind of orientation as the ‘having’ 
mode of existence, which is intimately related to the idea of a territorial imperative, as 
a capitalist society, with its modest scarcity, must value and legally respect the need 
for a private space that protects the individual’s possessions. In fact, according to 
Fromm, the deficiency-orientation is so intimately related to the proprietary ‘drive’ 
that he posits that the ‘having’ mode of being-in-the-world is derived from it: 
 
The nature of the having mode of existence follows from the nature of private 
property. In this mode of existence all that matters is my acquisition of 
property and my unlimited right to keep what I have acquired.241      
 
As Fromm contends, the ‘having’ mode can be summed up as, ‘I own, therefore I 
am’. This is because, in the ‘having’ mode, the individual owns the possession, but 
the possession, in as far as it defines his identity, also owns him. Indeed, to give up 
what one owns, is to give up part of the self.    
 Returning to those two readings of the play, an argument can now be made 
for the first one (i.e., that Pinter proposes that capitalism inculcates a utilitarian form 
of relating). More fully, using characters who suffer from acute deficiency needs (in 
Davies’ case, his status is the lowest possible in society, and so he craves desperately 
                                                 
241 Erich Fromm, To Have or to Be? (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp.76-77. 
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to be recognised and esteemed; as for Aston, his persecution at the hands of 
government agencies, coupled with his underlying loneliness, implies he has a strong 
need for security and for companionship; lastly, Mick’s entrepreneurial spirit 
camouflages his deep seated need to be esteemed by the bourgeois community), 
Pinter highlights how they are unable to form a harmonious collective, as they are 
incapable of seeing each other respectfully as individuals, but only as part of their 
respective individualistic projects. This utilitarian ethos is indeed exacerbated by the 
fact that they form a homosocial grouping, which consolidates and reinforces their 
shared weaknesses. According to Sharon Bird, this is a common feature of 
homosocial groupings: 
 
Homosocial interaction, among heterosexuals, contributes to the maintenance 
of hegemonic masculinity norms by supporting means associated with 
identities that fit hegemonic ideals, while suppressing meanings associated 
with non-hegemonic masculine identities.242      
 
As a group, they do not speak the language of emotions, nor do they, in particular, 
share (with one notable exception) any of their vulnerabilities with one another; on 
the contrary, the three of them maintain a defensive autonomy, as the others become 
simply a means to their respective ends. What therefore makes them so functional, in 
a thematic sense, as characters is that, in an already atomised society, they particularly 
underscore, as Pinter construes it, the pernicious ‘soul’ of capitalism (i.e., each 
individual wishes to use the other and to be ultimately defined by what they possess). 
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Masculinity’, Gender and Society, 10 no.2 (1996), 120-132 (p.121).    
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 Secondly, the psycho-political subtext of the pathological transitional space 
can now be understood as follows: in a society that fosters the development of 
deficiency needs, this prompts, in acute cases like the characters in this play, a 
heightened degree of embeddedness affects, which, in turn, causes a retreat to a 
private, indeed community-denying world. In other words, as Pinter shows in The 
Caretaker, the obverse side of the plundering and acquisitive enterprise that is 
capitalism is the pathological transitional space, where the proprietary drive becomes 
the quest for a private territory that is choreographed according to one’s own 
delusional needs. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have considered a number of psycho-political situations that 
represent one of the most Pinteresque of themes, namely the territorial imperative. In 
this section, I wish to summarise my conclusions. 
 A Slight Ache was one of Pinter’s earliest works, which, on an ostensible 
level, depicts a paranoid character, Edward, who is tormented by an elderly 
matchseller that stands just outside his back garden gate. Pinter’s drama is so much 
more than this, though, as he examines the psychodynamics of the relationship 
between class divisions and territorial divisions. More fully, Pinter’s characteristically  
psycho-political explanation for these social phenomena is that territorial divides are 
created through the psychological mechanism of projection, which tempers a raging 
psychical conflict by ‘evacuating’ the unwanted traits; indeed, this mechanism 
involves pinning them onto others, who represent, to some degree, the repressed 
characteristics. For Pinter, the existence of this projective ‘mechanism’ therefore 
explains why people can be driven by a demoniac territorial imperative that involves 
spatially isolating oneself from those that symbolise what has been disowned, as it is 
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important that the ‘carriers’ of the psychical content do not enter their territory and 
‘re-infect’ them with their own ‘poison’. In the play itself, Edward’s transposition of 
an inner conflict into a spatial one assumed a class inflection, as the working class 
matchseller came to embody Edward’s fear of failure and his own self-disgust. In fact, 
it was only once the matchseller entered his home and was directly engaged with that 
Edward started to unwittingly reacquaint himself with what he had disowned, such 
that the class divisions blurred as the territorial distance between the two men 
receded. Pinter thus underscored in his psycho-political play how class divisions are 
false and inauthentic, like the impostor Edward, as they involve a disowning of one’s 
common humanity so that defensive social and physical structures can be erected to 
protect a ‘bunker-style’ ego. 
 Pinter’s first play, The Room, is likewise a work about territorial 
appropriation, as the reclusive, indeed agoraphobic, Rose, clings to her lukewarm 
room as a means of trying to secure love. Nevertheless, the play possesses a more 
representative appeal than this might otherwise suggest, as Pinter’s psycho-political 
question is this: why do women capitulated to a domestic power structure that 
exposed them continually to the threat of male violence. His counterintuitive answer 
is that such women are driven by a ‘self-actualising’ tendency, which is hindered and 
almost fatally restrained by living in a patriarchal society. More fully, Pinter’s view is 
that patriarchal society does not provide women with much opportunity to nurture and 
develop their identities, as they are treated as men’s utensils. Consequently, according 
to Pinter, this objectifying, loveless arrangement fails to develop any potential 
towards autonomy, and so women cling to the bars of their domestic prison, in the 
hope that a protective space emerges, which will allow the True, autonomous self to 
‘incarnate’ itself. Overall, although the play is bleak in its denouement (Rose loses 
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forever her contact with her authentic self, Sal), Pinter indicts society rather than 
human nature, which raises the possibility of a more human and egalitarian 
relationship between the sexes.    
 Finally, The Caretaker construes the territorial imperative as a form of 
pathological use of the transitional space. In my earlier description of Winnicottian 
theory, I described how the ‘healthy’ transitional space is normally used as a space in 
which to lie fallow, to recuperate from the continual impositions of the reality 
principle. In this play, though, all three characters are driven by their deficiency 
needs, coupled with an underlying pessimism about their environment satisfying their 
desires. What this therefore means in the concrete is that the three characters, each in 
their own individual fashion, re-create the room using an inordinate degree of 
phantasy, which implies, in turn, a transitional space that is designed to exclude any 
element of reality that is deemed painful.  
 By means of this scenario, then, Pinter explored how the territorial 
imperative is more generally related to the capitalist proprietary ‘drive’, as the three 
characters breathe in an atmosphere of acute scarcity, which is conveyed by their 
willingness to possess or manipulate each other as though they were things. Where 
these characters differ from the ‘norm’, as it were, is by how little they engage in the 
wider world, and by the degree to which they treat the room as a phantasmal 
construction. In truth, these two factors are, of course, inter-related, as Pinter would 
no doubt agree that the more socially ‘adjusted’ individuals form a more ‘moderate’ 
transitional space, since their greater acquaintance with the wider world, and their 
greater confidence in securing what they need, implies that their homes will constitute 
a more egalitarian balance of the found and the created.  
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Chapter 4: Family Voices 
Introduction 
Steven H. Gale wrote the following about the importance of the concept of family in 
Pinter’s work: 
 
Although most of the scholarly consideration given to the subject as it 
appears in his dramaturgy has focused on The Homecoming (1965), the 
theme of family has been a central one since his first play, The Room (1957), 
when Rose solicitously ‘mothered’ her husband, Bert. The Birthday Party 
(1958), A Slight Ache (1959), The Caretaker (1960), Night School (1960), A 
Night Out (1961), The Collection (1961), The Lover (1963), Tea Party 
(1965), Landscape (1968), Night (1969), Silence (1969), Old Times (1971), 
Monologue (1973) and Betrayal (1978) all deal with this subject to some 
extent. In fact it is difficult to find a drama by Pinter that does not take the 
concept into account at least in passing.243  
 
Gale’s extensive listing of Pinter plays certainly corroborates his claim that the 
playwright’s works touch upon this theme again and again. There are several reasons 
for this, one of which is that family relationships are invested with a great deal of 
emotional energy, and conflicts are therefore inherently dramatic; furthermore, family 
relationships are also hierarchies, and therefore, as Pinter was well aware, they 
constitute one of the most universal of power relations. 
 This chapter will focus on two of Pinter’s most family-centric plays, namely 
Family Voices (1981) and The Homecoming. Apart from the fact that these works 
                                                 
243 Stephen H. Gale, ‘Harold Pinter’s Family Voices and the Concept of Family’ in Harold Pinter: 
You’ve Never Heard Such Silence, pp.146-166 (p.146-147). 
 210 
foreground the theme of family, the main reason for their inclusion is that, in my 
opinion, Pinter was essentially interested in the family as a patriarchal structure. More 
fully, these two readings concentrate on the theme of the family as the main structure 
in the creation and perpetuation of the ‘patriarchal order’. Family Voices, in 
particular, shows the ‘reigning sovereignty’ of the patriarchal order by means of the 
fact that the ‘lost’ son (unnamed Voice 1) cannot achieve any degree of independence 
from his mother due to his emotionally ‘absent’ father; indeed, the play illustrates the 
‘sovereignty’ of the patriarchal order by implying that a young man can either accede 
to the role of Symbolic Father or, like Voice 1, regress into the arms of the overly 
solicitous mother. 
 The Homecoming lays bare the structure of the patriarchal order by means of 
the dramatic repositioning of the mother-substitute, Ruth. In this work, three 
emasculated sons, and an emasculated father are unable (and, in the former cases, 
disinclined) to accede to the role of Symbolic Father, with his posited ‘phallic’ power; 
instead, Ruth is able to ‘replace’ the hapless Max, and she becomes patriarch-as-
matriarch. What this transition reveals, in Pinter’s view, is the insidious sexual 
politics of the patriarchal order. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, only one 
member of the family possesses any genuine power: the Symbolic Father, who is 
posited as the (temporary) guarantor of power and plenitude, because he possesses the 
primary signifier of that power: the phallus. Secondly, what is symptomatic of this 
non-egalitarian structure is that women are positioned in objectified, disempowered 
roles (mother and wife), which are based upon the phantasy that they signify ‘lack’. In 
general, the singularity of Ruth’s ‘succession’ to the family ‘throne’ exposes that 
there is a throne, and that it is ordinarily women’s role to sit at the feet of it.        
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Family Voices and The Homecoming 
Sean Homer wrote the following about what could be called the Oedipal orientation 
of libidinous desire: 
 
A materialist psychiatry interprets Oedipus as an ‘ideological form’, a 
referential axis–the invariant ‘daddy-mommy-me’–around which desire is 
oriented, channelled and above all else domesticated.244 
 
Homer’s mention of the invariant axis of desire–the ‘eternal daddy-mommy-me’–
illustrates the importance of the family, as a power structure, in forming and 
domesticating desire. More specifically, what Homer means is that desire is 
‘triangulated’, as the child finds, for the first time, that he has intense sexual feelings 
towards his original love-object (his mother), whilst confronting, at the same time, the 
regrettable and painful fact that deep in the heart of the family is also a formidable 
obstacle (his father). The allusion to the idea of the ‘eternal daddy-mommy-me’ 
therefore signifies that, for the rest of the individual’s life, his desire will be codified 
by this original experience, such that any love-object/love-obstacle will be symbols 
for daddy and mommy. 
 In this section, I wish to examine Pinter’s invocation, or should I say 
dramatization of the ‘eternal daddy-mommy-me’ by offering in-depth readings of 
Family Voices and of The Homecoming. Regarding the former, I will seek to show 
that Pinter explores, through the medium of this play, the theme of ‘absent fathers/lost 
sons’. More fully, I intend to argue that in this play Pinter suggests that, if the male 
adult has suffered the lack of an emotionally ‘present’ father, then he is condemned to 
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a life of slavish, indeed childish dependence, which culminates, in this case, as a 
return to mother. Overall, Pinter shows what happens when there is a ‘fault-line’ in 
the patriarchal order, such that no son can accede to the position of Symbolic Father. 
 The next, more complex play depicts a homecoming of sorts too, but, in this 
work, it is a woman called Ruth that ‘returns’ to her husband’s family. In this reading, 
I will argue that Pinter is still concerned with the Oedipal triangle, and with the issue 
of the patriarchal order, but what he intended to depict was the insidiousness, and, 
above all else, the pervasiveness of the patriarchal order. This he does by showing 
how a young woman can, through guile and desperation, accede to the position of 
matriarch in a dysfunctional and emasculated family. 
 My two readings will be prefaced, as usual, by a brief theoretical section, 
which, in this case, constitutes a short discussion of a Lacanian account of the 
Oedipus complex.  More fully, the main reason I will be explaining a few basic 
Lacanian concepts (most notably, the mirror stage and castration as a ‘portal’ into the 
Symbolic realm) is that they provide a cogent explication of what happens to men 
when they cannot accede to the role of the Symbolic Father. This kind of explanation 
is indeed important when examining the aforementioned plays, because, as has been 
mentioned, the psycho-political subtext of these works is that they explore various 
ruptures in the patriarchal order, which ultimately links back to a failure to resolve the 
Oedipus complex. 
      I 
The Freudian theory of the Oedipus complex is psychoanalysis’ great narrative of 
how capricious infantile desire gives way to the demands of social norms. Indeed, for 
Freud, it is not only countries that can be subject to reform, but psyches too, as his 
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account of the Oedipus complex underscores how children modify their ‘anti-social’ 
desires. Freud describes the first stage of the complex as follows: 
 
At a very early stage the little boy develops an object-cathexis for his mother, 
and deals with his father by identifying with him. For a time, these two 
relationships proceed side by side, until the boy’s sexual wishes in regard to 
his mother become more intense, and his father is perceived as an obstacle to 
them; from this the Oedipus complex originates. His identification with his 
father takes on a hostile colouring, and changes into a wish to get rid of his 
father in order to take his place with the mother.245  
 
Freud intimates that the Oedipus complex begins with the little boy’s sexual desires 
being channelled towards his mother (his first ‘love object’), and the child developing 
a strong, if somewhat defensive, sense of proprietorship that makes his father into a 
hate figure of sorts. In this family drama, what Freud was depicting was the battle 
between his two main principles of psychological functioning, as the pleasure 
principle speaks the language of wish fulfilment, which in this case means possessing 
mother all to oneself; in contrast, the reality principle is embodied in the dominating 
presence of the father, who acts as an unyielding obstacle to the child’s sexual desire 
and ambitions. With the family, therefore, desire is not so much strangulated, but 
subjected to ‘triangulation’, as the mother represents the merger of wish with object, 
whilst the father acts as a formidable hurdle. 
 Clearly, the Oedipal drama, as described by Freud, has no involved and 
complicated second act, as the ‘battle’ essentially goes on in the child’s mind. This is 
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because the child recognises, with an almost animal-like awareness of his safety, that 
the father is bigger and much more powerful, and that it would be folly to assert any 
challenge to the family structure. For Freud, what proves to be the most decisive 
element in the boy’s strategic calculation is his belief that if he were to assert himself 
in an attempt to win his love object, then father would not only punish him, but 
remove what patriarchal society defines as the very guarantor of power and of 
potency, namely his penis. In his writings, Freud termed this fear as the threat of 
castration, which acts, as Tony Thwaites puts it, as a kind of foreboding sense that 
punishment could be imminent, unless certain actions are taken: ‘For the boy, 
castration is a threat of something that might occur, in the future, as a punishment that 
can be averted by the right behaviour’.246       
 Since this threat of emasculation must be constantly entertained as a distinct 
possibility, the little boy realizes that, as long as he harbours sexual desires towards 
his mother, he is the enemy of his father. Consequently, the young boy decides that he 
should relinquish that particular desire, and redirect his libido towards a more 
‘suitable’ love object. Viewed from one angle, the dissolution of the Oedipus complex 
thus ends on a note of defeat, as the child has indirectly admitted that the father is 
‘master’ of the household, and that he remains the undefeated defender of his prized 
love-object. Yet, even at this early stage, the child understands that his initial defeat is 
only but a humbling first step along the road to mastery, as the Oedipal struggle is a 
particular case of losing the battle, only to win the war. The young boy is indeed 
aware that if he renounces his incestuous desires (or, more accurately, represses 
them), then he can begin his apprenticeship as a man-to-be, which will culminate in 
him embodying the symbolic role of Father in the family. Thus, the Freudian account 
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of masculine development emphasises that inter-generational rivalry gives way to the 
prospects of succession, as the young boy acts like a patient successor to the throne. 
Meanwhile, of course, mother is treated by both parties as a passive and impotent 
object, as she may inspire sexual jealousy, but, according to patriarchal ideology, her 
sexual organ signifies a conspicuous ‘lack’ of phallic power.   
 If the Freudian model of the Oedipus complex described how incestuous 
desires are tamed and transformed, Jacques Lacan elaborated upon one of Freud’s 
central assumptions, namely that subjectivity is shaped through subjection to the 
Other, which, for Lacan, means the symbolic order (i.e., the discursive ‘space’ known 
as language). For our purposes, his elaborations and amendments centre on two main 
theoretical proposals. Firstly, in his writings, Lacan posited the existence of a ‘mirror 
stage’, which he believed was one of the necessary preconditions for entry into the 
Oedipal ‘triangle. More fully, according to Lacan, subjectivity is constructed through 
a necessary alienation from the immediacy of lived experience (he calls this the 
‘Real’), as it is only through the dialectic of self and object that experiences can be 
known and potentially transformed. The mirror stage is the first stop on the path to an 
established identity, as it is the originary moment when the infant is alienated from his 
direct experience through seeing his self represented as a specular construct. As Lacan 
puts it: 
 
The mirror stage is the symbolic matrix in which the ‘I’ is precipitated in a 
primordial form, prior to it being objectified in the dialectic of identification 
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with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function 
as subject.247 
 
For Lacan, the mirror stage gives birth to representation, as the subject viscerally 
invests in a representational image, whether that be a mirror, or the mother’s mobile 
and sensitive face. Consequently, this new ability to be ‘found’ in the realm of images 
(Lacan calls this domain the ‘Imaginary’) provides the subject with a seemingly 
cohesive identity for the first time. Furthermore, the mirror stage also heralds the 
beginnings of the ability to symbolise, as the formation of a self-image, no matter how 
initially rudimentary it is, depends on a basic awareness of ‘I’, ‘other’ and a symbolic 
‘placeholder’ i.e., an image as a stand-in for the self. Since the Oedipal subject 
requires such self-awareness, combined with the capacity to cast mother and father in 
symbolic roles that are scripted by his desires, the mirror stage must be reached first.                   
 The other Lacanian amendment involves a rewriting of the role of castration 
in the dissolution of the complex. To reiterate, according to the Freudian model, it is 
the anatomical differences between the sexes which provide the impetus for the boy to 
fantasize about the prospects of losing the very embodiment of his power and 
potency. Now, Lacan does agree with this to some extent, as he acknowledges that 
patriarchal societies do construe the penis as the site of power and of potency, and that 
the Father embodies, in the words of Roland Barthes, ‘power, fascination, instituting 
authority, terror, power to castrate’.248 But what Lacan emphasised the most was that 
subjectivity is firmly established through a movement from the Imaginary to the 
Symbolic realm, which is otherwise known as the discursive Other (i.e., language). 
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For Lacan, this transition occurs when the subject is ‘castrated’ through a gradual 
recognition of his own powerlessness, and so the subject alienates himself even more 
from the Real, and submits to the prevailing patriarchal ideology. What he gains, 
Lacan argues, is an ability to articulate his experience, even though the inevitable 
alienation from the Real means that some of that experience is repressed due to its 
deviance from the dominant ideology. 
 Since this notion of castration is central to the subsequent close analysis, I 
shall describe it in more detail. According to Lacan, what instigates the ‘castration’ is 
the child’s dawning awareness that as much as he desires his mother, and wishes to 
have proprietorship over her, she is subjected to a power within the family that is 
greater than herself to which she must yield. In the family drama, the father plays the 
symbolic role of Father, as he signifies, as far as patriarchy is concerned, power, 
wholeness, and most importantly, the word as Law. Lacan therefore suggests that the 
child inevitably comes to the conclusion that his desire has to be modified in the 
interests of control, as what he now desires is to be the object of the mother’s desire, 
which is known as the phallus: 
 
What the child wants is to become the desire of desire, to be able to satisfy the 
mother’s desire, that is, ‘to be or not to be’ the object of the mother’s desire. 
To please the mother it is necessary and sufficient to be the phallus.249  
 
What Lacan means by ‘to please the mother it is necessary and sufficient to be the 
phallus’ is that the child’s original sexual desire towards the mother becomes inflected 
by a wish for mastery, and that this ‘mastery’ is only achieved through a severance (or 
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alternatively, a castration) of the original dyadic relationship, which means, in 
essence, submitting to the cultural order and becoming an embodiment of the 
symbolic Father. Importantly, during this transition a process of symbolic substitution 
also occurs, as the object of the mother’s desire–i.e., the phallus–becomes open to the 
chain of signifiers, and so the phallus becomes not simply the biological organ, but 
anything that represents, within patriarchal ideology, the letter of the law (Lacan 
terms this kind of signifier, ‘The-Name-of-The-Father’). This Lacanian account thus 
implies that what brings the Oedipal stage to a definitive conclusion is the Subject 
being situated in the Symbolic realm, as the cultural order’s patriarchal ideology 
provides a plenitude of other love objects (i.e., other women apart from mother), and a 
relatively coherent set of signifiers that embody the Father’s authority and mastery.   
     II 
Family Voices begins with Voice 1 speaking out from the void: 
 
I am having a very nice time. The weather is up and down but surprisingly 
warm, on the whole, more often than not. I hope you’re feeling well, and not 
as peaky as you did, the last time I saw you. No, you didn’t feel peaky, you 
felt perfectly well, you simply looked peaky. Do you miss me?250 
 
These opening lines appear to be the beginning of a pleasant, albeit strained, letter that 
is being read out by an unidentified person. In reality, however, none of the players in 
this work are engaged in what could be called correspondence; this is a point that is 
expressed by Hersh Zeifman: 
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Despite the antiphonal voices suggestive of an interchange of letters, a 
correspondence between son and mother, what we are in fact hearing are two 
separate voices which merely happen to intersect. We are not, then, dealing 
with a correspondence in any sense of the word: what appear to be letters are 
simply voiced thoughts, not written down.251 
 
Zeifman indeed touches on one of the central themes of this play, as Pinter could very 
well have entitled it as Family Monologues: each character voices their yearnings, but 
they are never communicated to one another. Thematically speaking, it is quite 
straightforward to interpret this intersection of voices as implying that each member 
of the family has become estranged from one another, like several members of a 
disbanded choir now singing to different hymn sheets. This interpretation is a cogent 
one, at least up to a point, as the yearnings of mother and son, for example, do not 
correspond as they would if they had been lovers; likewise, the relationship between 
father and son, as we shall see, was obviously distant.  
 Still, no matter how much the above seems to be a quintessential Pinteresque 
theme, I do not believe that Pinter intended for this play to be about characters 
disconnected from one another, to the point of being uninterested. Although 
communication does not occur in this play, there is nevertheless one important, easily 
overlooked fact: these characters, each in the privacy of their own chambers (well, in 
the father’s case, a glassy grave), cannot forget about one another. While it may be 
true that their thoughts will never be communicated, their yearnings, and even their 
expectations, are inextricably influenced by one another. As the play poignantly 
illustrates, it is impossible for them to not address one another, because, whether the 
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tone is accusatory or conciliatory, obsequious or goading, they are compelled to voice 
their thoughts about their family, who continue to influence them so profoundly. What 
Pinter is therefore concerned with in this play is an archetypal form of familial 
disconnection, with each aspect of it being represented by a key family player; in 
particular, this kind of disconnection manifests itself in the withholding of ‘midnight’ 
thoughts, which are those private, keenly felt sentiments deemed too intimate to be 
communicated directly. The subsequent discussion will show that the underlying 
cause of these out-of-synch antiphonal voices is a fault-line in this specific type of 
family: the father’s seeming indifference to his son (during life) has made all three 
‘family haunted’, since their deepest yearnings still centre upon the original triadic 
relationship, which, tragically, leads to conflicts that constitute their estrangement.        
 Returning to Voice 1, the question which suddenly disrupts his small-talk 
(‘Do you miss me?’) is an unusual one for a son to ask, as it is more commonly 
directed towards a lover. That may be so, but the analogy itself is not lost on Pinter, as 
he will depict this mother-son relationship as intimate and intense, even if their 
relationship is conducted from afar. Already in the opening preamble, Pinter implies, 
in a number of ways, that this man, of indeterminate, but presumably youthful, age 
lives his life as a ‘good boy’, as his existence is always in implicit dialogue with his 
mother. Firstly, the young man declares initially that he is ‘Dead drunk’ after ‘five 
pints in The Fishmongers Arms’.252 Later, he ‘comes clean’: 
 
When I said I was dead drunk I was of course making a joke. I bet you 
laughed. Mother? Did you get the joke? You know I never touch alcohol.253 
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Jokes sometimes are funny because they break a taboo, and, in this family, it is so 
unthinkable for this young man to get drunk that the claim is inherently amusing. Of 
course, his pleasures must have been vetted and approved of by his mother to such an 
extent that even claiming, into the void, that he is drunk makes him anxious about 
how his mother might respond: ‘Mother? Did you get the joke?’  
 Secondly, as a continuation of this theme of compliance, he discusses his 
plans in terms that strongly suggest that he is justifying his life according to what his 
mother (apparently) expects: 
 
I expect to make friends in the not too distant future. I expect to make 
girlfriends too. I expect to meet a very nice girl too. Having met her, I shall 
bring her home to meet my mother.254  
 
This is no son on the verge of independence, because these are not his own wishes, 
but rather lukewarmly expressed expectations. In his mind, this is what a ‘good boy’ 
should be doing, now that he has left the family nest. 
 Finally, a most definitive example of the mother’s pernicious influence from 
afar, is that, in spite of claiming to be attempting to widen the circle of his 
acquaintances, he does not talk to anyone outside: 
 
So they look at me, they try to catch my eye, they expect me to speak. But as 
I do not know them I do not speak. Nor do I ever feel the slightest 
temptation to do so. You see, mother, I am not lonely, because all that has 
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ever happened to me is with me, keeps me company; my childhood, for 
example, through which you, my mother, and he, my father, guided me.255   
 
He seems to be following advice that his mother, or father, gave him as a child about 
not talking to strangers. On a deeper level, though, he does not want to talk to 
strangers, as he is that mother-obsessed sort of individual, who was treated, for too 
long, as the mother’s phallic object. For him, life is not about making an effort, 
whether it be with strangers or anything else; rather, they should come to him, and 
provide him with support and solace. Since he has found a mother substitute in the 
form of the aged landlady, Mrs Withers, he especially prefers the sanctuary of the 
boarding house: 
 
I get on very well with my landlady, Mrs Withers. She tells me I am her 
solace. I have a drink with her at lunchtime and another one at teatime and 
then take her for a couple in the evening at The Fishmongers arms.256  
 
Voice 1 needs the role of a mother figure, and now that he has found one, he enjoys 
that hermetic relationship, which ironically, in a tragic sense, constitutes a kind of 
estrangement from his actual mother. Indeed, with a Mrs Withers present, it would 
seem he only needs memories of his original mother, and the occasional ‘talk’ with 
her.  
 Voice 2, the mother’s voice, follows on immediately from her son’s. Her 
tone, at least initially, is one of bewilderment, and of gentle reproach: 
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Darling. Where are you? The flowers are wonderful here. The blooms. You so 
loved them. Why do you never write? I think of you and wonder how you are. 
Do you ever think of me? Your mother? Ever? At all?257 
 
His mother knows that her son used to love her, like the blooms, but underneath the 
reproachful tone is the insistent question: ‘Am I, your mother, now dead to you?’ 
 This question goes unanswered, as it must, but this does not prevent his 
mother from wondering about the details of his new life, nor does it hinder her 
tendency to attempt to insinuate herself in his life: 
 
Have you made friends with anyone? A nice boy? Or a nice girl? There are 
so many nice boys and nice girls about. But please don’t get mixed up with 
the other sort. They can land you in such terrible trouble. And you’d hate it 
so. You’re so scrupulous, so particular. 
I often think I would love to live happily ever after with you and your young 
wife. And she would be such a lovely wife to you and I would have the 
occasional dinner with you both. A dinner I would be quite happy to cook 
myself, should you both be tired after your long day, as I’m sure you will 
be.258 
 
His mother understands that her son is ‘so scrupulous, so particular’ because he has 
been brought up to be a ‘good boy’, but she also appreciates, probably half-
consciously, that his cloistered upbringing gave him the will to vet people, yet not the 
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means: it would be so easy for him to be naively taken in, which is a prophecy 
subsequently confirmed.  
 Still, as much as she wonders about his new life, it is impossible for her to 
not return to her innermost wishes. Unable now to play the role of mother with him 
cast as a young child, she imagines the next best thing: being mother to her son and 
his lovely wife. This daydream proves not to be comforting, however, as she quickly 
returns to that blissful time when he was a young child, and would go on excursions 
with his father: 
 
I sometimes walk the cliff path and think of you. I think of the times you 
walked the cliff path, with your father, with cheese sandwiches. Didn’t you? 
You both sat on the clifftop and ate my cheese sandwiches together. Do you 
remember our little joke? Munch, munch. We had a damn good walk, your 
father would say. You mean you had a good munch, munch, I would say. 
And you would both laugh.259   
   
This is a poignant memory, especially so as this is a woman talking out of the void, 
indeed resisting sinking into the void that represents her complete lack of purpose; as 
she is acutely aware, she is no longer the mother, who provided sustenance and love 
to her child. She therefore must return, again and again, to these cherished memories 
that keep her from falling into the abyss of loneliness, which originated from her 
having assumed too much proprietorship over her son: ‘Darling. I miss you. I gave 
birth to you. Where are you?’260  As far as this mother is concerned, the umbilical 
cord still obtains, and yet, at the same time, she fears that a definitive severance from 
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the family has been made: ‘I wrote to you three months ago, telling you of your 
father’s death. Did you receive my letter?’261  
 When Voice 1 talks again, he sounds a note of distinct unease, which is in 
contrast to his original tone of ‘I’m having a very nice time’. Apart from finding Mrs 
Withers, and her (apparent) daughter, Jane, agreeable, he is so unsure about who the 
other boarders are that he dislikes them. As far as he is concerned, these people are 
like some strange, yet fleeting apparition that passes by on his wall; the following 
excerpt illustrates his attitude: 
 
But I’m not so sure about the other people in this house. One is an old man. 
The one who is an old man retires early. He is bald. The other is a woman who 
wears red dresses. The other one is another man. He is big. He is much bigger 
than the other man. His hair is black. He has black eyebrows and black hair on 
the back of his hands.262 
 
These descriptions of fellow lodgers are very schematic, as they betray the attitude of 
a young man who is so alienated from others that he can register his perceptions, but 
does not possess the wherewithal to confirm them: 
 
At night I hear whispering from the other rooms and do not understand it. I 
hear steps on the stairs but do not dare to go out and investigate.263    
 
This young man is becoming paranoiac, but what could be called his ‘non-
investigative’ attitude is a longstanding one. At this point in the play, the reasons for 
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this are not, of course, obvious, but in order to foreshadow what is coming, I wish to 
discuss his attitudes of timidity and doubt in terms of a ‘negative father complex’. 
Guy Corneau defines this complex as follows: 
 
The father’s absence results in the child’s lack of internal structure; this is the 
very essence of a negative father complex. An individual with a negative 
father complex does not feel himself structured from within. His ideas are 
confused; he has trouble setting himself goals, making choices deciding what 
is good for him, and identifying his own needs. For him, everything gets 
mixed up: love and reason, sexual appetites and the simple need for affection. 
He sometimes has problems concentrating, he is distracted by all sorts of 
insignificant details and in severe cases he has difficulty in organizing his 
perceptions.264 
  
Corneau’s thesis can be couched in Lacanian terms, which will render his point about 
a lack of internal structure clearer. According to Lacan, identification with the Name-
of-the-Father initiates the individual into the Symbolic realm which, in turn, provides 
the male child with access to a complex web of meanings that orientate his existence, 
and provide him with the illusory promise of achieving ‘phallic mastery’. This young 
man lacks this internal structure, however, as witnessed by his language remaining at 
the concrete imagistic (Imaginary) level, and by what Voice 2 inadvertently concedes 
when she says his father was proud of him: 
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As your father grew closer to his death he spoke more and more of you, with 
tenderness and bewilderment. I consoled him with the idea that you had left 
home to make him proud of you. I think I succeeded in this. One of his last 
sentences was: Give him a slap on the back from me. Give him a slap on the 
back from me.265   
 
Voice 2 expresses an ambivalent message: ‘yes, your father was proud of you, but it 
was founded upon the lie that you left home to make him proud. In actual fact, he 
normally hardly spoke or thought of you, and you left for reasons nothing to do with 
him’. Given such a father/son relationship, coupled with his overbearing mother 
sheltering him, it is no surprise that this young man finds the larger world of 
relationships an algebraic equation he cannot solve. For him, as an ‘uncastrated’ man 
(in the Lacanian sense), the world must indeed remain ‘unpenetrated’.     
 These limitations do not, however, prevent Voice 1 from continuing to try 
and work out what is going on in this house. He claims a ‘remarkable’ discovery: 
 
I have made a remarkable discovery. The old man who is bald and who 
retires early is named Withers. Benjamin Withers. Unless it is simply a 
coincidence it must mean that he is a relation.266  
 
Voice 1 has made a discovery, but his attention is so focused on solving the riddle of 
the different relationships that he overlooks a most important occurrence: Mrs 
Withers is beginning to treat him like a son: 
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You are my little pet. I’ve always wanted a little pet but I’ve never had one 
and now I’ve got one. Sometimes she gives me a cuddle as if she were my 
mother. But I haven’t forgotten that I have a mother and that you are my 
mother.267 
 
Voice 1’s remark, ‘I haven’t forgotten that I have a mother and that you are my 
mother’ raises the possibility that he might forget; his mother, in an act of almost 
maternal telepathy, senses this: ‘Sometimes I wonder if you remember that you have a 
mother’.268 Underlying his reassurance and her concern is the awareness that he needs 
a mother figure, as he lacks independence and he compulsively seeks for the security 
and belonging of the original dyadic relationship.     
  Voice 2 seems more desperate and indeed angrier now: 
 
Darling. Where are you? Why do you never write? Nobody knows your 
whereabouts. Nobody knows if you are alive or dead. Nobody can find you. 
Have you changed your name?269 
 
Voice 2 is frightened that, unbeknownst to her, a final severance has been made 
(‘Have you changed your name?’), which is why her questions almost border on the 
accusatory: ‘Why do you never write?’ No answers come, of course, and so, in her 
anger, she expresses her disapproval and her gnawing sense of bitterness through 
what his father supposedly said on his deathbed: 
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If you are alive you are a monster. On his deathbed your father cursed you. He 
cursed me too, to tell the truth. He cursed everyone in sight. Except that you 
were not in sight. I do not blame you entirely for your father’s ill humour, but 
your absence and silence were a great burden on him, a weariness to him. He 
died in lamentation and oath. Was that your wish?270  
 
The son’s ‘absence’, so-called, will be shown later to have more to do with the 
father’s ‘absence’, but, for the moment, evidently the mother’s bitterness is due to 
feeling like a spurned lover, who may, at some indeterminate time, be still found in 
the arms of her partner, once again: 
 
Or perhaps you will arrive here in a handsome new car, one day, in the not 
too distant future, in a nice new suit, quite out of the blue, and hold me in 
your arms.271 
 
Although this may sound like a clinical interpretation of events, the mother’s 
transition from hate to love proves that the father’s supposed predicament was only 
used as a pretext for expressing her great disapproval at being ‘overlooked’. All 
would be indeed forgiven if her son would return home, as his father was, in her view, 
only an appendage to what was their unspoken and unrealizable ‘love affair’. 
Moreover, it is because she construes an incestuous intensity between the two that, 
paradoxically enough, she cannot communicate these thoughts directly to her son, as 
these are ‘midnight’ wishes that express a future that she can never have. 
Nevertheless, her son stands accused, at least in her court of dreams. 
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 Voice 1 next moves on to express an unusual complication in the play: a 
resident called Riley turned away two apparent strangers from the door on the 
grounds that they were imposters: 
 
Two women stood on the doorstep. They said they were my mother and 
sister, and asked for me. [Riley] denied knowledge of me. No, he had not 
heard of me. No, there was no one of that name resident. This was a family 
house, no strangers admitted. No, they get on very well, thank you very 
much, without intruders. I suggest, he said, that you both go back to where 
you came from and stop bothering innocent hardworking people with your 
slanders and your libels…272     
 
It is not without significance that this resident is called ‘Riley’, as this lodger, like his 
The Room counterpart, is another outsider, and another guardian of the family. Where 
they differ, is this Riley is a homosexual rather than a black man (he remarks later, for 
example, that he ‘likes slender lads’ but, due to his religious beliefs, has to ‘keep a 
tight rein on my inclinations.’273) and, more importantly, the family he is protecting is 
a surrogate one, rather than making a plea to return to the original family. Later, it 
becomes evident why Riley turned away Voice 1’s actual mother and sister from the 
door: 
 
There are too many women here, that’s the trouble. And it’s no use talking to 
Baldy. He’s well away. He lives in another area, best known to himself. I like 
health and strength and intelligent conversation. That’s why I took a fancy to 
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you, chum, apart from the fact that I fancy you. I’ve got no-one to talk to. 
These women treat me like a leper. Even though I’m a relation. Of a sort.274  
 
Like Voice 1, Riley is another ‘lost son’, as both are isolated from their fathers, and 
neither of them can receive much emotional support from the old man Mr Withers, 
otherwise known as ‘Baldy’. Riley’s solution to this problem of the ‘absent father’ is 
to create a homo (social/sexual) space, because, as convoluted as it may sound, his 
misogynistic contempt for all women is an attempt to achieve, without any paternal 
advice and support, a degree of independence. Of course, this disavowal of mother 
and of all women means that Riley, in Pinter’s view, becomes a homosexual, who 
lusts after young, slender men. 
 The other ‘lost son’ has his own conflicts to contend with, which are not so 
much concerned with renouncing women. Unlike Riley, it would seem, at least at one 
point, that Voice 1’s happiest moment is being accepted by the three ladies of the 
house: 
 
Lady Withers wore a necklace around her alabaster neck, a neck amazingly 
young. She played Schumann. She smiled at me. Mrs Withers and Jane 
smiled at me. I took a seat. I took it and sat in it.  Am in it. I will never leave 
it. Oh mother, I have found my home, my family. Little did I ever dream I 
could know such happiness.275    
 
A mother-fixated son would naturally feel most at peace with the world when his new 
circumstances replicate, in their essential features, those of old. Consequently, his 
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happiest moment is when he renounces, in the interests of apparently growing-up, his 
old family in favour of his new one. It is unsurprising, then, that his mother, at this 
very point, feels the greatest disconnection from him, which is expressed in her 
memory of drying his hair as a child: 
 
[I] then looked into your eyes, and saw you look into mine, knowing that you 
wanted no one else, no one at all, knowing that you were entirely happy in 
my arms. I knew also, for example, that I was at the same time sitting by an 
indifferent fire, alone in winter, in eternal night without you. 276 
 
His mother describes a bleak sentiment, one which the play nevertheless supports: her 
greatest moment of connection is like a flicker protesting in vain against the 
enveloping eternal night. This incestuous love can never be consummated, and 
besides, the son will, and must, find a substitute. 
 Unknown to his mother, though, events are beginning to conspire towards 
her son returning home. It all begins when Voice 1 is invited into Baldy’s (otherwise 
known as Mr Withers) room, where he offers to the young man almost 
incomprehensible advice. Here is an example: 
 
My name’s Withers. I’m there or thereabouts. Follow? Embargo on all duff 
terminology. With me? Embargo on all things redundant. All areas in that 
connection verboten. You’re in a diseaseridden land, boxer. Keep your weight 
on all the left feet you can lay your hands on. Keep dancing. The old foxtrot is 
the classical response but that’s not the response I’m talking about. Nor am I 
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talking about the other response. Up the slaves. Get me? This is a place of 
creatures, up and down stairs. Creatures of the rhythmic splits, the rhythmic 
sideswipes, the rums and roulettes, the macaroni tatters, the dumplings in jam 
mayonnaise, a catapulting ordure of gross and ramshackle shenanigans, 
openended paraphernalia. Follow me? It all adds up.277      
 
In the midst of this deluge of delusions, there are some things that make sort of sense: 
Withers alludes to the house being a brothel (‘Creatures of the rhythmic splits’ and of 
‘gross and ramshackle shenanigans’) and he offers some cryptic, but nevertheless 
sexual advice that centres upon not doing the ‘classical’ foxtrot response, yet avoiding 
the ‘perils’ of homosexuality (‘Up the slaves’). Still, while he may claim that ‘It all 
adds up’, frankly it does not, which is Pinter’s point: Withers represents the kind of 
father figure who lays down laws (e.g., ‘All areas in that connection verboten’) in the 
Name-of-the-Father, but, just like how hard it was to initially determine his name, it is 
challenging to derive sense from what is verging on nonsense. In essence, what 
Withers represents is a father figure who cannot lay down the ‘law’ of what it means, 
symbolically, to be a man.  
 No one feels this lack as acutely as Voice 1, as his emotionally absent father 
bequeathed an unenviable ontological legacy: without any clear idea of what it is to be 
a man, Voice 1 has no sense of what he, as an independent agent, must become. Even 
he recognises that there are several portentous signs about his likely future, one of 
which is that he is becoming less and less independent, whilst, at the same time, the 
house is becoming more and more his prison: 
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But I rarely leave the house. No one seems to leave the house. Riley leaves the 
house but rarely. He must be a secret policeman. Jane continues to do a great 
deal of homework while apparently not attending any school. Lady Withers 
never leaves the house. She has guests. She receives guests. Those are the 
steps I hear on the stairs at night.278 
 
Voice 1 does not realize that one of the reasons (perhaps the main one) that the 
women do not venture outside is that this house is a brothel, and they are ‘ladies of the 
night’. But, in his case, the motive for his withdrawing from the world is more 
obscure; it is only in a later passage that a sufficient reason is given: 
 
They have decided a name for me. They call me Bobo. Good morning, Bobo, 
or, Don’t drop a goolie, Bobo, or, Don’t forget the diver, Bobo, or, Keep your 
eye on the ball, Bobo, or, Keep this side of the tramlines, Bobo, or, How’s the 
lead in your pencil, Bobo, or, How’s tricks in the sticks, Bobo, or, Don’t get 
too much gum in your gumboots, Bobo.  
The only person who does not call me Bobo is the old man. He calls me 
nothing. I call him nothing. I don’t see him. He keeps to his room. I don’t go 
near it. He is old and will die soon.279     
 
The women in the house have begun to deliberately treat him as though he were a 
child, with them, in the complementary role, of mother-figure; furthermore, Riley, 
with his erotic-like possessiveness, is also a sort of mother-figure too. Voice 1 is 
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indeed being ‘infantilized’, hence why he is regressing to a state of almost 
unmitigated dependence on those in the boarding house. 
 In order to save his ‘soul’, as it were, Voice 1 recognises that he must 
urgently return to his original home and talk to his father, as Withers does not hinder 
his development by treating him as a child; nevertheless, he does not promote any 
nascent potential for independence: 
 
I’m coming back to you, mother, to hold you in my arms. I am coming home.  
I am coming also to clasp my father’s shoulder. Where is the old boy? I’m 
longing to have a word with him. Where is he? I’ve looked in all the usual 
places, including the old summerhouse, but I can’t find him. Don’t tell me 
he’s left home at his age? That would be inexpressibly skittish a gesture on 
his part. What have you done with him, mother?280 
 
Voice 1 is unaware of the fact that his father is dead, and so the advice and the 
support that he may have received goes unspoken. To underscore this, Pinter 
introduces, at this late stage in the play, Voice 3–the voice of his father. Here is a 
relevant passage: 
 
Well, that is not entirely true [that I’m not dead], not entirely the case. I’m 
lying. I’m leading you up the garden path, I’m playing about, I’m having my 
bit of fun, that’s what. Because I am dead. As dead as a doornail. I’m writing 
to you from my grave. A quick word for old time’s sake. Just to keep in 
touch. An old hullo out of the dark. A last kiss from Dad.  
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I’ll probably call it a day after this canter. Not much more to say. All a bit of 
a sweat. Why am I taking the trouble? Because of you, I suppose, because 
you were such a loving son. I’m smiling, as I lie in this glassy grave.281 
 
These are poignant words, uttered by a (supposedly) dead man, and yet they very 
much live. Indeed, they are poignant, because they are a last goodbye, and they affirm 
a truth that was never uttered during his lifetime: Voice 1 was ‘such a loving son’. 
Sadly, as Pinter intimates, the emotionally absent father did not ‘take the trouble’, 
though, during life, and now his words go forever unheard. 
 At the play’s conclusion, Voice 1 is returning home, expecting to receive 
love, and a wise word from his father: 
 
I am on my way back to you. I am about to make the journey back to you. 
What will you say to me?282 
 
The answers, from his mother and father respectively, are not encouraging: 
 
I’ll tell you what, my darling, I’ve given you up as a very bad job. Tell me 
one last thing. Do you think the word love means anything? 
 
I have so much to say to you. But I am quite dead. What I have to say to you 
will never be said.283 
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In their own respective and distinctive ways, these voices sing a song of 
estrangement: his mother, with her incestuous possessiveness, curses his 
independence; his father, with his retiring attitude towards life, retreated from his 
paternal responsibilities, such that all the kind and wise words will now go unspoken. 
Tragically, this, in effect, constitutes the son’s legacy, which is to be forever a 
‘fatherless boy’.  
     III 
The Homecoming opens with a seemingly innocuous question that is, in reality, an 
accusation: 
 
 MAX: What have you done with the scissors? 
 Pause. 
 I said I’m looking for the scissors. What have you done with them? 
 Pause. 
 Did you hear me? I want to cut something out of the paper. 
 LENNY: I’m reading the paper. 
MAX: Not that paper. I haven’t even read that paper. I’m talking about last 
Sunday’s paper. I was just having a look at it in the kitchen. 
Pause. 
Do you hear what I’m saying? I’m talking to you! Where’s the scissors? 
LENNY (looking up, quietly): Why don’t you shut up, you daft prat? 
MAX lifts his stick and points it at him. 
MAX: Don’t you talk to me like that. I’m warning you.284 
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In this opening exchange, Pinter already shows that this family exist within a hotbed 
atmosphere of pervasive distrust and profound contempt for one another, as ‘missing’ 
scissors become immediate grounds for blame, which then leads to insults and direct 
threats. Aggression in this family is barely hidden away, and the corrosive effects of 
familiarity have led to an almost complete absence of civility. 
 As Max continues to talk, and Lenny listens, it becomes clearer that the son 
has developed a strategy that precludes extensive quarrelling, as Lenny alternates 
between seeing his father as either a ‘non-person’, or some figure only suitable for 
mockery. The following passage illustrates Max’s humiliating predicament, as Lenny 
discounts his father so much that the only recognition he gives of his presence is to 
insult him: 
 
 MAX: I think I’ll have a fag. Give me a fag. 
 Pause. 
 I just asked you to give me a cigarette. 
 Pause. 
 Look what I’m lumbered with. 
 He takes a crumpled cigarette from his pocket. 
 I’m getting old, my word of honour. 
 He lights it. 
You think I wasn’t a tearaway? I could have taken care of you, twice over. 
I’m still strong. You ask your Uncle Sam what I was. But at the same time I 
always had a kind heart. Always.     
Pause. 
I used to knock about with a man called MacGregor. I called him Mac.  
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You remember Mac? Eh? 
Pause. 
We were two of the worst hated men in the West end of London. I tell you I 
still got the scars. We’d walk into a place, the whole room’d stand up, they’d 
make their way to let us pass. You never heard such silence. Mind you, he 
was a big man, he was over six foot tall. His family were all MacGregors, 
they came all the way from Aberdeen, but he was the only one they called 
Mac. 
Pause. 
He was very fond of your mother, Mac was. Very fond. He always had a 
good word for her. 
Pause. 
Mind you, she wasn’t such a bad woman. Even though it made me sick just 
to look at her rotten stinking face, she wasn’t such a bad bitch. I gave her the 
best bleeding years of my life, anyway. 
LENNY: Plug it, will you, you stupid sod. I’m trying to read the paper. 
MAX: Listen! I’ll chop your spine off, you talk to me like that! You 
understand? Talking to your lousy filthy father like that! 
LENNY: You know what, you’re getting demented.285 
 
 
Not being able to even get a cigarette from your own son would ordinarily be 
upsetting, but Max, in spite of his proclamations that he ‘had a kind heart’, has long 
ago given up on expressing the ‘softer’ feelings of life. On the contrary, he assumes, 
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like many men do, the patriarchal view that what one needs to possess is not so much 
kindness, but unyielding authority; this is why, for example, his request for a cigarette 
is an imperative (‘Give me a cigarette’), and his rebuttal to Lenny is based upon an 
exercise of supposed physical power: ‘I’ll chop your spine off, you talk to me like 
that!’ Yet, as Max knows only too well, his word is certainly not law in this 
household, and so he compensates by mythologizing his past experiences with his 
best friend, MacGregor, as this was supposedly a time when he was a commanding, 
hated, yet fascinating figure. 
 In light of these early events, Max’s claim to be one of the ‘worst hated men 
in the West End of London’ is a somewhat ironic admission, as it would appear that 
he is now the most hated in his family home. For an audience member watching this 
play, a natural question to ask at this point would be this: why has this aggressive, 
confrontational man never inspired any respect, indeed any fear from his son? For 
example, shortly after threatening to ‘chop off’ Lenny’s spine, Max’s phallic power is 
ridiculed by his son: 
 
LENNY: Oh, Daddy, you’re not going to use your stick on me, are you? Eh? 
Don’t use your stick on me Daddy. No, please. It wasn’t my fault, it was one 
of the others. I haven’t done anything wrong, Dad, honest. Don’t clout me 
with that stick, Dad.286 
 
As the play progresses, the audience learns why Max possesses, as it were, so little 
‘clout’, as his family have never ‘succumbed’ entirely to the dominant patriarchal 
ideology, since their late mother, Jessie, refused to be ‘domesticated’. In a most 
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oblique fashion, Pinter introduces the role that Jessie played when he has Max relate 
how he had a ‘gift’ for telling which horses would last the course: 
 
Because I always had the smell of a good horse. I could smell him. And not 
only the colts, but the fillies. Because the fillies are more highly strung than 
the colts, they’re more unreliable, did you know that? No, what do you know? 
Nothing. But I was always able to tell a good filly by one particular trick. I’d 
look her in the eye. You see? I’d stand in front of her and look her straight in 
the eye, it was a kind of hypnotism, and by the look deep down in her eye I 
could tell whether she was a stayer or not. It was a gift. I had a gift.287 
 
Uncle Sam’s later admission that ‘MacGregor had Jessie in the back of my cab as I 
drove along’288 will brutally undermine Max’s credibility about possessing a ‘gift’ for 
detecting ‘unreliability’, but at this point he unwittingly provides an excellent 
metaphor for how patriarchy situates women in the family. More fully, as Max 
unintentionally concedes, what husbands do is ‘domesticate’ women by ‘training’ 
them to ‘stay the course’, which means they become obedient, monogamous wives. 
Of course, this ‘training’ only works if men can be construed as figures of authority 
and of fascination, as they must, like hypnotists, persuade their wives to submit to 
their word as though it were unquestionable law.      
 In this particular case, however, Max possessed no authority over his wife, 
Jessie; indeed he was quite unable at the beginning to discern that she was not a 
‘stayer’, nor was he later capable of making her submit to the wider ideological 
‘rules’. Due to his perceived failure as a man, Max is prone to alternate between 
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licking his wounds, so to speak, and reminding anyone within earshot, lest they 
forget, that he has all the ‘credentials’ of a father. With his brother Sam, in particular, 
he not only takes the opportunity to brag, but he also shows his cruel, mocking streak, 
as Sam’s life as a bachelor provides Max with an opportunity to attack a target that is 
even more a figure of fun than the betrayed, emasculated husband i.e., the effeminate, 
mummy’s boy, who has never, on an emotional level, left the nest. Here is a good 
example, where Max explains why he looks after his brothers: 
 
Before he died, Sam. Just before. They were his last words. His last sacred 
words, Sammy. You think I’m joking? You think when my father spoke–on 
his deathbed–I wouldn’t obey his words to the last letter? You hear that, Joey? 
He’ll stop at nothing. He’s even prepared to spit on the memory of our Dad. 
What kind of a son were you, you wet wick? You spent half your time doing 
crossword puzzles! We took you into the shop, you couldn’t even sweep the 
dust off the floor. We took MacGregor into the shop, he could run the place by 
the end of a week. Well, I’ll tell you one thing. I respected my father not only 
as a man but as a number one butcher! And to prove it I followed him into the 
shop. I learned to carve a carcass at his knee. I commemorated his name in 
blood. I gave birth to three grown men! All on my own bat. What have you 
done?289 
 
Since Max evidently lacks phallic power, he is keen to poke fun at Sam’s apparent 
impotence (‘you wet wick?’) and lack of physical strength (‘you couldn’t even sweep 
the dust off the floor’).Nevertheless, what he is most eager to assert, almost to the 
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point of portraying himself in a hyper-masculine way, is that he was a model son, who 
obeyed his father’s word as law ‘to the last letter’, and that he was a model father, 
gifted with the unprecedented ability to ‘give birth to three grown men’. Of course, 
whilst he may, in fact, have been a dutiful son, who continued the family business, his 
conspicuous refusal to credit Jessie in the co-creation of his three sons is not only to 
score against Sam’s celibacy, but to leave out the woman responsible for his 
conflictual relationship with his sons. The reality, as Max knows full well, is that 
Jessie exerted an inordinate degree of influence over her three sons, which is a truth 
that he can somewhat acknowledge when he wishes to wax lyrical about the virtues of 
his family: 
 
That woman was the backbone to this family. I mean, I was busy working 
twenty-four hours a day in the shop, I was going all over the country to find 
meat, I was making my way in the world, but I left a woman at home with a 
will of iron, a heart of gold and a mind.290   
 
With Max being absent so much, this gaping hole ‘crippled’ his family, as he freely 
admits when he provides a scathing, if too self-exculpatory, assessment of his 
predicament: 
 
A crippled family, three bastard sons, a slutbitch of a wife–don’t talk to me 
about the pains of childbirth–I suffered the pain, I’ve still got the pangs–when 
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I give a little cough, my back collapses–and here I’ve got a lazy idle bugger of 
a brother won’t even get to work on time.291 
 
This contemptuous attack on his family shows that Max worships industriousness, and 
yet he has failed to see that this very industriousness took its toll, since his absences 
from home provided an opportunity for Jessie’s infidelities, whilst also ensuring that 
his three pampered sons had almost complete proprietorship over her. Furthermore, 
and just as disastrous in its consequences, Max unwittingly confesses in his comments 
about his ‘three bastard sons’ and in his defensive claim that he gave ‘birth’ to them 
that what is most questionable is his paternity. Lenny, for one, has his suspicions, 
which he raises in his typical cockney ‘taking the piss’ style: 
 
I’ll tell you what, Dad, since you’re in the mood for a bit of a…chat, I’ll ask 
you a question. It’s a question I’ve been meaning to ask you for some time. 
That night…you know…the night you got me…that night with mum, what 
was it like? Eh? When I was just a glint in your eye. What was it like? What 
was the background to it? I mean, I want to know the real facts about my 
background.292  
 
Although Jessie is absent in this play, Pinter suggests that, in the past, she never felt 
much incentive to submit to Max’s authority, as he was away from home a great deal, 
which meant that her affections were either directed maternally towards her children, 
or adulterously towards unnamed men. Consequently, from a Lacanian perspective, 
Jessie’s three sons were subjected to an unusual and problematic form of Oedipal 
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‘triangulation’, as Jessie did not submit to Max in the ‘Name of the father’, partly 
because his absences undermined his authority, and partly because he was not even 
the biological father. Rather, the symbolic placeholder of Father is construed as an 
occasional usurper, who, whether he is Max or a fling like MacGregor, temporarily 
disrupts the blissful dyadic bond between mother and son. Thus, the Father role is 
construed both as an irritant and as a figure to disrespect, which is why none of the 
sons take heed of what Max says; instead, in as far as they do accord him a significant 
role in the family, it is as a substitute mother figure, who does the domestic duties for 
them. Max himself bemoans this fact at one point: 
 
 JOEY: Feel a bit hungry. 
 SAM: Me, too. 
MAX: Who do you think I am, your mother? Eh? Honest. They walk in here 
every time of the day and night like bloody animals. Go and find yourself a 
mother.293     
 
Due to their unconventional upbringing, Max’s three sons need a mother, but they 
have never needed to submit to Father. This is why, in Lenny and Joey’s case, they 
wait for the ‘return’ of mother rather than adopt, as most men do, their ideological 
position as husbands and fathers. Indeed, as we shall see in more detail later, the 
Symbolic realm has little claim on Jessie’s three sons. 
 Max’s suggestion that they ‘Go find yourself a mother’ surprisingly comes 
true when Teddy, the eldest son, arrives at night with his wife, Ruth. Unbeknownst to 
the sleeping family, their deepest wish has been fulfilled, although at this early stage 
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in the play, Ruth seems more like a subdued wife than a mother. Initially, the 
explanation for Ruth’s quietness and slightly melancholic demeanour appears to be 
her understandable awkwardness about her husband staging his ‘homecoming’ to 
happen by night: 
 
TEDDY and RUTH stand at the threshold of the room. They are both well 
dressed in light summer suits and light raincoats. Two suitcases are by their 
side. They look at the room. TEDDY tosses the key in his hand, smiles.       
TEDDY: Well the key worked. 
Pause. 
They haven’t changed the lock. 
Pause. 
RUTH: No one’s here.  
TEDDY (looking up): They’re asleep. 
Pause. 
RUTH: Can I sit down? 
TEDDY: Of course. 
RUTH: I’m tired. 
Pause. 
TEDDY: Then sit down. 
She does not move. 
That’s my father’s chair. 
RUTH: That one? 
TEDDY (smiling): Yes, that’s it. Shall I go up and see if my room’s still 
there? 
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RUTH: It can’t have moved. 
TEDDY: No, I mean if my bed’s still there. 
RUTH: Someone might be in it. 
TEDDY: No, they’ve got their own beds. 
Pause. 
RUTH: Shouldn’t you wake somebody up? Tell them you’re here? 
TEDDY: Not at this time of night. It’s too late.294 
 
Ostensibly, Teddy is oblivious to the oddity of arriving so late, and indeed, he seems 
almost glad that he can survey the house without the interference of his family; later it 
becomes obvious, though, that this arrival is strategic, as he is emotionally distanced, 
to say the least, from his family, and considers them, in spite of his protestations, to be 
‘ogres’: 
 
 TEDDY: There’s no need to be nervous. Are you nervous? 
 RUTH: No. 
 TEDDY: There’s no need to be. 
 Pause. 
They’re very warm people, really. Very warm. They’re my family. They’re 
not ogres.295    
 
Curiously, Ruth may be a little awkward rather than nervous about their peculiar kind 
of arrival, but what grates the most against her sensibilities is that the way this 
‘homecoming’ has been staged is symptomatic of her husband’s selfish and 
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narcissistic way of treating others. Consequently, although she wishes to leave, she 
has learnt from experience that there is little point in her making an emotional plea, as 
Teddy pays no attention to her deeper needs, such as to be with her family: 
 
` RUTH: Do you want to stay? 
 TEDDY: Stay? 
 Pause. 
 We’ve come to stay. We’re bound to stay…for a few days. 
 RUTH: I think…the children…might be missing us. 
 TEDDY: Don’t be silly.  
 RUTH: They might. 
 TEDDY: Look, we’ll be back in a few days, won’t we? 
 He walks about the room. 
 Nothing’s changed. Still the same. 
 Pause. 
Still, he’ll get a surprise in the morning, won’t he? The old man. I think 
you’ll like him very much. Honestly. He’s a…well, he’s old, of course. 
Getting on. 
Pause. 
I was born here, do you realize that?296 
 
In light of Ruth’s later refusal to return with Teddy to the children, her tentative 
suggestion that they not stay is decidedly ironic. But, for present purposes, the wider 
point is that Ruth knows that it is pointless to assert what she wants, as Teddy will not 
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listen; he finds it easy to speak for both of them in an authoritative manner (‘We’ve 
come to stay’), and he makes petulant retorts when Ruth raises any objections to what 
he wishes to do: ‘I was born here, do you realize that?’ Obviously, as far as Teddy is 
concerned, they are a matching pair in a way that goes beyond them wearing 
corresponding light summer suits.   
 With a husband so self-absorbed, Ruth has become, over the years, a 
possession, in fact, a necessary appendage. Pinter intimates that Ruth’s presence is 
required to keep Teddy existentially secure, as is evidenced by his distress and 
confusion over his wife deciding to go for a late-night stroll: 
 
TEDDY: At this time of night? But we’ve…only just got here. We’ve got to 
go to bed. 
 RUTH: I just feel like some air. 
 TEDDY: But I’m going to bed.   
 RUTH: That’s all right. 
 TEDDY: But what am I going to do? 
 Pause. 
The last thing that I want is a breath of fresh air. Why do you want a breath 
of fresh air? 
 RUTH: I just do.297 
 
Teddy did not mind letting Ruth go to bed while he stayed up, but when Ruth asserts, 
perhaps for the first time, that she wishes to leave his ‘suffocating’ presence and do 
something independently, he finds this very confusing and unnerving. According to 
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his solipsistic reasoning, since he does not wish to do something, he cannot figure out 
why Ruth would wish to behave differently, which says a great deal about how little 
he accords his wife a separate and autonomous existence. Such behaviour no doubt 
seems puzzling, but a later disclosure from his Uncle Sam offers a plausible 
explanation as to why Teddy treats Ruth in this domineering, yet quietly confident 
manner: 
 
SAM: Teddy, shall I tell you something? You were always your mother’s 
favourite. She told me. It’s true. You were always the…you were always the 
main object of her love.298 
 
While Teddy’s ‘being-in the-world’ will be discussed at more length later, Sam’s 
secretive disclosure suggests that Teddy was pampered and treated as her main love 
object. If this confession is true, then it explains why Teddy would be so ‘contained’, 
and yet so conjoined with his wife, as his status as phallic object meant that he 
virtually never had to submit to any other authority, since his mother was, in many 
respects, his alone. Now that his connection to Jessie is definitively severed, Teddy 
thus expresses considerable distress at the prospect of his mother substitute, Ruth, 
leaving even for a stroll, as he exists at the emotional level of an infant, who must 
know, at every stage, where she is situated. In short, his lack of genuine 
independence, combined with his deep-seated conviction in his own centrality, makes 
him, in the colloquial sense, a ‘control freak’. 
 After an oblique and somewhat forced exchange with Lenny, Teddy decides 
to go to bed, leaving Ruth to encounter his brother upon her return. Right from the 
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beginning of their conversation, there is some verbal sparring, only this time, Lenny is 
not so clearly the victor: 
 
 LENNY: Good evening. 
 RUTH: Morning, I think. 
 LENNY: You’re right there. 
 Pause. 
 My name’s Lenny. What’s yours? 
 RUTH: Ruth. 
 She sits, puts her coat collar around her. 
 LENNY: Cold? 
 RUTH: No. 
 LENNY: It’s been a wonderful summer, hasn’t it? Remarkable. 
 Pause. 
Would you like something? Refreshment of some kind? An aperitif, 
anything like that? 
RUTH: No thanks. 
LENNY: I’m glad you said that. We haven’t got a drink in the house. Mind 
you, I’d soon get some in, if we had a party or something like that. Some 
kind of celebration…you know. 
Pause. 
You must be connected with my brother in some way. The one who’s been 
abroad. 
RUTH: I’m his wife.299 
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Lenny, in his opening gambit, wishes to come across as the debonair gentleman, the 
host, who makes conversation about the weather and then asks whether she wants an 
aperitif; of course, this is not done out of any real sense of courtesy, but rather as a 
means to underscore the absurdity of their late-night, unannounced arrival. Ruth, in 
turn, instinctively realizes, right from the start, that Lenny is a mocker, and she 
decides neither to concede anything to him, including inaccurate pleasantries 
(‘Morning, I think’), nor to admit to any vulnerability, such as being cold. At this 
stage, Ruth’s direct, yet nonchalant attitude does not seem to faze Lenny, however, as 
he gives her a glass of water before asking her about her connections to Teddy and 
what they had been up to in the recent past: 
 
 RUTH: We’re on a visit to Europe. 
 LENNY: What, both of you? 
 RUTH: Yes. 
 LENNY: What, you sort of live over there with him, do you? 
 RUTH: We’re married. 
 LENNY: On a visit to Europe, eh? Seen much of it? 
 RUTH: We’ve just come from Italy. 
LENNY: Oh, you went to Italy first, did you? And then he brought you over 
to meet the family, did he? Well, the old man’ll be pleased to see you, I can 
tell you. 
 RUTH: Good. 
 LENNY: What did you say?  
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 RUTH: Good.300    
 
It is decidedly odd that Lenny seems surprised that Teddy’s wife should be 
accompanying him on holiday, and furthermore, it is bizarre that he describes their 
relationship as ‘you sort of live over there with him, do you?’ Both of his reactions 
can be explained, though, by taking into account that Lenny’s mother, Jessie, did ‘sort 
of live with’ Max, and that, as a couple, they hardly did spend any time around one 
another. Thus, marriage for Lenny is hardly a sacred institution, and, as their 
conversation progresses, it becomes clear that he does not accord women, ostensibly 
at least, any degree of respect. Indeed, in a most surprising move, he asks to hold 
Ruth’s hand, and when she wonders why, he explains using an anecdote about a 
recent occurrence at the docks, where a lady made a ‘proposal’: 
 
This lady had been searching for me for days. She lost tracks of my 
whereabouts. However, the fact was she eventually caught up with me, and 
when she caught up with me she made this certain proposal. Well, this 
proposal wasn’t entirely out of order and normally I would have subscribed 
to it in the normal course of events. The only trouble was she was falling 
apart with the pox. So I turned it down. Well, this lady was very insistent 
and started taking liberties with me down under this arch, liberties which by 
any criterion I couldn’t be expected to tolerate, the fact being what they 
were, so I clumped her one. It was on my mind to do away with her, you 
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know, kill her, and the fact is, as killings go, it would have been a simple 
matter, nothing to it.301 
 
In spite of Lenny concluding this tale somewhat anticlimactically (he ‘only’ gave the 
woman ‘another belt in the nose and a couple turns of the boot’), he is, on a conscious 
level, sending out a strong message to Ruth that he is a man with a violent temper, 
and his preferences are not to be taken lightly. Nevertheless, if this anecdote is 
understood in the context of wanting to hold her hand, it is more a description of his 
acute anxiety than a cautionary tale. Although Lenny’s wish to hold Ruth’s hand 
shows that he aches for some degree of physical intimacy with a woman (something 
which is conspicuously absent in his homosocial household) his violent reaction to the 
lady taking ‘liberties’ suggests that he is deeply frightened of women that assume an 
assertive relationship to men, which is why he initiated a counterattack. In fact, it 
turns out that he calls them, somewhat arbitrarily, ‘diseased’: 
 
 RUTH: How did you know she was diseased? 
 LENNY: How did I know? 
 Pause. 
 I decided she was. 
 Silence.302 
 
Later, Lenny’s relationship to the symbolic realm will be discussed in more detail, but 
for the moment, what is relevant is that assigning this flirtatious woman to the 
category of ‘diseased’ reflects his deep-seated ambivalence towards promiscuity. To 
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be clear, this is not because he has some moral objection to adultery or prostitution 
(his work as a pimp attests to that), but rather it has to do with his need for control, as 
his mother has left him with this legacy of ambivalence: on the one hand, the 
promiscuous and the assertive remind him of Jessie such that submitting to their 
affections is not entirely unwelcome; on the other hand, these women are, by their 
very definition, inconstant in love, and there is always the threat of being abandoned. 
For Lenny, then, his pseudo-resolution to this ambivalence is, as his role as pimp 
implies, to try and dominate the promiscuous, so that he can keep them on a ‘leash’ 
and hence ‘around’. Ruth, however, quickly exposes Lenny’s sham, as she 
demonstrates that his depiction of himself as a physically violent and domineering 
man is all talk, which is evident when he tries to take her glass away from her: 
 
 LENNY: And now perhaps I’ll relieve you of your glass. 
 RUTH: I haven’t quite finished. 
 LENNY: You’ve consumed quite enough in my opinion. 
 RUTH: No I haven’t. 
 LENNY: Quite sufficient, in my own opinion. 
 RUTH: Not in mine, Leonard. 
 Pause. 
 LENNY: Don’t call me that, please. 
 RUTH: Why not? 
 LENNY: That’s the name my mother gave me. 
 Pause. 
 Just give me the glass. 
 RUTH: No. 
 256 
 Pause. 
 LENNY: I’ll take it then. 
 RUTH: If you take the glass…I’ll take you. 
 Pause. 
 LENNY: How about me taking the glass without you taking me? 
 RUTH: Why don’t I just take you? 
 Pause. 
 LENNY: You’re joking. 
 Pause. 
You’re in love, anyway, with another man. You’ve had a secret liaison with 
another man. His family didn’t even know. Then you come here without a 
word of warning and start to make trouble. 
 She lifts up the glass and lifts it towards him. 
 RUTH: Have a sip. Go on. Have a sip from my glass. 
 He is still. 
 Sit on my lap. Take a long cool sip. 
 She pats her lap. Pause. She stands, moves to him with the glass.  
 Put your head back and open your mouth. 
 LENNY: Take that glass away from me. 
 RUTH: Lie on the floor. Go on. I’ll pour it down your throat. 
 LENNY: What are you doing, making me some kind of proposal? 
 She laughs shortly, drains the glass. 
 RUTH: Oh, I was thirsty.303 
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Even though Lenny made out that he was ready to kill the woman down at the dock 
for taking ‘liberties’, he is so impotent when Ruth confronts him that he can neither 
take the glass of water away, nor can he ‘take’ her. Ruth, in contrast, has no problem 
about being assertive, and what is most significant about her approach is that she 
immediately recognises the strategic advantage of Lenny unwittingly conceding that 
he had a particularly close relationship with his mother (after all, it is only she that 
can call him Leonard), as she starts to pretend that she is Jessie, who is imploring him, 
in a most seductive way, to take a sip from her glass and sit on her lap. Despite 
Lenny’s protestations, though, it is obvious that he is transfixed by her proposals, as 
his unresolved Oedipal fixation on his mother, coupled with his corresponding 
passivity that comes from being the object of Jessie’s desire, means that he wants to 
submit to this mother/whore figure. As for Ruth, she concludes this battle of wits 
feeling enervated, as it is not only her thirst that has been quenched; indeed, unlike in 
her relationship with the abstracted, almost asexual Teddy, she has had a rare 
opportunity  to express her sexuality, and she realizes that there was, very much so, a 
‘thirst’ needing to be ‘quenched’.  
 Lenny’s dismissive and misogynistic presumption that Ruth is ‘trouble’ 
turns out to be widely shared, as Max’s reaction to seeing her for the first time is to 
call her a tart, and a ‘stinking pox-ridden slut’: 
 
 MAX: Who asked you to bring tarts in here? 
 TEDDY: Tarts? 
 MAX: Who asked you to bring dirty tarts into this house? 
 TEDDY: Listen, don’t be silly– 
 MAX: Have you been here all night? 
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 TEDDY: Yes, we arrived from Venice. 
MAX: We’ve had a smelly scrubber in my house all night. We’ve had a 
stinking pox-ridden slut in my house all night.   
 TEDDY: Stop it! What are you talking about? 
MAX: I haven’t seen the bitch for six years, he comes home without a word, 
he brings a filthy scrubber off the street, he shacks up in my house! 
TEDDY: She’s my wife! We’re married! 
Pause. 
MAX: I’ve never had a whore under this roof before. Ever since your 
mother died. My word of honour. (To Joey) Have you ever had a whore 
here? Has Lenny ever had a whore here? They come back from America, 
they bring the slopbucket with them. They bring the bedpan with them. (To 
Teddy) Take that disease away from me. Get her away from me. 
TEDDY: She’s my wife.304 
 
Max’s annoyance at their sudden arrival is somewhat understandable, but his rage at 
Ruth’s presence is unwarranted, suggesting that she is more an outlet for long 
suppressed feelings of hatred towards Jessie, who was, in his view, the last ‘whore’ 
under his roof. Significantly, Max construes her in disease-ridden terms, as though 
she were an infection that is to spread into his sanitised household, which is a belief 
about (promiscuous) women that Lenny shares too, as evidenced by his admission 
that he called that particular lady of the night ‘diseased’ because he had wanted to 
depict her in that way. With such a scathing view of women, it is unsurprising that 
Max orders Joey to throw them both out as a form of ‘quarantine’, but, in light of later 
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developments, what is important is that Joey feels no need to comply; on the contrary, 
he abstains from obeying his father’s wish, leading to Max attacking his son, and a 
brief, if quite painful skirmish, between Max, Joey and Sam. More fully, after Max 
has punched Joey and fallen to the ground (almost like a bee stinging before dying), 
and Sam has been attacked in the process, Max gets back onto his feet again and 
adopts a decidedly different attitude towards Ruth: 
 
 MAX: Miss. 
 Ruth walks towards him. 
 RUTH: Yes? 
 He looks at her. 
 MAX: You a mother? 
 RUTH: Yes. 
 MAX: How many you got? 
 RUTH: Three. 
 He turns to Teddy. 
 MAX: All yours Ted? 
 Pause. 
Teddy, why don’t we have a nice cuddle and kiss, eh?  Like the old days? 
What about a nice cuddle and kiss, eh? 
 TEDDY: Come on, then. 
 Pause. 
MAX: You want to kiss your old father? Want a cuddle with your old 
father?305 
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Max’s sudden change of heart can only be explained by him expending his 
aggression, and his revisionary construal of Ruth and of Teddy. With respect to Ruth, 
Max starts to see her as a mother, which is a role that he idealizes, mainly because it is 
a supporter of the family structure, and it therefore consolidates his role as head of 
household and authority figure; as for his attitude towards Teddy, he becomes 
affectionate once he learns that his son has followed in his footsteps (the only one to 
do so) by having three children, and he acts almost maternally when he asks whether 
Teddy wants a cuddle and a kiss. Nevertheless, in spite of the mood changing, there is 
a disturbing undercurrent to Max’s shift in attitudes, as he seemed only interested in 
Ruth in as far as she was a means to the end of creating children. Thus, Max has no 
moral objections to a utilitarian attitude towards women, but rather he supports, as a 
member of patriarchy, women being exploited for the purposes of creating children. A 
member of the audience would therefore not be wrong in wondering whether Ruth has 
already been a kind of prostitute back in the States, as her married life might very well 
have been all about delivering the ‘goods’ only to then be materially rewarded with 
the benefits of a professor’s salary.   
  Once Ruth starts to ‘mingle’ with the family, so to speak, she asserts her 
specifically female presence in a way that constitutes a more coy, less predatory 
manner than that which she adopted in her late-night encounter with Lenny. At one 
point, she objects to Lenny and Teddy’s hyper-abstract, pseudo-philosophical 
discussion, where the former talks about the difficulties of symbolisation, using the 
example of a table: ‘All right, I say, take it, take a table, but once you’ve taken it, 
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what are you going to do with it? Once you’ve got hold of it, where you going to take 
it?’306 This is Ruth’s riposte: 
 
Don’t be too sure though. You’ve forgotten something. Look at me. 
I…move my leg. That’s all it is. But I wear…underwear…which moves with 
me…it…captures your attention. Perhaps you misinterpret. The action is 
simple. It’s a leg…moving. My lips move. Why don’t you restrict…your 
observations to that? Perhaps the fact that they move is more 
significant…than the words which come through them. You must bear 
that…possibility in mind.   
Silence. 
Teddy stands.307 
 
Ruth’s rejoinder to Lenny’s question about ‘taking’ the table addresses the sexual 
symbolism of his query, as Lenny’s doubts are symptomatic of his underlying 
impotence: he is most unsure about ‘taking’ a woman, as he lacks, for reasons to be 
described later, the usual patriarchal conviction that he is the dominant and aggressive 
partner in the relationship; in other words, he is not situated very comfortably in the 
patriarchal ideology, which advocates that the man is the ‘seizer’. Nevertheless, 
Ruth’s objection has more to do with Teddy than with Lenny, as what Ruth is saying 
in essence is that men’s relationship towards women should not be a matter of 
‘taking’, but a matter of submitting to the erotic, sensual, and therefore non-
conceptualized object of fascination. In Lacanian terms, what Ruth is proposing is that 
men, in particular her overly-educated husband, submit to the pre-conceptual sphere 
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of life (i.e. the Real and Imaginary realms), which means responding, in fact, 
submitting, to the sensual appeal and rhythm of the female body. Clearly, this 
objection is not to ‘score’ a point in an intellectual debate, but rather it constitutes a 
plea to the men around her; this is because her life, over the last six years, has been, 
on an emotional and erotic level, barren: 
 
 I was born quite near here. 
 Pause. 
 Then…six years ago, I went to America. 
 Pause. 
It’s all rock. And sand. It stretches…so far…everywhere you look. And 
there’s lots of insects there.308  
 
Ruth’s images of desolation betray how unsatisfying, indeed life-denying it has been 
to live with her desiccated ‘insect’ of a husband in the States. Still, there is a glimmer 
of hope in her terse recounting of her past, almost as through a flower had emerged in 
the desert, as she mentions that she was born near this house, and so her return might 
constitute a ‘homecoming’ to her alienated sexual self.       
 Ruth’s riposte to the question of ‘taking’ the table easily suggests that she, 
herself, is ready to be ‘taken’. Yet, the play as a whole problematizes the notions of 
sexual dominance and of submission. While it is indeed true that Ruth later agrees to 
the family’s proposition of becoming a prostitute at an establishment in Greek Street, 
her contractual submission does involve, as much as such a role permits, drawing up 
her own terms; after all, a woman that warned Lenny that she would ‘take’ him if he 
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took the water away was never going to be without any power or influence. In reality, 
Ruth manages to exercise a great deal of influence over Max’s two sons, Joey and 
Lenny, as it has been intimated earlier that she is a symbolic substitute for their 
mother, who has, in a sense, ‘returned’. In this concluding part of my reading, it is 
therefore necessary to explain the precise reasons why she exerts, in each case, a 
singular fascination upon them; furthermore, it must also be explained why Teddy 
fails to rescue his wife from the fate of becoming a prostitute, and simply walks away 
to become a stranger, once again, to the family. 
 In his study on Pinter’s examination of cultural power, Marc Silverstein 
succinctly characterizes Joey’s relationship to women, which he attributes to Max’s 
son being still entrapped at the Oedipal stage: 
 
Joey’s fluctuating movement between identification and aggressivity 
characterizes Joey’s relationship with women and further attests to his 
entrapment within the Oedipal complex. When the mother refuses to 
associate the phallus with the father, she herself becomes the quintessential 
object of the child’s desire, the object with whom it identifies.309    
 
Silverstein intimates that Joey is ‘caught’ in a dialectic of identification and 
aggressivity, which implies that he is primarily situated at the Imaginary stage, as he 
either merges with some object, viewed as a specular other, or he rebels, in an 
antagonistic fashion, against it. A good example of this is when he is standing in front 
of a mirror, shadowboxing: 
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JOEY is in front of a mirror. He is doing some slow limbering-up exercises. 
He stops, combs his hair, carefully. He then shadowboxes, heavily, watching 
himself in the mirror.310 
 
Joey is the most taciturn, and yet the most physically aggressive of the three sons, 
which can be explained by his failure to be situated in the Symbolic realm. This 
‘failure’ (which, in truth, resides more with Jessie and Max) has two important 
implications. Firstly, Joey is unable to articulate, at any great length, the nature of his 
subjectivity; indeed, sometimes he expresses the poverty of his subjectivity, such as 
when he says, ‘Feel a bit hungry’311, as this is a simple, declarative statement that 
nevertheless omits any claim of ownership over his experience.  
 Secondly, although Joey works in demolition and boxes in the evening, 
Silverstein perceptively notes that his violent acts, particularly his sexually violent 
behaviour, is a displacement of his ‘frustrated desire for identification with the 
mother’.312 Proof that this is so is that Joey does not ‘go the whole hog’ with Ruth, 
and he explains his reasons as follows: 
 
I’ve been the whole hog plenty of times. Sometimes…you can be happy…and 
not go the whole hog. Now and again…you can be happy…without going any 
hog.313      
 
Joey’s remark that he can be happy sometimes ‘without going any hog’ hints at the 
fact that, when a woman represents his mother, his preference, if not his compulsion, 
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is to merge with her, which is the very opposite of penetration. Since Joey was one of 
Jessie’s phallic objects, he has never had to submit to the Symbolic order, which 
would otherwise wrench him away from his mother, only to then, according to 
patriarchal ideology, empower him with the authority and legislative powers of the 
Name-of-the-Father. In Ruth’s case, he is unwilling, or perhaps unable, to penetrate 
her, as he wishes to return to that wordless state of union, which is his true home. 
Luckily enough for Joey, at the end of the play, he does, in fact, achieve this 
‘homecoming’ once Teddy has left: 
 
JOEY walks slowly across the room. He kneels at her chair. She touches his 
head, lightly. He puts his head in her lap.314  
 
 Moving now onto the more loquacious and sinister brother, Lenny, he, too, 
eventually submits to Ruth’s charms, in spite of greeting her with a welcoming that 
was undercut with the threat of violence. According to Silverstein, the reason for this 
change is that Lenny bears a similar ‘Oedipal burden’, which in his case means that he 
has a fractious relationship with the Symbolic, since he is poised ‘between’ the  
Symbolic and the Real:   
 
Lenny’s verbal facility, his penchant for elaborate narrative and ability to 
wield words as weapons suggests a higher degree of integration within the 
linguistic field than Joey enjoys; yet, if more articulate than his brother, Lenny 
nevertheless bears a similar Oedipal burden that problematizes his relation to 
the symbolic. Like Joey, Lenny does not possess full membership in the 
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symbolic; unlike Joey, who exists in the no-man’s land between the symbolic 
and the imaginary, Lenny occupies a position on the border between the 
symbolic and the real.315 
 
Shortly after this explication, Silverstein goes on to explain how this liminal position 
concretely affects Lenny’s being-in-the-world: 
 
What does it mean, then, to assert that Lenny inhabits a border region between 
the symbolic and the real? In such a region the real constantly threatens to 
outstrip the symbolic, not because of any lack of signifiers, but rather because 
the signifiers no longer provide an epistemological framework guaranteeing 
the certainty of the world they attempt to symbolize.316 
 
What Silverstein intimates is that, for Lenny, there is a ‘slippage’ between signifier 
and signified, in the sense that the Real continually resists being completely 
‘captured’ and defined by the symbolic; instead, the connection seems tenuous and 
has to be enforced in an act of representational violence, which is why, for example, 
Lenny does not appreciate the oddity of simply deciding that the woman at the docks 
was ‘diseased’. Indeed, in his pseudo-philosophical exchange with Teddy, Lenny 
articulates, using the example of a table, the problems he has with representation: 
 
 LENNY: Take a table. Philosophically speaking, what is it? 
 TEDDY: A table. 
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LENNY: Ah. You mean it’s nothing else but a table. Well, some people 
would envy your certainty…All right…take it, take a table, but once you’ve 
taken it, what are you going to do with it? Once you’ve got hold of it, where 
are you going to take it?317  
 
For Lenny, the signifier ‘table’ cannot take ‘hold’ of the thing called table, and so it 
seems a contrived relationship, where the object’s ‘realness’ resists any kind of 
linguistic imposition. Now, as was described earlier, this philosophical discussion has 
an underlying erotic subtext to it, as Lenny’s inability to ‘take’ anything through 
symbolic capture renders him impotent when confronting women. More fully, this 
passivity, this painful inability to ‘take’ a woman, can be traced back to his close 
relationship to his mother, and his contemptuous attitude towards his father. From 
what has been said in the play, it is clear that Jessie did not treat Max’s word as law, 
which meant that Lenny, like his two siblings, did not feel that he needed to submit to 
the commanding power of the word. Consequently, language fails to possess a 
conclusive form of signifying power for Lenny, which, in the terms of the play, leaves 
him open to being dominated by Ruth, as he cannot rely upon the conventional 
linguistic/ideological support that portrays men as the aggressive and penetrative 
partner. On the contrary, women, like Ruth, who are perceived as both sexy and 
protective (in other words, mother/whore figures) can easily ‘take’ him, as he neither 
can assert, with any conviction, his phallic power, nor can he resist the appeal of the 
domineering feminine touch. Proof, if any were needed, that Ruth has won the battle 
(even if she has lost the war) is that, in spite of submitting to the proposal of 
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becoming a prostitute, Lenny, in his eagerness to keep her, agrees to her strict 
stipulations:  
 
 RUTH: How many rooms would this flat have? 
 LENNY: Not many. 
 RUTH: I would want at least three rooms and a bathroom. 
 LENNY: You wouldn’t need three rooms and a bathroom. 
 MAX: She’d need a bathroom. 
 LENNY: But not three rooms 
 Pause. 
 RUTH: Oh, I would. Really. 
 LENNY: Two would do. 
 RUTH: No. Two wouldn’t be enough. 
 Pause. 
 I’d want a dressing-room, a rest-room, and a bedroom. 
 Pause. 
 LENNY: All right, we’ll get you a flat with three rooms and a bathroom.318 
 
Perhaps the reason why Lenny became a pimp was due to his awareness, on some 
half-conscious level, that he did not possess the usual, patriarchal conviction that he 
had the power to dominate sexually, and so material dominance rescued him from 
being completely impotent and powerless in the sexual sphere. Whatever the case 
may be, the notion of contracted sexual relations must have a particular resonance for 
Lenny, given that all signifying positions, including sexual roles, seem to him to be 
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matters of convention that you can ‘take’, but then ‘what are you going to do with it?’ 
In Lenny’s case, the answer would be: ‘not very much’, but at least his role as pimp 
secures him a means of keeping flirtatious women somewhat under his control, unlike 
how it was with Jessie, who must have, at times, inadvertently abandoned Lenny to 
pursue her liaisons. Of course, Ruth intuitively understands Lenny’s underlying 
phantasies which is why playing both mother and whore allows her to secure a 
contract from him that keeps her content, as she knows he secretly wants a mother 
figure. His capitulation to her terms at the end of the play is therefore by no means 
insignificant.         
          The final brother to be discussed (the ‘philosopher’ of the family) is, in many 
respects, the bearer of the heaviest Oedipal burden. In his account of Teddy’s notable 
‘paralysis’ of will, Silverstein produces a charge sheet that underscores how 
ineffectual Teddy is: 
 
His repeated attempts to withdraw from philosophical argument with Lenny; 
his comically ineffectual theft of Lenny’s cheese-roll as a substitute for 
direct verbal or physical confrontation; his virtual refusal to intervene in the 
family’s ‘assimilation’ of Ruth–all of these examples, suggesting a kind of 
linguistic paralysis, serve to remind us that, like his brothers, Teddy remains 
trapped in an Oedipal crisis that disqualifies him from fully acceding to the 
symbolic.319  
 
Silverstein is by no means exaggerating Teddy’s inability to take decisive action. A 
particularly cringing example of his ‘impotency’ is when he declares to his wife that it 
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is perfectly acceptable for Ruth to remain as a ‘guest’, which is his euphemism for a 
prostitute: 
 
Ruth…the family have wanted you to stay, for a little while longer. As a… 
as a kind of guest. If you like the idea I don’t mind. We can manage very 
easily at home…until you come back.320 
 
This passage exemplifies a pitiful example of a man trying, as best as he can, to keep 
a stiff upper lip in a situation that warrants some kind of demonstration that he loves 
his wife, and wishes to protect her from what would ordinarily constitute an 
unenviable fate. Teddy cannot, of course, muster such emotion, essentially because he 
worships his ‘intellectual equilibrium’ more than anything else. In the following 
passage, one can see that he tries to cope with an escalating call for action by uttering 
a hymn song to detachment: 
 
You wouldn’t understand my works. You wouldn’t have the faintest idea of 
what they were about. You wouldn’t appreciate the points of reference. You’re 
way behind. All of you. There’s no point in me sending you my works. You’d 
be lost. It’s nothing to do with intelligence. It’s a way of being able to look at 
the world. It’s a question of how far you can operate on things and not in 
things. I mean it’s a question of your capacity to ally the two, to relate the two, 
to balance the two. To see, to be able to see! I’m the one who can see. That’s 
why I can write my critical works. Might do you good…have a look at 
them…see how certain people can view…things…how certain people can 
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maintain…intellectual equilibrium. Intellectual equilibrium. You’re just 
objects. You just…move about. I can observe it. I can see what you do. It’s the 
same as I do. But you’re lost in it. You won’t get me being…I won’t be lost in 
it.321 
 
Ostensibly, this speech, verging on a sermon, is about the importance of achieving a 
degree of detachment, as only then can insights be achieved: ‘To see, to be able to 
see! I’m the one who can see.’ Nevertheless, Teddy’s speech reveals many of his 
deep-seated anxieties and phantasies, which make him such a cold and ineffectual 
man. For example, his belief in the sovereignty of his own critical reasoning powers is 
predicated upon the virtues of ‘acting on things’, where ‘things’ betrays the appeal of 
treating the world as some sort of mechanism, with him as the ‘enlightened’ operator. 
In fact, Teddy’s repeated use of the word ‘lost’ implies that, if he did not stand against 
the world in his supposedly dignified and detached manner, he would be annihilated 
by his merger with an inert and ultimately senseless form of existence. Yet not to be 
‘lost’ in this fashion may rescue his fragile subjectivity from its forever possible 
descent into a mere ‘object’, but it comes with a costly existential price: both decisive 
action and the vicissitudes of love are based upon an investment in people and in 
situations, and thus they require, if not demand, commitment as opposed to 
detachment.        
 Silverstein provides a cogent assessment of Teddy’s existential predicament 
when he remarks: 
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Teddy remains trapped between a dependence on Ruth and the paralytic 
detachment that prevents him achieving ‘being’ through any kind of decisive 
and empowering action. His ineffectual attempt to woo Ruth away from the 
family with the promise that ‘you can help me with my lectures when we get 
back. I would love that’ encapsulates this lack of ‘being’. Hardly an 
attractive proposition from Ruth’s perspective, Teddy’s offer denies her 
status as an independent entity, while assimilating her as a constitutive 
element of his self. Paradoxically, however, Teddy’s denial of Ruth’s human 
(as opposed to sexual) difference grants her considerable power by defining 
her as the agent who will transform his lack into plenitude. 322   
  
I believe that the play, coupled with some insights from Lacanian theory, provides a 
means of understanding why Teddy has become so ineffectual, as well as so clinically 
detached from life. Perhaps the most telling remark in relation to this is Sam’s 
comment that Teddy, out of all of the sons, was Jessie’s favourite. One can therefore 
surmise that Teddy keenly felt, even more than the other two, the original bliss of 
merger with the mother, but, at the same time, this symbiotic relationship would be 
punctuated by moments of rupture, which would be experienced particularly 
intensely. Now, since Max never did become, in any consistent and sustained way, the 
phallic object for Jessie, these moments of rupture became distressing intimations of 
nothingness, a ‘void’ at the centre of Teddy’s ‘being’. This is because ordinarily the 
father, as phallic object, acts as an existential ‘crutch’, as a symbolic identification 
with the paternal provides a means of becoming ‘resourceful’; indeed, the child need 
no longer feel impotent when the mother disappears from his view, as he can become 
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the fascinating object of the (m)Other’s desire. In Teddy’s case, however, since he 
was, for an inordinate period of time, his mother’s phallic object, he is left with an 
unenviable existential legacy: he either possesses, according to his phantasy, 
omnipotent control over his mother, or his mother leaves a conspicuous gap in his 
being that he feels powerless to remedy. 
 It is worthwhile to elaborate further upon two of the important implications 
of Teddy’s profound ‘lack’ at the heart of his ‘being’. Firstly, Teddy’s fetishizing of 
reason and of detachment can be explained by his attempt to continue, albeit in a 
modified form, his phantasy of omnipotence. Given that he originally held the status 
of phallic object, it is natural for him to assume that, in as far as a solution can be 
found, it resides within. Indeed, the reasons why he compulsively worships his ability 
to conceptualise are as follows: a) thinking can be a means to schematize the world in 
the interests of manipulation (i.e., acting ‘on’ things); b) thinking, particularly of the 
most abstract kind, can provide an exultant sense of control, as it deceives the thinker 
into believing that he need never be ‘lost’, since his map defies the potentially 
disruptive power of contingency (to paraphrase Teddy, with such a map, ‘the structure 
isn’t affected’); and c) abstractive ‘truth’ acts as a buffer, as it is a form of mediation 
that precludes Teddy from slipping into the otherwise engulfing realm of the Real. In 
truth, however, in spite of the above reasons, his ‘philosophical’ attitude is still 
ultimately a sign of impotence, as Teddy is unable to fully accede to the Symbolic 
realm, where he would have been able to articulate his desires and feelings through 
the medium of concrete and expressive language. Instead, as far as Pinter is 
concerned, he is trapped in the alienating and depotentiating discourse of the 
academician, who, as Ruth intimated, exists in the dry and static world of the ‘desert’. 
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 Secondly, the rent in Teddy’s ‘being’ also accounts for his otherwise 
inexplicable concessionary behaviour towards his ogre-like family. Although Teddy 
desperately needs Ruth to fill the lack in his ‘being’, he is nevertheless quite incapable 
of considering his wife as an autonomous person. Indeed, it is this narcissism, born 
out of his original status as Jessie’s phallic object, which prevents him from 
attempting, in any shape or form, some kind of rescuing of Ruth, because, for Teddy, 
women belong to him as an extension of himself. In other words, Teddy’s attitude 
towards Ruth betrays much pain, but even greater perplexity, as he never once in the 
play was able to understand that his wife might have needs that do not coincide with 
his own, and therefore he is unable to make any sort of plea that speaks to Ruth’s 
deepest and most abiding wishes. On the contrary, it is Ruth who makes a plea, 
dressed as a cliché, when she says, as Teddy leaves, ‘Don’t become a stranger’323, as 
she understands that, with her assertion of her own needs, her husband now sees her 
as a defamiliarized object that he can no longer operate ‘on’. 
     IV 
In his study of masculinity, David Buchbinder explains what is meant by the term 
‘symbolic patriarchy’: 
 
A symbolic patriarchy is a social structure or community within which 
power is dispersed among the male subjects. Such power is not necessarily 
vested self-evidently and officially in a single male individual, although 
often, of course, we do find men heading large organizations and 
corporations as well as governments.324 
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Buchbinder’s description draws attention to the fact that a symbolic patriarchy, in 
contrast to a formal one, does not posit a patriarch, whose position is secure, and 
whose power is absolute. He offers the following qualification: 
 
Rather than see masculine power as something owned by individual males it is 
more productive to think of such power as something held out as promised to 
men, and as always only provisionally held by individual males.325   
 
What Buchbinder is essentially describing here is a distinction between inflexible 
structure and mobile individual position. He refines this distinction when he explains 
the differences between the patriarchal order and the patriarchal economy:  
 
The first of these [the patriarchal order] is a social and conceptual structure 
that is capable of adapting to current social, economic, and cultural conditions. 
As a structure, therefore, patriarchy organizes sexual and social identity both 
differentially and preferentially. It thus produces gendered subjectivity within 
an order of rank and precedence that establishes not only the privileging of 
men over women, but also some men over others, on such grounds as race, 
social class, physique, or sexual orientation. 
The second aspect of patriarchy concerns the ways in which the patriarchal 
order generates and distributes the flows of power within both social and 
institutional organizations. This we may call the patriarchal economy. Its 
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connection to the patriarchal order is so close that one defines the other, such 
that they operate complementarily and synchronously.326  
 
 When one considers the patriarchal order, it is clear, from the term 
‘patriarchy’ itself, that the symbolic and social space par excellence that preserves this 
order is the institution known as the family. From a psycho-political point of view, 
what lends the family institution its privileged position as ‘enforcer’ of the patriarchal 
order is that the interlocking symbolic relationships provide a means for the male 
organ to be equated with the potential to acquire and hold phallic power: 
 
Instead of considering the penis as an absolute guarantee of masculine power, 
let us think of the actual, fleshy penis as a kind of promissory note to its 
possessor, or like the lottery ticket that admits the possessor of a penis to the 
chance of winning millions of dollars, but does not guarantee that success. The 
possession of a penis is simply a necessary precondition to the accrual of 
power under a patriarchal order. Power itself is actually vested elsewhere, in a 
symbol called the phallus.327 
 
Of course, phallic power is not a biological given, but, from a psychoanalytical 
perspective, a fusion of phantasy with a contingent social order. Lacanian theory, as 
we have noted, describes the relationship between the familial patriarchal order and 
the familial patriarchal economy quite well. Regarding the former, the family is based 
upon the father possessing power and authority (his word, in a literal sense, is law); in 
particular, the male child (the patriarch-to-be) construes his father’s power as a form 
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of ‘fascination’, in the sense that he exerts a magnetic attraction upon mother’s desire. 
Since the child is learning that he cannot exert complete and unqualified control over 
his mother, this recognition of someone, ostensibly similar to himself, possessing such 
power is not unwelcome. Yet this case of triangulated desire is predicated upon father 
being dominant and mother being subordinate, and so these phantasies represent a 
consolidation of the patriarchal order itself.  Indeed, as long as the symbolic 
relationships are based upon male=plenitude=power and female= lack= subordination 
then, to paraphrase Teddy, the structure is not affected. All that we have instead is a 
patriarchal economy, where sons traditionally supplant fathers as head of households, 
and women are exchanged between father and husband. 
 In terms of the psycho-political significance of Pinter’s play, Family Voices, 
as we have noted, the father’s absence, in the emotional sense, created, in the son, a 
‘negative father’ complex. Indeed, since Family Voices could, in one sense, be retitled 
Lost Sons/Absent Fathers (as it is about the reasons for a rupture in the patriarchal 
order) no character, male or female, is therefore able to accede to the symbolic role of 
Father, and thus no character possesses any authority. This is for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, the son (Voice 1) has no past or present male role model that can define, in the 
Name-of-the-Father, what constitutes the ‘law’ of being a man; couple this with Voice 
1’s almost incestuous attachment to his mother, and we have the predicament of a 
young man unable to gain independence from the Desire-of-the-Mother, as he can 
find no definition of phallic power that he can ‘acquire’, which would grant him 
authority over a symbolic substitute for his mother. This scenario inevitably 
constitutes a regressive return to the family home, and to childish dependence. 
 Secondly, Riley defines another kind of ‘lost son’, according to Pinter, as he 
exemplifies the torturous manoeuvring of a homosexual in a heterosexual, patriarchal 
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order. More fully, although Riley may be a policeman, and therefore an upholder of 
patriarchal law, he cannot be the Symbolic Father, as he lacks the typical 
ideologically-defined criteria: the ability to marry a woman and produce children, 
which perpetuates the patriarchal order. Since he is also apparently treated as a pariah 
by women, then his only hope of constructing a family is by constructing a sort of 
homosocial order predicated upon intergenerational homosexual desire i.e., older men 
linking up with ‘slender lads’. This is indeed a variant of incestuous maternal desire. 
 Finally, the emotionally absent fathers, Dad and Mr Withers, were unable to 
connect with their ‘sons’ and ‘initiate’ them into manhood, either because they 
allowed them to become too close to their mothers, or they could not articulate in any 
clear and coherent fashion, what it is to ‘graduate’ into becoming a man. In both 
cases, where the difficulty lies is that these two men are emasculated men, who live 
(or lived) their lives either without any attempt or ability to educate their son. Indeed, 
what goes forever unsaid, or what remains obscure and incoherent, still has the same 
disabling effect: lost sons cannot accede to the only position of authority and of 
relative independence that the patriarchal order confers: to become the Symbolic 
Father and acquire the ideological markers of phallic power. 
 Moving now onto The Homecoming, this does not so much focus on the 
‘hole’ in the patriarchal order that is caused by lost sons/emasculated fathers; rather, it 
makes a related point, as it highlights, through a defamiliarizing sequence of events in 
the patriarchal economy, the overall intransigence of the patriarchal order, since it is 
the mother-figure that accedes to the role of patriarch as matriarch. More fully, as we 
have noted, all three of Max’s sons were, to varying degrees, unable to proceed to 
being completely situated in the Symbolic realm, and consequently, they lacked that 
deep and abiding conviction in their own dominance and authority (or, to put it 
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alternatively, they lacked phallic power). When Ruth arrives, she instinctively 
recognises both the maternal and paternal deficit in the family, and she exploits this 
singular situation to her benefit. What she understands is that, if she assumes the form 
of an ambiguous mother/whore figure, then she can rise to the status of matriarch in 
this family, as the two ‘castrated’ sons have a compulsive need to assume 
proprietorship over their ‘mother,’ but they lack any ability to assert themselves 
through sustained and domineering action; in other words, providing that Ruth 
submits to their sexual needs and need for intimacy, she can ‘call the shots’ in other 
respects, as she intuits their underlying helplessness.        
 Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to believe that this ascension to 
matriarch constitutes some kind of transgressive assertion of ‘female power’. Rather, 
Ruth’s ‘promotion’ to matriarch is, in essence, a ‘move’ in the patriarchal economy 
that still preserves the patriarchal order. Silverstein explains why: 
 
Ruth effectively disables and reconstitutes the patriarchal family, but, in 
what amounts to the play’s supreme irony, she can only achieve her victory 
through the exercise of phallic power: the power to castrate and the power to 
fascinate…Her empowerment disrupts the patriarchal ideology that equates 
the ‘masculine’ and the phallus, while, at the same time, her own mimicry 
and appropriation of the Father’s’ hallucinatory attributes’ secure the status 
of the phallus as the master signifier of cultural power. Rather than a victory 
over phallic power, the reconfiguration of the family as a matriarchal unit 
provides a new and stronger channel for that power than did the attenuated 
patriarchal unit over which Max presided…To put this another way: it is not 
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the mother, but the symbolic father who makes the homecoming that gives 
the play its title.328 
 
It may seem quite a stretch to equate Ruth with the symbolic father position, but there 
are several key indicators that this is so: these centre upon her aggressive sexuality 
(her threat (promise?) to ‘take’ Lenny), her word being taken as law, and her use of 
her body as an object of fascination that ‘performs’ with the intent of seizing their 
attention. In short, Ruth acts as a signifier for dominant activity, whether it be sexual 
assertion, or declarative discourse. 
 One final qualification should be made in this discussion, though. It is 
difficult to forget that, at the conclusion of this play, Ruth agrees to go to Greek Street 
to become a prostitute for the material benefit of the family. Pinter himself does not 
see this pact as binding, nor does he view it as a limitation on the kind of freedom that 
she possesses: 
 
She does not become a harlot. At the end of the play she’s in possession of a 
certain kind of freedom. She can do what she wants, and it is not at all certain 
that she will go to Greek Street. But even if she did, she would not be a harlot 
in her mind.329   
  
Pinter’s remark that Ruth is in ‘possession of a certain kind of freedom’ may seem 
puzzling, as a prostitute is often depicted as the epitome of objectification of women, 
since they are reduced to an object of trade. What must be kept in mind, however, is 
that, whilst Ruth is objectified as a woman, the freedom she possesses is of the 
                                                 
328 Silverstein, p.106. 
329 Pinter, interview with William Packard, First Stage, 6 no.2 (1967), pp.79-85 (p.82). 
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unusual kind, as she holds the symbolic position of Father in the family. 
Consequently, if Ruth decided to not become a harlot, then she could exercise her 
phallic power to withdraw from the pact, and so Pinter is quite right that it is by no 
means certain that she would go to Greek Street. In fact, it is clear, as the curtain 
comes down, that this family are so dependent on her in an emotional sense that they 
would do anything to prevent her becoming a ‘stranger’ again.  
Conclusion 
Let me now briefly summarise the general conclusions of this chapter. I intimated in 
my introduction that Pinter is primarily concerned with the family as the primary 
supporter of what can be termed the patriarchal order. This thematic foundation must 
be kept in mind in any summary of how these plays explore the psycho-political study 
of family structures. 
 Considering the first play, Family Voices, Pinter foregrounds the painful 
predicament of the ‘lost’ son who has been burdened with an emotionally ‘absent’ 
father. More fully, what Pinter intimates is this: without an emotionally ‘present’ 
father, the son is faced with a world whose paternal law is scribbled incoherently, and 
so he cannot succeed to the role of the Symbolic Father, since he knows not how to 
become a man. In such circumstances, the son must, like Voice 1, return to the 
expectant and longing arms of mother. There is, Pinter intimates, no other ‘place’ for 
him to go, as independence from the maternal dyad, in a patriarchal order, is 
predicated upon father ‘modelling’ manhood. Overall, the insidious ‘sovereignty’ of 
the patriarchal order is affirmed, as the son’s fate is poised between the only two 
possibilities that this ideological structure permits: either possess the symbolic 
representative of the phallus, and achieve power, or lapse into powerless dependency. 
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 In terms of The Homecoming, this focuses on the patriarchal order as well, 
but, in this play, the particular emphasis is on the role of the Symbolic Father, and on 
women’s subjection within this order. More fully, Pinter uses the dramatic situation to 
illustrate the following fundamental aspect of the patriarchal order, with its inherent 
power relations: Ruth’s almost transgressive succession to the role of patriarch-as-
matriarch underscores that women are usually subjected to the disempowered position 
of wife/mother. Pinter intimates that this disempowered role is due to the patriarchal 
order channelling the ‘economy’ of desire in such a fashion that the mother acts as a 
‘signpost’ for where the real power and authority is to be found: in the possession of 
the ‘phallic’ father. In this particular case, however, Ruth is able to subvert the usual 
‘flow’ of the patriarchal economy, as none of the ‘unholy’ trinity of sons had resolved 
their Oedipal conflicts, and the father’s word was never taken as law. Still, even with 
these evident ‘fault-lines’ that are open to manipulation, Ruth does not and cannot 
affect the patriarchal structure: at the end of the play, the ‘sovereignty’ of the 
patriarchal order is nevertheless confirmed, because, as Teddy might say, ‘The 
structure wasn’t affected’.                
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Chapter 5: ‘The Scum or the Essence?’- A Summing Up 
In Pinter’s only novel, The Dwarfs, the character Len asks, during a pseudo-
philosophical conversation about identity, whether he has known ‘the scum or the 
essence?’330 In this final chapter of the thesis, I must humbly declare that what I have 
examined of Pinter’s work neither constitutes the ‘essence’ of his oeuvre, nor has it 
(thankfully) descended into mere rhetorical posturing that reveals nothing about some 
of his most central themes and obsessions. 
 I have divided my concluding chapter into two sections for ease of reading. 
First of all, I explain in the initial section how the general Pinteresque psycho-political 
relationship assumes the form of an ‘I-It’ relation i.e., self against others; after this, I 
append a summary of how chapter themes of this thesis can be shown to be related to 
one another, primarily because they involve at some level some kind of ‘I-It’ division. 
Secondly, I offer two possible critiques of Pinter’s psycho-political position, which 
contest his central premise: that it is the case that psychological ‘realities’ support 
from the ‘inside-out’ oppressive power relations. More specifically, the social 
materialist position, as represented by commentators such as David Smail, would 
argue that there are such entities as psychological realities, but they are entirely 
manipulated and therefore shaped by outside forces; he would not, in other words, 
agree with Pinter’s ‘depth’ psychology, which suggests that power relations are 
supported by not ‘mere’ motivations (what Smail terms as ‘interests’), but primarily 
by psychological defences and phantasies. As for the other counter-argument that I 
provide, this assumes a constructivist bent, which posits that there is no private, 
‘inner’ realm, but, in truth, what we know and feel are social constructions masked as 
psychological ‘realities’.  
                                                 
330 Pinter, The Dwarfs, rev. edn (London: Faber, 1992), p.152. 
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      I      
The ‘I’ versus the ‘It’ 
Writing about one of the two primary orientations towards the world, Martin Buber 
describes how the ‘I-It’ relation is premised upon a utilitarian attitude: 
 
The primary relation of man to the world of It is comprised in experiencing, 
which continually reconstitutes the world, and using, which leads the world 
to its manifold aim, the sustaining, relieving, and equipping of human life. In 
proportion to the growing extent of the world of It, ability to experience and 
use it must also grow.331 
 
For Buber, the ‘I-It’ relation involves the objectification of the world (a division into 
subject vs object), and therefore it inherently requires the self-division of the 
‘imperial’ knowing subject, as recognition of the other’s subjectivity and of possible 
commonality is the beginning of an ‘I-Thou’ relationship; thus Buber asserts, ‘The 
primary word ‘I-It’ can never be spoken with the whole being’.332 Furthermore, Buber 
contends that, since the ‘I-It’ orientation requires the other to be used, the other is 
only considered in terms of their general properties (writing about the ‘I-Thou’ he 
suggests that, in this case, ‘I have been seized by the power of exclusiveness’333), 
which means that the ‘I’ treats the other according to past categorizations: 
 
The ‘I’ of the primary word ‘I-It’, that is, the ‘I’ faced by no ‘Thou’, but 
surrounded by a multitude of contents has no present, only the past. Put it 
                                                 
331 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), p.36. 
332 Buber, p.11. 
333 Buber, p.14. 
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another way, in as far as man rests satisfied with the things that he 
experiences and uses he lives in the past, and his relationship has no present 
content. He has nothing but objects.334      
 
 It is not difficult to appreciate that Pinter’s characters, with a few notable 
exceptions, relate to one another in an ‘I-It’ fashion. The most comprehensive reason 
for why this is so is that he is a psycho-political writer, who explored, in his works, 
the psychological factors, which support oppressive power relations. More fully, 
oppressive power relations by definition require the dehumanization, and therefore the 
objectification of oppressed groups; furthermore, and less obviously, these power 
relationships are based on the use of projection, which involves supposedly 
unwholesome characteristics being attributed to those considered to be ‘less’ than 
them. Unsurprisingly, such ‘I-It’ power relations require the presence of self-division 
within the objectifying group. 
 In terms of how the ‘I-It’ manifests itself in relation to the three main themes 
of this thesis, firstly, an authoritarian character, such as Nicholas, treats dissidents 
with nothing but contempt, as they embody, as ‘It’, his underlying powerlessness that 
is the Janus-faced partner to his doubt-free faith in his ideals; indeed, the dissident 
becomes a repository of his profound doubt about the absolute veracity of his ideals, 
and they also embody his deep-seated sense of isolation from the world. In addition, 
the authoritarian’s body ‘armour’ is a means of maintaining a literal boundary 
between that which is oneself and those who are objectified, due to them ‘containing’ 
projected ‘material’, as ‘pathogenic’. 
                                                 
334 Buber, p.18. 
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 Secondly, the territorial imperative, as Pinter conceives it, is premised upon 
the erection of rigid boundaries, as the home is construed as part of the self, whilst  
that which is external is deemed as ‘other’ or ‘It’; as the extensive readings in chapter 
three illustrate, this leads to various forms of self-alienation as Buber might have 
predicted. Another feature of the territorial imperative that links with this idea of ‘I-It’ 
is that the pathological transitional space, with its extensive use of phantasy, requires 
that their homes are treated as mere objects that satisfy the individual’s deficiency 
needs. Consequently, their acquisitive mentality means they do not so much relate to 
their rooms, but rather master them. One of the important and tragic implications of 
this is that they also try to do this to anyone else living in their rooms, such that no 
bond between them can be formed, or at least developed. 
 Finally, the family, with its patriarchal order, is an objectifying structure par 
excellence, as the parents are construed in a phallocentric, and therefore objectifying 
manner i.e., the mother is an embodiment of ‘lack’ and the father is the possessor of 
that which represents plenitude and guarantees power. Since the patriarchal order 
assigns clearly demarcated roles that are never subverted by the patriarchal economy 
(even Ruth is patriarch-as-matriarch), family members are stereotyped and therefore 
objectified.   
Authoritarianism and Patriarchy: The Fatherland 
In her writings, the Chilean feminist Julieta Kirkwood described the family as an 
authoritarian structure: 
 
Today it is more evident to many sectors that authoritarianism is more than a 
political problem, that it has roots and causes in all of the social structures, 
and that one must question and not reject many elements and contents that 
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were previously considered ‘political’ because they are attributed to day-to-
day private life. Today people have begun saying that the family and the 
socialization of children are authoritarian.335 
 
In light of Kirkwood’s positing of the family as an authoritarian structure, it is worth 
examining this supposed connection between the two, because, just as it is important 
to not conflate them on a theoretical level, it is equally important not to do this when 
reviewing Pinter’s work. In my view, there are several ways that Pinter relates the two 
structures without overly identifying them. Firstly, and most obviously, he portrays in 
plays like Party Time how authoritarian societies assign women to the domestic 
sphere, where they can ‘serve’ their husbands, and act as a ‘buffer’ that defends them 
from ‘impure’ influences. Overall, this social structure is as patriarchal as much as it 
is authoritarian, as it is based upon dichotomous schematization, which is a trademark 
of the authoritarian personality; furthermore, assigning women to the domestic sphere 
means that men become patriarchs, as they are ‘masters’ of the outside world as much 
as they are in their own home. 
 Secondly, whilst state officials like Nicholas consider their rulers as father 
figures, father substitutes such as even Ruth behave as though they are the legislating 
force in the family (i.e., in the Name-of-the-Father). Evidently, there is a 
correspondence between the two, according to Pinter, which is a viewpoint also 
supported by certain psychoanalytical schools of thought: in Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
for example, the father as Symbolic Father possesses that which signifies power, and 
this means that he is the authority, if not quite the authoritarian, in the family. Indeed, 
Pinter’s plays suggest a way to maintain a certain distinction between the two (even if 
                                                 
335 Julieta Kirkwood, qtd in Sonia E. Alvarez’s, Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women’s 
Movements in Transition Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.7.   
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it cannot be enforced to a great degree), as his works imply that authoritarians are not 
simply the product of the usual Oedipal resolution; rather, like Nicholas, their Oedipal 
submission to the status quo is compounded by an earlier fault-line at the time that 
delusions of omnipotence are ordinarily resolved. This implies that these ‘fatherland’ 
figures do not only require the Oedipal-based promise of power, but they also need 
the ontological stability that comes from being able to identify with a stable, inflexible 
worldview. 
 Finally, Pinter typically depicts the family in terms of smothering mothers 
and non-nurturing fathers. One of the important implications of this is that neither 
parent is able to help the individual achieve any kind of independence and 
individuality; in fact, unless the individual regresses to maternal dependency, he 
cannot exist without some ‘direction’, which therefore makes him more susceptible to 
following the guidance of some kind of authoritarian institution as a substitute.     
Patriarchy and Territory: The Intruder as Familiar Stranger 
Jane Wong Yeang Chui describes the concept of the ‘intruder’ as being one that 
ordinarily possesses a negative connotation: 
 
The term ‘intrude’ implies negative connotations, and ‘intruders’ in Pinter’s 
plays are ascribed a set of qualities that are contingent on social stereotypes: 
they are base, obnoxious, deceptive, scheming, and they bear ill intentions. 
These ideas of the intruders create a dichotomy that distinguishes victim and 
victimizer, which leads to interpretations of the stranger-intruder as a 
necessarily oppressive figure.336  
 
                                                 
336 Jane Wong Yeang Chui, Affirming the Absurd in Harold Pinter (New York: Palgrave, 2013), p.7. 
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The main point Chui makes is a straightforward one: by definition intruders are 
unwelcome, and they act as oppressors, because, at the very least, their presence is an 
imposition upon those who own that piece of territory. But Chui also makes a more 
subtle point, which is that it would be a mistake to construe the ‘Pinter’ intruder as 
exclusively an oppressive force. More fully, what we see time and again in a Pinter 
play is that he depicts intruders as ‘familiar strangers’, who ‘carry’ the burden of the 
main character’s projections, which means, in essence, that their crossing the 
threshold implies the ‘disowned’ moving into the realm of the ‘owned’. 
Consequently, from a psychological point of view, these ‘intruders’ are oppressors in 
as far as they are tangible reminders of a character’s self-alienation, which was caused 
by their bad faith (i.e., self-deception). They are, in short, reminders of that which 
they have taken pains not to remember i.e., they are embodiments of the return of the 
repressed (for example, even in the case of Stanley’s encounter with Goldberg and 
McCann, these persecutory emissaries are also oppressors in the above sense, as they 
represent to some extent Stanley’s disowned social conscience). 
 More generally, this motif of the ‘familiar stranger’ often appears in Pinter’s 
room plays for a very specific psycho-political reason: irrespective of the particular 
play, if the work explores the themes of the ‘territorial imperative’ and/or that of 
patriarchal dominance, then the notion of the ‘intruder’, the ‘familiar stranger’ is the 
form that the ‘I-It’ power relation manifests itself. This is because those who protect 
their territory assume a domineering attitude towards their intruders (and I use the 
word ‘their’ advisedly), as they try to master or conquer the embodiment of that 
which they have sought to keep repressed. Indeed, this domineering style (turning the 
world, in the words of Edward, into a ‘hunting ground’337) is symptomatic of a 
                                                 
337 A Slight Ache, p.167. 
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patriarchal worldview that believes it must make the Other submit, even if that Other 
is a misrecognised Other i.e., an embodiment of their own alienated self. 
Authoritarianism and Territoriality: Body armour 
The authoritarian, as Pinter has depicted him, is, in his very being, a divisive man: he 
must see the world as divided into ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’. 
Furthermore, on a literal and territorial level, he must also divide the world according 
to his projections, which means that he defends himself against being ‘infiltrated’ by 
using whatever represents his embodied boundaries (i.e., usually his body, but, in a 
hyper-inflated fashion, it can also encompass his country). In the play Party Time, this 
inter-relationship between the autocratic personality and territoriality is foregrounded 
the most with the idea of a ‘body armour’, as it was noted that those in power 
‘contain’ themselves from those that are oppressed not only out of concern for safety, 
but also due to their belief in their own moral superiority. In general, the defence of 
territory serves as a means of preventing being ‘contaminated’, which is what one 
would expect from groups that use projection as their main psychological defence.   
     II 
Pushed from Within or Pulled from Without: A Question of ‘Proximity’ 
One of the central axioms of David Smail’s social materialist theory of mental distress 
concerns the importance of distal powers in shaping human conduct: 
 
The societal operation of power and interest is immeasurably more 
important in understanding human conduct than are the components of 
personal ‘psychology’.338 
 
                                                 
338 David Smail, Power, Interest and Psychology: Elements of a Social Materialist Understanding of 
Distress, 2nd edn (Monmouth: PCCS, 2007), p.21. 
 291 
Smail expands upon this point when he describes his two key theoretical concepts: 
power and interest: 
 
The person exists as an embodied being in a material environment that is 
structured physically and (more important for our purposes) socially. The 
principal dynamic of social structure is power, which is transmitted through 
interest. The most powerful influences that end up impinging upon the 
individual tend to be those furthest from him/her i.e., economic, political and 
cultural power. These are mediated by lesser powers closer to the individual, 
ultimately via other individuals encountered in families, social groups, 
workplaces etc.339    
 
Firstly, Smail argues that distal power relations shape more proximate power 
structures, such that the latter, more ‘visible’ form of power is only but an 
intermediary. Consequently, since traditional psychology’s emphasises the inner 
world of motivation, will and phantasy as the basis of human conduct, it is 
(unwittingly) complicit in an ideological distortion of material reality: 
 
Far from helping people understand how their conduct is construed by the 
actions of powers well beyond their ken, psychology focuses them instead 
on an ‘inner world’ of ideality that doesn’t even escape the confines of their 
own skulls.340  
 
                                                 
339 Smail, p.26. 
340 Smail, p.32. 
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 Secondly, due to Smail’s conviction that it is outside forces that shape 
human conduct, he suggests that the central psychological concept of drive must be 
radically revised as the manipulation of interest: 
 
The crucial theoretical point I’m trying to make is that by conceiving of 
‘drives’ as ‘interests’ we turn traditional psychology inside out, so that rather 
than seeing individuals as pushed from within by various urges and desires 
for which, ultimately, they are personally responsible, they are pulled from 
without, by the social manipulation of, in the last analysis, inescapable 
biological features of being human.341  
 
 Smail’s social materialist understanding of power relations (in particular the 
relationship between power structures and biological needs) is certainly ideologically 
opposed to the worldview of Pinter’s poetic realism/psycho-political drama. This is 
mainly because Pinter’s drama implies that biological needs manifested as 
psychological phantasies and motivations (the ‘inner’ world) support and shape power 
structures (the ‘outer’ world). Unlike Smail, Pinter adheres to a metaphysics of depth, 
as he construes oppressive power relationships to be (at least partly) symptomatic of 
an underlying psychopathology in the body politic. 
 It is not relevant to the present discussion to determine which one (if any) is 
correct. Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider what potential weaknesses Smail’s 
position uncovers in Pinter’s psycho-political understanding of power. In general, 
Pinter’s emphasis on the inner world implies that any power structures that he 
explores have to be proximate, ‘visible’ relations; indeed, Pinter’s room-based drama, 
                                                 
341 Smail, p.35. 
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with its hothouse bed of ‘intimacy’, precludes any extensive examination of distal 
powers. If Smail’s top-down model happens to be correct about how power is 
organised, then this would therefore mean that Pinter’s inability to portray distal 
powers implies that he is unable to not only provide any idea of what supports the 
oppressive power relations, but he also fails to supply a coherent sense of how 
people’s interests are manipulated by those distal powers. These omissions indeed 
provide one explanation for Pinter’s political pessimism, as the underlying causal 
factors would be obscured by his ideological position. 
The ‘Myth’ of the Inner-outer         
Smail’s social materialist understanding of power is still premised upon the idea 
(some might say the myth) of an inner, private reality in relationship with a 
‘moulding’ outer world. This philosophical position was, however, subject to 
extensive critique in the twentieth century, most notably by the Austrian philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Although his arguments are involved, and are not particularly 
relevant to our discussion here, one of his rebuttals of the ‘myth’ of the inner-outer 
takes the form of critiquing the ‘transport’ model of human communication i.e., the 
theory that language acts as a public carrier of meaning, which is then ‘unpacked’ by 
the recipient in his private inner world. Godfrey Vesey provides the following 
Wittgensteinian riposte to this view, which asserts that the ‘transport’ model leads to 
scepticism about meaning: 
 
It is not difficult to see what are the implications of the ‘transporting ideas’ 
model of linguistic communication. If, as the advocates of the theory hold, 
ideas and thoughts are ‘inner’ and ‘private’, then how can a speaker and a 
hearer, a writer and a reader, ever know that the ideas and thoughts that are 
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evoked by an utterance are the same as the ideas and thoughts expressed by it? 
According to the theory, one is never in a position to compare them. One 
cannot see into another’s mind.342    
 
According to Wittgenstein, such deconstructions of the idea of the ‘inner-outer’ 
proves that language does not ‘carry’ meaning, but rather that it is an expression of 
otherwise non-linguistic behavioural responses. One of the most important 
implications of this viewpoint is therefore that our conduct is only meaningful in as 
far as it is expressible in the form of societal constructions: there cannot be an 
unmediated biological (i.e., private) realm that shapes and is shaped by society. 
 Clearly, Pinter’s poetic drama relies upon the ‘transport’ theory, as his 
positing of an unconscious means that all communication is the carrier of 
overdetermined meaning–in fact, this accounts for Pinter’s rich use of subtextual 
communications. Yet, assuming that the Wittgensteinian view is correct, Pinter’s 
account has the propensity to reify human conduct in as far as it manifests itself in 
certain oppressive power structures; this is because he explains oppressive power 
relations as a match for corresponding ‘underlying’ pathological inner traits. 
However, as Wittgenstein might argue, this is to overlook that our power relations, in 
as far as they are ‘disciplinary’ forms of behaviour, are social constructions through 
and through. Thus, this social constructivist understanding of power, for example, 
undermines any claim that the patriarchal order rests upon any essential foundation in 
human psychology/biology. Pinter, in contrast, seems to suggest that the patriarchal 
order reigns ‘supreme’, irrespective of even some singular shifts in the patriarchal 
economy (i.e., Ruth’s acquirement of the role of the Symbolic Father), which 
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highlights, once again, that his psycho-political perspective may be unduly 
deterministic.   
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